The Birth of the New Government of Iraq: Delayed and Lame

Introduction

In a remarkable display of public courage millions of Iraqi people voted on January 30, 2005 in favor of a democratic form of government in the first general and free elections in the history of modern Iraq.

The initial enthusiasm that accompanied the successful conclusion of the elections has gradually given way to a growing sense of frustration in the wake of endless haggling by the newly elected Iraqi politicians over the forming of the new government and its political program. [1]

The New Cabinet

Almost three months after the elections, the designated Prime Minister, Dr. Ibrahim al-Ja'fari, [2] announced on April 27 the formation of his cabinet. Ironically, the day of the announcement coincided with Saddam Hussein's birthday which, in the past, was a day of great celebrations and fanfare which is hardly the atmosphere which characterized the birth of the new government.

The day after the announcement, the prime minister presented his new government to the National Assembly for confirmation. Of the 185 members present, 180 members voted for the new government. It is noteworthy that on such a historic day when a newly democratic government was formed, 90 members of the National Assembly, or one third of the 275 members, including the outgoing Prime Minister Ayad Allawi, were absent.

The government comprises a prime minister, four deputy prime ministers and 32 ministers divided between the Iraqi National Alliance (17 posts), the Kurdish Alliance (8 posts), Sunnis (5 posts), Turkmen (1 post) and Christians (1 post). Each of the three large groups mentioned above will be assigned the post of a deputy prime minister. Mr. al-Ja'fari has remained non-committal with the regards to the fourth post of deputy prime minister. The composition of the government reflects the new reality in Iraq where religious and ethnic considerations are paramount. For the list of ministers and their affiliation, see Annex I.

Criteria for Selection of Ministers

In presenting his cabinet to the National Assembly, Dr. al-Ja'fari said that he selected the members of his cabinet based on three criteria: competence because the country was in need of Iraqi capability to push the political process forward; integrity/honesty -- because of the high level of corruption in government and, finally, national reputation and the nationalist history of the candidate.

Reflecting the new culture of democracy, al-Ja'fari said: "Welcome to every voice that has participated in the government and welcome to every voice that has not participated in the government … as long as he disagrees in a civilized way." [3]

The Reasons for the Prolonged Process

There are many reasons that may have contributed to the prolonged process in forming the new government. Some of these reasons are technical or procedural. Others have to do with substantive policy issues. On the technical side, the delay in forming the government could be attributed to the absence of experience at the political level with coalition making in a democratic parliamentary system, the inability or lack of willingness to compromise and engage in the art of give and take and the pressures to put together a national government that includes all the political and ethnic segments of the Iraqi population.

The substantive issues are profoundly difficult. They could determine the longevity and efficacy of the new Iraqi government and more importantly, the future of democracy in Iraq and the very survival of the territorial integrity of the country.

Consensus for Inclusiveness

There is a consensus among all Iraqi political forces for inclusiveness, particularly of the Sunni community which has boycotted the elections but whose participation in the new government was considered crucial both for the sake of national reconciliation and for defeating the Sunni-led insurgency in the country. However, unlike the Shi'a, the Sunnis have nothing equivalent to a marja'iya,a sort ofa central religious authority that speaks for them and guides their action. Nor is there a Sunni political party of any weight represented in the National Assembly which could negotiate on behalf of the Sunnis [the exception is Ghazi al-Yawer's party with only five seats in the National Assembly.). As a result, the Sunnis speak with multiple voices representing multiple and disparate groups, each seeking to maximize its representation in the new government. It is worrisome but not surprising, that the negotiation with the various Sunni groups has failed to reach an agreement, particularly on the candidate who would occupy the Ministry of Defense.

The Kurdish Demands

The two major Kurdish parties, the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), under Jalal Talabani and Kurdistan Democratic Party, under Mastoid Brazen, have emerged from the elections as the second largest political group in the National Assembly with 75 seats in the 275 seat National Assembly, or 27 percent of the seats. The size of the Kurdish representation in the National Assembly is far greater than their demographic weight and it was only made possible by virtue of the Sunni's boycott of the elections.

It was clear from the outset that in order for the Shi'ite dominated United Iraqi Alliance to form a government, the Kurdish vote was critical. Thus, for the first time in the history of Iraq, the Kurdish vote has become indispensable for governing the country, and there was a price to be paid to earn it:

• The election of Jalal Talabani as President of Iraq.
• The adherence to the principle of federalism in Iraq that will allow the Kurds full autonomy over their three governorates – Dehouk, Erbil, and Suleimaniya. [A new twist was recently added by the demand of three of the southern Shi'ite governorates of Basra, Nassiriya, and 'Amara for a Federation of the South. [4] ]
• The integration of the City of Kirkuk, with its vast oil reserves, into Kurdistan.
• The Shari'a, or Islamic law, should only be one of the sources of legislation in Iraq but not the only one.
• The Kurdish militia – the Peshmerge – should be part of the Iraqi armed forces and hence, should be financed by the national budget. At the same time no regular Iraqi army may enter Kurdistan without the prior approval of the Kurdish parliament.
• The reversal of the process of Arabization of Kirkuk initiated by Saddam Hussein by sending the non-original Arab residents of Kirkuk, mainly from the south, back to their old places of residence.
• The equitable, and pre-agreed, method of sharing oil revenues between the central government and the government of Kurdistan.

There were also speculations that the Kurds were dragging their feet regarding the establishment of the new government because they were suspicious of the designated prime minister's Islamist thinking and his close association with the Shi'ite religious establishment, particularly Ayatollah Ali al-Sistani. The Kurds may have also been suspicious about the prime minister's views on federalism. They may have therefore surmised that if al-Ja'fari runs into insurmountable problems in forming the new cabinet someone else who is more sympathetic to the Kurdish agenda could emerge as Prime Minister. [5]

The Sunni Demands

Throughout the negotiation process for forming the new government the Sunnis have made demands reflecting not their weight in the national assembly (17 delegates) but reflecting their demographic weight which is close to 20 percent of the population. The Sunni demands may have also reflected their political dominance in Iraq for centuries and their unwillingness to accept the new reality where the locus of power has shifted, perhaps permanently, from the Sunni minority to Shi'ite majority. Although a Sunni, Hajim al-Hassani was elected as speaker of the National Assembly and another Sunni, Sheikh Ghazi al-Yawer (the former interim president) was elected as vice-president they were quick to complain about being marginalized. A Sunni member of the National Assembly, Mish'an al-Jabbouri, told Al-Jazeera TV: "We feel betrayed. No one respects our presence in this country." [6]

The inclusion of the Sunnis of Iraq is crucial for the drafting and the final ratification of the constitution in a national referendum. It should be recalled that because of Kurdish insistence the Transitional Administrative Law (TAL ), Iraq's interim constitution, included a provision that the constitution to be drafted by the National Assembly and submitted in the referendum shall be deemed rejected if two thirds of the voters in three governorates voted against it. The intention behind this provision was to grant the three Kurdish governorates a veto power over the ratification of the constitution if it did not meet their demands. But the same weapon can be wielded by the voters in the Sunni governorates if their representatives were not sufficiently involved in the drafting of the constitution or they were not satisfied with it.

After a prolonged negotiation, the Prime Minister has allocated five cabinet positions to the Sunnis including the important Ministry of Defense, in addition to the post of a deputy prime minister.

Nevertheless, and at the very last moment, the Sunnis have opted out of the government because, in the words of Ghazi al-Yawer, the posts earmarked for the Sunnis were below "the desired level." [7] The real issues were twofold: the selection of the minister of defense (the Sunnis proposed candidates with long associations with the Saddam regime), and second, they demanded that the policies of de-Ba'thification be suspended and that those who are occupying government positions should be allowed to keep them. During the swearing in of the new government at the National Assembly on May 3, the most senior Sunni politician, Vice President al-Yawer, was demonstrably absent.

The Participation of Allawi's Group

The outgoing Prime Minister, Ayad Allawi, who controls 40 seats in the National Assembly, made a number of demands as a condition for his party's participation in the government. He asked for one sovereign ministry [8] and a number of other ministries which were deemed by the United Iraqi Alliance as disproportionate to the weight of his party in the National Assembly. He also demanded the right to dissolve the government if the parties did not reach agreement on a major policy issue. Finally he asked that clerics remain outside the government. [9] After protracted negotiations the parties could not reach an agreement and Allawi declared himself the leader of the opposition in the National Assembly and left the country on a personal trip to Lebanon.

The Coalition Agreement

The two key parties in the coalition, the United Iraqi Alliance and the Kurdish Alliance signed a coalition agreement that meets most of the Kurdish demands. The agreement stipulates a commitment to adhere to the provisions of the Transitional Administrative law as the ultimate law for the new government, the legislature and the judiciary until a new constitution is promulgated. Most importantly, the agreement makes a specific mention of article 58 of TAL which requires that the Iraqi transitional government "act expeditiously to take measures to remedy the injustices by the previous regime's practices in altering the demographic character of certain regions, including Kirkuk…" The reference was to the Arabization program implemented by the Saddam regime which the Kurds maintain it has changed the Kurdish character of the city which the Kurds insist in keeping within the Kurdish federal structure. The agreement also confirms the principle that the Shar'ia is one, but not the only source, of legislation. [10]

The Marginalization of Women

As part of the drive for the liberalization of the Iraqi society, the Transitional Administrative Law has stipulated that one third of all the candidates to the national assembly should be women. The competing parties in the national elections, including the United Iraqi Alliance, have complied with this requirement. As a result, 31 percent of members of the National Assembly are women.

However, women have not faired well in the new governing bodies of the country. The Iraqi President, Prime Minister, and the Speaker of the National Assembly, each with his two or more deputies, comprise entirely of men. In the new government with its 36 members, including the prime minister and his deputies, only 6 are female ministers but only one female from the Iraqi National Alliance which controls the premiership and 17 other cabinet positions. By contrast, of the eight cabinet posts occupied by the Kurds, three are women. A woman was designated by the Sunnis should they join the government and the only Christian minister is a women. The almost total exclusion of women from the Shi'ite parties represented in the government may not augur well for the status of women in Iraq under a Shi'ite leadership. It will be worth watching the framers of the new constitution address the issue of equality for women.

Challenges Ahead

Clearly, security will be the top priority of the new government. The reconstruction of Iraq will be all but impossible without a security environment that would allow the development and reconstruction efforts to go forward. A secure environment would also allow a vast reservoir of Iraqi entrepreneurial initiatives to be unleashed for rebuilding Iraq on the ruins created by the Saddam regime.

Timeliness is also of the essence. There are hardly four months for drafting a constitution which may require Herculean efforts, and much good will and lots of compromise, on the part of everyone, to bridge over potentially highly divisive and contentious issues such as the role of Islam in legislation, the nature of federalism, the future of Kirkuk, the policy of de-Ba'thification, the integration of the various militias in the armed forces of the country, and the allocation of oil revenues.

ANNEX I: The Iraqi Cabinet

Members of the United Iraqi Alliance

Members of the Kurdish Alliance

Sunni Ministers

Christian Party

Vacant and unallocated

*Dr. Nimrod Raphaeli is Senior Analyst of MEMRI's Middle East Economic Studies Program