In an article on the Hamas-affiliated website www.palestine-info.info, columnist Mu'min Bsiso calls on Hamas to reassess its political and military policies, in light of what he calls the grave plight of the Palestinian people. He argues that Hamas must show greater flexibility, adjust its policies to the existing circumstances, and agree to the establishment of a Palestinian government that is acceptable to the rest of the world. In discussing the military situation, he criticizes Hamas' management of the Gaza war and even implicitly condemns the firing of rockets into Israel.
Following are excerpts from the article: [1]
Hamas Must Show Flexibility, Adjust to Reality
"The Palestinian problem has never been as complicated as it is today. The Palestinians have hit rock bottom in their deterioration and [internal] discord. The relations [among different factions] in the nation have never been as bad as they are today. Rebuilding Gaza is one of the most important challenges of the Hamas government, and the key [to success] is the establishment of a Palestinian government that will be acceptable to the international community...
"Hamas' rise to power, and its takeover of Gaza, made it legitimate for Israel to launch a war against it, and the situation created by the recent [Gaza] war may lead to another war, if Hamas continues to rule [Gaza] and in the absence of any possibility of a tahdiah with the occupation. If another war breaks out, Hamas' frameworks and institutions, which took years to develop, may take a direct hit from Israel and disintegrate.
"Hamas' rise to power, its dominance in the government following the [2006] elections to the Legislative Council, and its military victory [i.e. the Gaza coup] have cost it dearly from the diplomatic, economic and organizational perspectives, as well as on the ground. [The duty of] governing [Gaza] distracted it from some of the tasks and [issues] that should always be given top priority - especially the resistance and the restructuring of the movement so as to best serve the interests of governance and diplomacy.
"These facts obligate Hamas to reassess its diplomatic options and tactics, and find the option best suited to the political facts and reality. It must display greater diplomatic flexibility, which will yield partial achievements [even if] not comprehensive ones.
"Agreeing on a government of independent [representatives], according to the political plan set out in the Mecca Agreement, is one of the options acceptable to the international community, and it is the option best suited to the current period - which is fraught with obstacles, pitfalls and challenges. This option is the full answer to the internal and external political challenges, and to the challenge of rebuilding Gaza. At the same time, it preserves Hamas' political program and prevents the undermining of [this program].
"Establishing a 'government of independents,' as was agreed upon [in the past], will breathe new hope into the Palestinian cause. [Furthermore,] it will relieve Hamas of [bearing] the heavy cost and [difficult] consequences of governing, and of accountability to the public for the economic [crisis]. It will also deprive [Israel] of any pretext for renewing its sweeping and unconstrained aggression [against Gaza].
"This will give Hamas the time to rebuild its frameworks and organizational and social institutions, and to carry out a better and more accurate assessment of the resistance - the [right] way to maintain it, nurture it and strengthen it, based on innovative and advanced approaches that will be developed to meet the challenges facing the Palestinians..."
Errors in Hamas' Functioning During the Gaza War
While enumerating the positive aspects of Hamas' functioning during the war, Bsiso also lists the errors in its policy: "Generally speaking, Hamas' military readiness was insufficient, and it was unable to withstand an attack of this scope, [though the attack was preceded] by endless threats on the part of Israel [giving ample warning of what was coming].
"By relying exclusively on methods borrowed from Hizbullah, [Hamas lost] the element of surprise, on which it was counting. The occupation army, [on the other hand,] was well prepared, and succeeded in foiling many of these tactics and methods. There was need for different, creative methods, with which the occupation army had not previously dealt.
"The lack of anti-aircraft weapons left the Palestinian home front vulnerable [to attack by Israeli planes and helicopters], and considerably limited the Hamas [fighters'] maneuverability and effectiveness in the field.
"[In addition, Hamas] had no antitank weapons of long or medium range weapons (i.e. over 1 km), which deprived it of any ability to deal with the convoys of Israeli tanks and [armored] vehicles, giving the Israeli forces superiority in the [battle]field...
"Before the war, the movement completely ruled out the possibility of an all-out confrontation and massive Israeli invasion [of Gaza. In other words,] it inaccurately assessed the probability of a confrontation with the occupation. There was no strategic plan for a drawn-out guerilla war in the event of an Israeli invasion deep into the populated regions [of Gaza]. [Moreover,] prior to the war, the movement's ability to uncover networks of collaborators was poor - meaning that the occupation army had a stream of information that helped it to hit many Palestinian targets."
The article also lists "chronic" problems that plague the resistance, such as "spontaneous resistance operations carried out by some Palestinian factions, especially rocket attacks; the clashing positions and agendas of the resistance factions in some cases, and lack of coordination among them..."
Bsiso concludes that there is need to learn lessons and to "formulate a strategic plan, in light of the possibility of another war, while mapping all the options, alternatives and needs - so that the plan will be ready for implementation immediately and without delay. At the same time," he adds, "the movement must show restraint, and regulate the mechanisms of resistance on the Gaza front. The resistance factions must reach understandings, including on suitable solutions for the [various] negative phenomena.
"Hamas has taken many lessons from the war - but the obstacle [preventing it from] implementing the more sensitive [lessons] has to do with external factors beyond its control."
