On September 27, 2008, the London-based Saudi daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat published an article by Walid Al-Zubaidi, an Iraqi political analyst who supports the Iraqi resistance against the U.S., listing four alternatives that Al-Zubaidi believes to be open to the Iraqi resistance forces. Rejecting the first three options, he states that an intensification of the conflict is the only feasible alternative since, he says, "throughout history, occupation has been terminated only as a result of great battles." Al-Zubaidi argues, "If the U.S. forces should [suddenly] lose a large number of troops, and this receives wide media coverage, or if the resistance fighters capture American soldiers and officers, or take over U.S. [military] bases and headquarters, the White House would ask for negotiations [with them] without delay, and would either immediately withdraw or set up a timetable for such a withdrawal – thereby complying with all Iraqi demands."
Following are excerpts from Al-Zubaidi's article:[1]
The Iraqi Resistance Must Choose One of Four Alternatives
"Four alternatives are currently open to the Iraqi Resistance, each with its own distinct character. It appears that combining two or more of these options would be difficult, and that, considering the present circumstances, and upon deliberating the next stage, [only] one should be chosen and pursued. The four alternatives are as follows:"
"Terminating Resistance Activities [Today] Is Out Of The Question..."
"This option will be adopted when the resistance fighters are satisfied that they have achieved the objectives they set [for themselves] when resistance against the American occupation of Iraq first erupted... Insofar as these objectives still constitute the main force motivating the resistance factions, battalions, and armies... terminating resistance activities [today] is out of the question..."
"The Iraqi Resistance Would [Not] Join the Political Process in Hope of Reforming It... [Such a Move] Would Contradict [Its] Orientation and Principles"
"This option may have been the driving force behind all efforts that have been and are still being made under the heading 'Conciliation in Iraq,' as of 2005. The U.S. government has been striving to open this avenue, in the hope of engaging the Iraqi resistance factions and dismantling their national plan in the corridors of the political process.
"The greatest effort [in this direction] came at a conciliation conference held November 19-21, 2005 in Cairo, under the auspices of the Arab League, as well as at a July 2006 meeting at the Arab League premises. However, all initiatives [proposed on these occasions] clashed with the principles espoused by the national forces, which are identical to the platform and objectives of the resistance... [in that] they require a complete withdrawal of the occupation forces, an end to the political process established by the occupation... and the initiation of an Iraqi political process that is completely unconnected to any vestiges of the U.S. occupation.
"In light of the above, it seems hardly possible that the Iraqi resistance would join the political process in hope of reforming it – after all, [such a move] would contradict the orientation and principles [of the resistance]."
"Maintaining the Status Quo... May Weaken The Resistance, Thereby [Rendering It Powerless to] Achieve the Primary Objectives For Which It Was Established"
"There is no doubt that the resistance fighters... have been continually setting up guidelines and devising plans to achieve their objectives in the shortest possible time. If we take a look at the Iraqi resistance today, we will arrive at the following conclusions:
"1. It has achieved impressive results on the battlefield and has caused numerous losses among the occupying U.S. forces...
"2. In line with the most important principle in warfare, the occupying troops are operating under a most trying mental strain... as a natural, cumulative effect of the attacks that have been and are still carried out by the Iraqi resistance factions – which shows that the resistance has military advantage on the ground.
"3. After buying the Sahwah forces[2] as allies, the occupying forces have regained some of their power, which they lost completely during the years 2005-2006 under the painful onslaught of the resistance.
"4. The occupying forces have been trying to hide behind the [Iraqi] security apparatuses... [in an attempt to] make the conflict an intra-Iraqi matter... As a result, the resistance is bound to lose one of its most significant achievements, i.e. the fear and panic it has sowed among the enemy troops.
"Maintaining the status quo – that is, carrying out traditional attacks (e.g. roadside bombs, shelling of military bases with rockets and mortars, or sniper fire...) may, in the long run, weaken the resistance, thereby [rendering it powerless to] achieve the primary objectives for which it was established in the first place – i.e. ending the occupation and preserving the unity of the Iraqi people and territory. It follows that this option may not be feasible [either]..."
"Attacks of Large Scope And Superior Quality Would Deal a Crushing Blow... In This Way, The Resistance Will Achieve The Objective For Which It Was Established"
"Big battles are imperative for deciding the outcome of the conflict in Iraq between the occupying forces and the resistance. These will be initiated by the Iraqi resistance factions and directed against the U.S. forces as well as foreign forces assisting them all over Iraq. Throughout history, occupation has been terminated only by means of big battles.
"Thus, Vietnam was liberated after big, decisive battles, which lasted 40 days and culminated on April 30, 1975, with the U.S. forces fleeing via helicopters from the roof of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon...
"The Americans will not leave Iraq peacefully either, only following big events – especially since the U.S.'s domestic political situation is ready to respond to such events. If the U.S. forces should [suddenly] lose a large number of soldiers, and this occurrence receives wide media coverage – or if the resistance fighters capture American soldiers and officers, or take over U.S. [military] bases and headquarters – the White House would ask for negotiations [with the resistance forces] without delay, and would either immediately withdraw or set up a timetable for such a withdrawal – thereby complying with all Iraqi demands.
"Also, if some big events stir up the public opinion in the U.S. and internationally, all sides that are seeking to support the U.S. plan for the Iraqi occupation will reassess their [respective positions], turning the tables against those who support and promote the U.S. continued occupation [of Iraq].
"Furthermore, attacks of large scope and superior quality would deal a crushing blow to the U.S.'s claim that it has consolidated its rule over Iraq and improved the security situation there.
"In this way, the resistance will achieve the objective for which it was established... and reap the fruit [of its labors], having sacrificed thousands of casualties, prisoners, and displaced persons [for the cause]..."
Endnotes:
[1] Al-Sharq Al-Awsat (London), September 27, 2008.
[2] Forces comprised of members of Iraqi Sunni tribes that fought against terrorist organizations, especially Al-Qaeda, in cooperation with the U.S. and Iraqi forces.
