Two Days To NATO's Warsaw Summit, Pro-Kremlin Think Tank Valdai Club's Expert Warns: 'Western Support... To Anti-Russian Political Forces In Belarus, Armenia And Azerbaijan Would Lead To New Crises Like That In Ukraine'

In anticipation of the NATO summit in Warsaw, the program director of the Valdai Discussion Club's (a pro-Kremlin think tank) Foundation for Development and Support, Dmitry Suslov, wrote an article, titled "Without a 'Common Space': A New Agenda for Russia-EU Relations". The article advises Russia to establish a security dialogue with the EU, given the frozen state of military dialogue with the U.S. and NATO. The primary focus of military dialogue with the EU or with each EU state separately should focus, on preventing direct ground and air clashes. The second focus would be devoted to conventional and nuclear arms-control discussions.

The author warns that the modernization of the U.S. tactical nuclear weapons and the deployment of the U.S./NATO missile defense system in Eastern Europe "could trigger a new arms race involving nuclear weapons and high-precision conventional weapons in Europe on a scale reminiscent of the arms race of the early 1980s."[1] Suslov states that Russia could withdraw from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) Treaty, in response to U.S. and NATO policy in Eastern Europe (i.e. the stationing of the missile defense system and their military installations). This scenario would turn Europe "into a potential military front and raise the likelihood of military escalation to the limit." According to Suslov, the modern threats of cyber-attacks make a possible confrontation between Russia and the West "riskier than during the Cold War."

Suslov concludes that it is the EU's interest to play the role of a mediator in restoring military and political dialogue between Russia and NATO, in order to prevent further military escalation. Suslov believes that the U.S. "will show no political desire" to restore the NATO-Russia Council, but Europe should take that initiative itself, since the absence of dialogue would produce a military crisis on the EU"s doorstep. A contrasting view was provided by NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg, in an interview with the Russian news agency Interfax. Stoltenberg states that NATO's relations with Russia depend on "a clear, constructive change in Russia's actions," which would demonstrate compliance with international law and with its international obligations and responsibilities. "So the ball is in Russia's court," Stoltenberg says.[2]

On the one hand Suslov invites the EU to take a more independent role on security issues in , on the other hand he warns that continued EU adherence to U.S. and NATO' policies in Eastern Europe will endanger the European security space . Likewise, he warns that if the EU or individual EU member states extend any support to anti-Russian political forces in Russia's near abroad, such as Belarus, Armenia and Azerbaijan, Brussels can expect "new crises like that in Ukraine." The same holds true for  EU efforts to retain Moldova and Georgia in "its orbit at any cost".  Suslov does not expect the EU to surrender "those countries to Russia's sphere of influence," but merely to respect Russia's "economic and humanitarian interests" in these areas and Russian President Vladimir Putin's pet project of a Eurasian integration.

It is arguable that the Eurasian integration project in itself promotes the establishment of an economic and political area under Russia's influence. Suslov in his article promotes the idea that Europe should detach itself from U.S. tutelage and become an independent voice within NATO itself, which for Suslov means Europe should draw closer to Russia. This is spelled out when the author talks about a "common neighborhood" grouping Europe and Russia, and hints at a Eurasian economic and political integration extending from Lisbon to Vladivostok and excluding the U.S. However, this policy appears oblivious to other aspects. The EU, which is not a monolithic bloc to begin with, now confronts the post-Brexit fallout and an unprecedented threat to its unity. Under these circumstances the EU is ill-equipped to play the role of mediator or push for dialogue between Russia and NATO. Also, despite internal differences on easing sanctions on Russia, the EU countries attach major responsibility to Russia's actions in Ukraine as a factor that undermined the European security order. Therefore, the creation of a "common space" between Russia and the EU appears inappropriate when the EU views Russia as the threat to "neighborhood" stability.

Below are excerpts from Suslov's article, that appeared in the influential Russian foreign policy journal , Russia In Global Affairs:[3]

Dmitry Suslov, Program Director of the Valdai Discussion Club"s Foundation for Development and Support , (Valdaiclub.com).

'The INF Treaty Is At Stake'; Europe Might 'Turn Into A Potential Military Front'

"The freezing of the military dialogue between Russia on the one hand and the U.S. and NATO on the other - and the unlikelihood that it will resume after 2017 - make it increasingly important that Russia either strengthen or, in a number of cases, establish a dialogue on 'hard security' issues with individual EU member states and EU institutions. Such dialogues are essential during periods of confrontation...

"A military dialogue between Russia and the EU, and between Russia and individual EU member states should be focused, first, on developing new measures to prevent direct military clashes on the ground and in the air, sea and cyberspace, on creating constant channels of communication between defense ministries and military headquarters, and on developing new rules of conduct that would prevent incidents such as the downing by Turkey of a Russian bomber over Syrian air space [in 2015], and especially such incidents in the region of the Baltic states and Black Sea.[4]

"Second, although Brussels has actively avoided it until now, it is preferable that EU states and institutions engage in discussions over the control of conventional and nuclear arms, as well as the potential arms race in Europe. A critical situation has developed in this area. Modernization of the US tactical nuclear weapons and continues deployment of its missile defense system in Europe - and the fact that the new U.S. administration might intensify and even enhance this policy - could trigger a new arms race involving nuclear weapons and high-precision conventional weapons in Europe on a scale reminiscent of the arms race of the early 1980s.

"The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) Treaty is at stake. Washington's decision to build up its missile defenses in Europe and the NATO military infrastructure in Central and Eastern Europe [CEE] and the Baltic states might leave Russia no choice but to withdraw from that treaty. That would immediately turn Europe into a potential military front and raise the likelihood of military escalation to the limit. Moreover, the modern threats of cyber-attacks and others make it even riskier than during the Cold War that tensions will erupt into open hostilities. And finally, the lack of resolution on questions concerning missile defense, tactical nuclear weapons, the INF Treaty and military infrastructure in the CEE and Baltic states exclude the possibility of a serious dialogue on the future of the control of conventional weapons in Europe. It would be highly irresponsible for European countries to fail to discuss these issues with Russia and the United States."

'Brussels And Moscow Could Scale Back The Geopolitical Rivalry Over Countries Of The Common Neighborhood'

"Third, it is in the interests of the EU to restore the military and military-political dialogue between Russia and NATO for the sake of preventing further military escalation. Many Western experts and politicians now acknowledge that it was a mistake to freeze the Russia-NATO Council during a time of crisis.[5] The U.S. will show no political desire to restore such activity, but Europe could take that initiative itself. In fact, it was Great Britain that formally put forward the proposal to create the NATO-Russia Council back in 2002.

NATO-Russia Council (Source: Nato.int)

"Finally, it would go a long way toward preventing new Ukraine-like crises in Europe if Brussels and Moscow could scale back the geopolitical rivalry over countries of the 'common neighborhood' such as Belarus and Armenia that have already joined the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU)[6] or Azerbaijan that has already ruled out the possibility of signing an Association Agreement with the EU. Any support by the EU or EU member states for trends disruptive to the EAEU or anti-Russian political forces in Belarus, Armenia and Azerbaijan would undoubtedly lead to new crises like that in Ukraine. Efforts by the EU to hold Moldova and Georgia in its orbit at any cost - regardless of their economic and political difficulties and needs - will no doubt meet a similar end.

"Of course, the expectation is not that the EU hands over those countries to Russia's 'sphere of influence,' but that it respect Russia's practical economic and humanitarian interests as well as a Eurasian integration process that is proceeding naturally and bringing benefit to the participating states. It was Brussels' refusal to take Russia's interests into account and its decision to completely bar Moscow from discussions regarding Ukraine's Association Agreement with the EU that unleashed the processes that eventually led to the unrest in Kiev in the fall of 2013, to Euromaidan and the coup [sic].[7] The subsequent hasty signing of the EU Association Agreement with the new Ukrainian authorities significantly complicated the resolution of the conflict in Donbass. A tripartite dialogue between Russia, the EU and Ukraine would have prevented these disasters. It is important not to repeat that mistake with regard to Moldova and Georgia, especially given their internal instability and unresolved territorial conflicts.

"Against the current backdrop of confrontation, it makes more sense for Russia and the EU to focus not so much on bringing 'common neighborhood' countries into their respective integration orbits as on finding ways to ensure their stability and security. Destabilizing those countries could carry a higher price tag than anticipated. In this context, the EU and Russia should agree on rules for tripartite cooperation with Moldova, Georgia, and in the future, Ukraine. And the best way to prevent conflicts with EAEU member states is for the EU to grant formal recognition to the EAEU and to establish a direct dialogue with it on issues of their respective competences."

 

Endnotes: