A Palestinian Account of the Four Years of the Intifada

Palestinian columnists have recently published articles assessing the four years of the Intifada, in which they admitted that the grave harm caused to the Palestinians stemmed from their choice of suicide/martyrdom operations as the primary method of struggle. In addition, the PA's status as the leader of the Palestinian people has been undermined, and signs of anarchy in Palestinian society have increased. Some of the accounts described the Palestinians as closer to defeat than to victory, and complained about the lack of political achievements, lack of goals, and lack of strategic planning. The following are excerpts from the columns:

A Lack of Strategic Planning, Goals, and Political Achievements

Hanna Amirah, a member of the PA Executive Council and of the political bureau of the Palestinian People's (Communist) Party, wrote: "The Intifada has not succeeded in becoming a general popular Intifada or [one that] transcends borders, as some of the [Palestinian] leaders wanted. It did not manage to arouse Arab and international identification, as the Palestinians have expected, or to set in motion a political move that would put an end to the occupation… The Intifada has not managed to fulfill the slogans of providing international defense or [to bring about] the posting of international observers, nor [has it managed] to break the U.S. monopoly on a [political] settlement. It has not managed to bring about the lifting of the siege over the Palestinian people and its elected president, or to stop the construction of the separation fence…" [1]

In his column in the PA daily Al-Ayyam, senior PA Information Ministry official Hani Al-Masri wrote: "The Intifada is now closer to defeat than to victory… There is no doubt that we are extremely far from establishing a free and independent state and from fulfilling the right of return…" [2]

PA daily Al-Hayat Al-Jadida editor Hafez Al-Barghuthi wrote: "We hail our fighting people, which have displayed bravery, courage, and sacrifice at a rate of thousands of percent, but has managed to reap only 30% of the gains. The reason for this lies in an absence of strategic planning, a lack of national unity, and a lack of government. Courage alone is not sufficient, and bravery alone does not achieve victories. We must look around us to recognize the extent of the defeat that has hit us. We do not sense the existence of a strong rule, compliant factions, or a democratic administration…" [3]

In a similar vein, Union of Palestinian Writers board member Dr. Fayhaa Abd Al-Hadi wrote: "The Palestinian stance has not defined a c entral objective, planning, or organization. It has not succeeded in uniting its ranks around an internal agreement that would define the stages of the struggle or determine a common denominator that would bind all the [Palestinian] elements…" [4]

Muhammad Yaghi, a columnist for the PA daily Al-Ayyam and a supporter of the Geneva initiative, claimed: "[The fact] that we refused to accept a decision, as required of us in the Mitchell [Commission] report, in the Tenet plan, and in the road map, has not served our interests, but Israel's. Everyone remembers that Israel chose from the Mitchell report only [the part dealing with] the cooling-off period, in order to prevent the international community from intervening in the implementation of the other parts of the report, and it succeeded in this, because we refused to implement the part related to us… As for the road map … due to various reasons, among them the fear of sliding into an internal confrontation, the PA refused to implement the security part of the road map … [and this] gave Israel a rationale for proposing the withdrawal plan…" [5]

Ashraf Al-Ajrami, another Al-Ayyam columnist, believes that "the political stalemate also stemmed from [the fact] that the Palestinians did not succeed in embarrassing the Sharon-led Israel and in pushing it politically into a corner through the raising of political initiatives and the proposal of plans that would be in line with the course of events and with international developments. Moreover, the Palestinians were those who were pushed into a corner, and Israel stood out as the initiating party, which thwarts international plans [on the one hand], and on the other hand suggests alternatives that seem more acceptable…" [6]

The Intifada has Led to Anarchy and Loss of Control

In his daily Al-Hayat Al-Jadida column, Hafez Al-Barghuthi wrote: "We have failed in preventing collapse in the internal [arena] and we have lost control over the situation, so that the occupation and its generals have succeeded in dragging us into their filthy war and bringing us to kill citizens, in order to justify their massacre of our children and our women… Since lawlessness and anarchy are pleasing to our eyes, we have eliminated – either intentionally or unintentionally – the authority and very foundation of the PA, and we have lost direction… When we called for dealing with a problem, supporting the PA and coordinating between all the factions in order to avoid anarchy, we were surprised at the feverish rush towards rifts and anarchy… This is the result of the lack of caring, the neglect, the helplessness, and the rifts… We must admit with honesty that we have been defeated in the internal arena… We have lost the ability to think strategically… [7]

In an interview with Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, political analyst Hani Habib said: "The absence of law and security has contributed to the rise in corruption [and to the intensification] of the war against reforms and their supporters with the claim that resistance to the occupation is at the top of [our] list of priorities. The Intifada has distanced the Palestinians from internal reforms and has not chalked up any achievements regarding the conflict with the occupation. The factions have grown stronger at the cost of regression in public activity…" [8]

Al-Ayyam columnist Muhammad Yaghi wrote: "Today we are further from our goals than ever before… The large number of independent leaderships does not stem from the [need to] deal with [Israel's] pursuit of the Intifada's hard core, as in the first Intifada. Instead, it reflects differing, often contradictory, [internal] strategies. Thus, for example, the Islamic leadership conducts military operations within Israel, while the PA condemns them. Without one leadership, one rule, agreed-upon methods and goals, we cannot attain successes. If, after four years, the [Palestinian] factions and the PA are [still] discussing the goals of the Intifada and the means by which to achieve them, there is a real problem which must be acknowledged and dealt with." [9]

The Attacks have Created an 'Affinity between Palestinian Resistance and the Terror'

PA Executive Council memberGhassan Al-Shak'a wrote in Al-Quds: "Israel has utilized the opportunity [created] on September 11 wisely and has driven world public opinion [to take a stand] against the Palestinians, and especially the U.S. and Britain, which formed an absolute affinity between the Palestinian armed resistance and terror. Moreover, the concept of terror has been associated with Muslims in general. It would have been possible to obtain good results had the Palestinians adopted the popular non-violent method of struggle – an organized struggle that could be directed and controlled… But nowadays the entire world is against us, and it exerts terrible pressures on the Palestinian people and its leadership. A situation [has arisen] in which the Palestinian side is not accepted as a party [for negotiations]." [10]

Muhammad Yaghi wrote in Al-Ayyam: "[One of the failings of the Intifada] is the inability to draw a line between legitimate and illegitimate means of struggle. The [Palestinian] military operations … have provided the Israeli government with a pretext to shirk its responsibility [in its dealings] with the world … and have extricated Israel from its isolation. They have enabled the continued pressure on the Palestinian people and its leadership to the point of calling for its replacement. These actions have led to the equation between the occupier and the occupied in most of the U.N.'s resolutions in the past four years. [The military operations] have weakened the elements of peace in Israel, which we need, and have strengthened the settlers and the extreme Israeli right at their expense. The most important thing is that these activities have split the Palestinian people because of differences of opinion regarding them and have deterred broad sectors from active participation in the Intifada. Thus, the Intifada has become an Intifada of the military elites instead of a popular Intifada. This has led to an erroneous interpretation of the events. So did the [Palestinian] statements referring to a 'mutual cease-fire,' as if there is a Palestinian army against an Israeli army, instead of describing the situation as a confrontation between the Israeli army and the Palestinian people." [11]

Ashraf Al-Ajrami wrote in Al-Ayyam: "There is a stagnation in the political process … but the Palestinians bear part of the responsibility for this, because they contributed to creating [the] conditions that helped the right in Israel to succeed in the elections – by means of the intensification of operations against Israeli citizens." [12]

'The Gravest Damage is the Growing Prevalence of a Negative Culture that Glorifies Death'

Al-Ayyam columnist Ashraf Al-Ajrami also dealt with the socio-cultural facet of the damage caused by the Intifada: "The gravest damage [to the Palestinians following the Intifada] is the growing prevalence of a negative culture that glorifies death and treats reality as predestined fate, from which one cannot extract oneself, [a culture] that prefers a return to the roots contrary to the course of history, in an effort to escape the complex reality and to hide behind the distant past.

"Also, concepts of distancing conflicts [and treating them as] a crime and a prohibition have taken over. In the Palestinian arena, signs of anarchy and social backwardness have become prevalent, returning society to tribalism and turning people into pawns under the threat of weapons, at the expense of anything cultural that is in line with the development and building of a modern political government capable of dealing with the challenges of the 21st century…" [13]

What Steps Should be Taken to Rectify the Intifada's Damage?

PA Chairman Yasser Arafat's advisor Bassam Abu Sharif proposed "stopping the firing of mortars towards settlements in Israel and restricting the struggle to military targets everywhere, including armed settlers, who are also the soldiers of the occupation." [14]

Ahmad Majdalani, advisor to PA Prime Minister Ahmad Qurei (Abu Ala'a) and minister without portfolio, wrote: "One must maintain the popular character of the Intifada, distance oneself from the militarization of the Intifada, and vary the forms of struggle and resistance. Martyrdom operations against civilians within Israel must be stopped immediately, [and] a message [must be] conveyed to Israeli society denouncing and refuting Israel's lies and claims. Lessons must be drawn from the bitter experience of the years of the Intifada, from the suffering and the victims, in order to enhance the dialogue towards the consolidation of a political plan for an Intifada with concrete political aims…" [15]

Ghassan Al-Shak'a wrote in Al-Quds: "Since the responsibility lies both with the PA and the Palestinians, great courage is needed to carry out a 're-evaluation,' openly and not behind closed doors, in order to institute law and order and to maintain a serious dialogue that will be based on interests and not sentiments. In addition, new methods of struggle must be adopted, which will be in line with reality..." [16]

Hafez Al-Barghuthi wrote in Al-Hayat Al-Jadida: "[We] must loosen the restraints and exercise self-criticism… The Intifada must not be continued merely for its own sake… Any struggle without a political objective is a futile struggle… The time has come for the blood of the shahids [martyrs] to speak and to ask to put an end to the fiasco in the internal Palestinian arena. The time has come for all the PA and Palestinian factions to respect their people and the national Palestinian interest and to become closer to the interests of the general public…" [17]

Muhammad Yaghi wrote in Al-Ayyam: "As for the refugees, they must wait a long time until their problem is resolved. What is offered us now can be summed up in one sentence: cessation of armed violence. The refugees' problem can wait." [18]