The following are some of this week's reports from the MEMRI Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor (JTTM) Project, which translates and analyzes content from sources monitored around the clock, among them the most important jihadi websites and blogs. (To view these reports in full, you must be a paying member of the JTTM; for membership information, send an email to jttmsubs@memri.org with "Membership" in the subject line.)
Note to media and government: For a full copy of these reports, send an email with the title of the report in the subject line to media@memri.org. Please include your name, title, and organization in your email.
The following report is now a complimentary offering from MEMRI's Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor (JTTM). For JTTM subscription information, click here.
On the evening of March 22, 2024, four gunmen stormed the Crocus City Hall in the Moscow suburb of Krasnogorsk, shot at the estimated 6,000 people who were attending a rock concert, and set the venue on fire, causing the roof to collapse. According to Russian authorities, 137 people were killed in the attack and more than 100 injured. Russian authorities apprehended four citizens of Tajikistan and charged them with committing terrorist acts, while President Vladimir Putin has insisted the "radical Islamists" who committed the attack were linked to Ukraine.
On March 24, 2024, Media Analyst, a pro-Islamic State (ISIS) Telegram channel, shared a post discussing the March 22 deadly attack in Moscow, for which ISIS claimed responsibility. The post argued that the attack was a "smart strike" that would lead to further global chaos and deepen differences between Russia and NATO.
The following report is now a complimentary offering from MEMRI's Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor (JTTM). For JTTM subscription information, click here.
On March 25, 2024, the Al-Azaim Foundation, a media outlet linked to the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), published an English-language poster threatening to carry out attacks against Russians, including President Vladmir Putin.
On March 23, 2024, after releasing a brief statement claiming responsibility for the deadly attack in Moscow that killed at least 40 people and injured 100 others, the Islamic State (ISIS) released a second statement providing further details on the attack.
On March 26, 2024, a pro-Al-Qaeda Telegram bot published a poster depicting a group of mujahideen marching through a mountainous area. The poster announces "a campaign of donations to our brothers the mujahideen in the Arabian Peninsula."
On March 25, 2024, a pro-Al-Qaeda anonymous account on X (formerly Twitter) shared a post claiming Khalid, the son of Al-Qaeda de facto leader Sayf Al-'Adl aka Mohammad Salah Al-Din Zidane, had died in a fire. The post also featured a photo showing the deceased son in his Islamic shroud.
On March 22, 2024, 'Amaq News Agency, the media arm of the Islamic State (ISIS), released a statement claiming responsibility for the deadly attack that took place in a Moscow concert hall earlier today.
On March 21, 2024, the Islamic State (ISIS) released Issue 435 of its weekly newsletter, Al-Naba'. The issue's feature article emphasizes that the call for jihad applies to all Muslims, of all ages, without exceptions, and that adherents of jihad who answer the divine command are eventually rewarded.
On March 22, 2024, the Islamic State (ISIS) released issue 435 of its weekly newsletter Al-Naba' which included a report highlighting the group's attacks in Syria during the past week. According to the Al-Naba' infographic, there were nine attacks. The report featured two exclusive photos and two claims of attacks which ISIS had not announced earlier.
Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) Claims Suicide Attack On Taliban In Kandahar
On March 21, 2024, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) claimed a same-day suicide attack against the Taliban in Kandahar, southern Afghanistan, which reportedly killed dozens of Taliban operatives.
SUPPORT OUR WORK
On March 23, 2024, the Islamic State Sahel Province claimed responsibility for three operations on March 20 and 21, 2024, carried out against the Niger Armed Forces and Christian civilians in Mali, during which, it alleges, 35 soldiers and civilians were killed.
In recent days, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP) has claimed several attacks on Nigerian army forces in Borno State, in the country's northeast, including a suicide bombing targeting the Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) troops.
On March 21, 2024, the Islamic State (ISIS) released issue 435 of its weekly newsletter, Al-Naba', which included an exclusive report documenting a March 17 ISIS attack against personnel of the Philippines Armed Forces in southern Philippines' Maguindanao del Sur Province.
On March 21, 2024, an Australian pro-Islamic State (ISIS) preacher who is a central figure in the Salafi and jihadi community in Australia, and among English-speaking jihadis on social media, published a poster on his Instagram account.
On March 23, 2024, Al-Malahem, the official media outlet of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), published a two-page statement in Arabic condemning Yemen's Iran-backed Ansar Allah Movement (the Houthis) for "blowing up" inhabited Muslim houses in the city of Rada'a, in Yemen's Al-Bayda' governorate. This report reviews the statement.
On March 23, 2024, Al-Sahab, the official media outlet of Al-Qaeda's Central Command, published a statement that comprised a two-page condolence letter in Arabic following the death of Khalid Batarfi, leader of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). Batarfi's death was announced on March 10 in an official AQAP video, and although no details about the circumstances were provided, the implication was that the cause of death was an illness.
The following report is now a complimentary offering from MEMRI's Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor (JTTM). For JTTM subscription information, click here.
On March 24, 2024, the Al-Zallaqa Media Foundation, the media arm of Al-Qaeda's affiliate in the African Sahel, Jama'at Nusrat Al-Islam Wal-Muslimeen (the Group for Support of Islam and Muslims – GSIM), published a 24-minute, 18-second video of an audio speech by Abu Mahmoud Al-Ansari, the group's emir of Burkina Faso.
On March 20, 2024, Al-Kataib Foundation for Media Production, the media arm of Al-Qaeda's affiliate in Somalia, Harakat Al-Shabab Al-Mujahideen (Al-Shabab), published videos in Somali featuring four Al-Shabab officials praising the group's March 14 suicide attack on SYL Hotel in Mogadishu, calling the attack a source of pride and a sign of victory over the adversaries of shari'a.
On March 25, 2024, a prolific Al-Qaeda supporter, published a poster on the Al-Qaeda-operated Rocket.Chat server, titled "Who [Will Come] to [Support] the Wounds of Islam?", inciting Muslims to jihad against "accursed Jews and their allies" around the world.
On March 21, 2024 a Telegram channel supporting Syrian jihadi group Hay'at Tahrir Al-Sham (HTS), released an infographic poster summarizing recent HTS inghimasi [commando-style attacks behind enemy lines, in which the attackers are likely to be killed] operations between March 1-20.
On March 20, 2024, an English-language Salafi-jihadi Telegram channel published a post claiming that Africa has the potential to be the "starting point" and "seat" of a renewed Islamic caliphate.
On March 26, 2024, the armed forces of the Yemeni Houthi Ansar Allah movement claimed responsibility for "six military operations during the past 72 hours using a large number of ballistic missiles and drones."
On March 22, 2024, Russian state news agencies reported that several gunmen opened fire at Crocus City Hall, a popular concert venue on the outskirts of Moscow. Dozens of people were reportedly injured or killed and the building was on fire.
On March 27, 2024, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an Iran-backed joint operations group of Iraqi militias, published a statement claiming a March 26 drone attack against the Ovda airbase in southern Israel.
On March 24, 2024, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an Iran-backed joint operations group of Iraqi militias, claimed responsibility for a drone attack on the same day on "the Ministry of Defense of the Zionist entity," in Tel Aviv. The organization also threatened to escalate its operations during the current month of Ramadan.
On March 22, 2024, Hamas issued a statement hailing Russia, China, and Algeria for vetoing a U.S. draft resolution at the UN Security Council aimed at reaching a ceasefire between Hamas and Israel, in exchange for a hostage release deal and condemnation of Hamas.
On March 25, Hamas's military wing, the Izz Al-Din Al-Qassam Brigades, published links to its official website and Telegram channels; it also published email addresses for "donations and support."
On March 25, 2024, a Jordanian entity shared a post, on its Telegram channel, calling on Jordanians to besiege the Israeli Embassy in Amman, Jordan, at 10:00 PM local time that night.
The following report is now a complimentary offering from MEMRI's Jihad and Terrorism Threat Monitor (JTTM). For JTTM subscription information, click here.
After the March 22, 2024 attack on a concert in Moscow, Afghan writer Sorkh Kohi wrote an article examining how a regional war by proxies is heating up in Afghanistan and its neighborhood. The Dari-language article noted that the Islamic State (ISIS) executed a suicide bombing at a bank in Kandahar, the spiritual headquarters of Afghan Taliban, on March 21.
After the Moscow concert attack of March 22, 2024, a pro-Afghan Taliban writer authored an article that was published as part of a series of tweets on X, formerly Twitter, arguing that Tajikistan has now emerged as a major stronghold of the Islamic State (ISIS).
A pro-Afghan Taliban media outlet published an article arguing that America blamed the Islamic State Khurasan Province (IKSP) for the Moscow concert attack of March 22, 2024, because the U.S. is trying to weaken the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA, i.e., the Afghan Taliban).
