In Advance Of Revival Of U.S.-Iran Nuclear Talks, Iranian Calls For Iran To Possess Nuclear Weapons Are Again Heard

Introduction

Calls in Iran for obtaining nuclear weapons are again being heard, against the backdrop of Iran's announcement that it is determined to avenge the assassination of Hamas political bureau leader Ismail Haniyeh in an IRGC guesthouse in Tehran on July 31, 2024, and amid reports in Western media about Iran's progress towards nuclear weapons.

It appears that these declarations are a calculated preparation of the ground on Tehran's part for a renewal of the U.S.-Iran contacts on the nuclear issue, regarding which Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and Iran's new foreign minister, Abbas Araghchi, are signaling receptivity, with the aim of advancing Iranian interests vis-à-vis Iran's nuclear program and its economy, as well as protection for its proxies in the region.

Supreme Leader Khamenei Approves Talks With The U.S. Aimed At Advancing Tehran's Nuclear, Economic, And Regional Interests

Foreign Minister Araghchi told Shabakeh Khabar TV in an August 24, 2024 interview that there is a need for "new negotiations" for a different arrangement. He said: "The agreement, in its format,  is not a simple process. As is known, when you [re]open such a document, it is not easy to reassemble it... We must approach this issue from a different point of view. The previous negotiations and agreement can serve as a point of reference, but they cannot be executed as they are. There is a need for new negotiations. Of course, as I said, the situation in Europe is difficult [and] in America, they are dealing with elections, and therefore this will not be an easy task, but we will make all possible efforts. We see this as a mission and an obligation to ease the burden of the sanctions on the [Iranian] public and to get them lifted. We will prioritize this subject and will use all the country's scientific, political, and judicial skills in this area, and we hope we will be able to make a positive step in this direction..."[1]

At the first meeting of the new government, on August 27, 2024, which was headed by President Masoud Pezeshkian, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei approved the mandate to conduct talks with the American administration, saying: "We should not pin our hopes on the enemy and wait for him... This reality is manifested also in the words of President [Pezeshkian] and in the announcements by Foreign Minister [Araghchi] a few days ago. Of course, this does not contradict the fact that in certain cases it is possible to cooperate with the enemy – but the thing is that we must not rely on him or trust him..."[2]

The goals of the Iranian regime in advancing talks with the American administration now, before the end of the Biden administration and on the eve of the U.S. presidential election are multidimensional:

• First and foremost, in the nuclear issue: The Iranian regime aspires to obtain recognition from the American administration for its right to possess nuclear weapons for reasons of defense and deterrence.

• At the same time, the Iranian regime seeks a complete lifting of the sanctions against it for promoting terrorism and for human rights violations in Iran – sanctions imposed by the U.S. and other countries since the Islamic Revolution in 1979. The sanctions that were lifted under the 2015 JCPOA nuclear deal concerned the nuclear sphere only, per Khamenei's instructions to the negotiating team. Thus, trade with Iran by third countries is not free because of U.S. sanctions still in effect in other spheres.

• Another area that the Iranian regime will attempt to promote is U.S. recognition of Iranian influence in the Middle East – that is, the resistance axis that Iran has built across the region and its military organizations (Hizbullah in Lebanon, the Palestinian resistance, the Houthis in Yemen, the Shi'ite militias in Iraq and Syria) that operate in coordination with Iran and according to its interests. This is in light of the war that Israel, with the backing of the West, declared against the Iranian proxies with which Iran has surrounded Israel.

It appears that U.S.-Iran contacts have been underway in secret for some time, including by means of mediators acting in service of Iran such as Qatar and Oman. In these talks, the sides are acting in accordance with understandings arrived at, inter alia, against the backdrop of Israel's continuing war in Gaza and against Iran and its proxies in the region. It can be assumed that an understanding was reached behind the scenes in response to Israel's killing of Hizbullah's military chief Fuad Shukr, which was an Israeli response to Hizbullah's killing of 12 children in the village of Majd Al-Shams in the north of Israel.

This response was apparently coordinated among the sides – Hizbullah and Israel and above them Iran and the U.S.; this can be deduced from the series of Lebanon and Israel visits by U.S. envoy Amos Hochstein on August 13 and 14, some 10 days before Israel's response. It enabled a display of a severe strike by each side on the other, both arranged in advance: Hizbullah removed its rockets from southern Lebanon while Israel responded with a limited preemptive strike against rockets deployed in a particular area in southern Lebanon, after which Hizbullah claimed to have carried out what it called a limited drone strike on Israeli military intelligence bases in the center of the country – a claim denied by Israel – and a rocket strike in the north of Israel. It appears that these understandings were the initial basis for arriving at a broader regional arrangement, in the framework of which a public channel for Iran-U.S. talks on the above topics would be opened.

Iran's Policy: Leveraging Iran's "Right" To Respond To A Strike On It Into Upgrading Its Nuclear Status And Obtaining Approval For Possessing Nuclear Weapons Or Other Political Aims

The Iranian regime appears to be leveraging events and incidents that tarnished Iran's image – such as the killing of top Hamas official Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran and Iran's announcement that it would respond to Israel for this – in order to gain political-strategic compensation. For example, it is advancing the idea of possessing nuclear weapons as a response to any activity against it, on the political or military level, or as justification for the need for deterrence against its enemies in the region and in the West.[3] This is how Iranian spokesmen described the negotiations with the Biden administration in 2022 – as a situation in which developing nuclear weapons is a defensive response to a possible attack on Iran, or would officially serve as compensation for what it would deem repeated violations of an agreement by the U.S. These violations would be a U.S. withdrawal from any agreement achieved, or the U.S.'s failure, according to Iran's criteria, to meet its economic obligations to Iran.

Iran has done this in the past – for example, in April 2024, after Israel killed Qods Force commanders in Syria in an airstrike, Iranian officials called for changing Iran's declared nuclear policy from civilian to military and to obtain nuclear weapons (see Senior Iranian Regime Officials Warn Of Iran's Coming Nuclear Breakout). It appears that the open discourse on this matter, particularly over the past two years (see Shift In Iranian Regime Statements On Nuclear Weapons: Regime Spokesmen Talk Openly About Them, Aiming For Western Acquiescence To Iran As A Nuclear Threshold State, August 2, 2022) is directed by and serves the aims of the Iranian regime in gaining acceptance, inside Iran and internationally, of the idea that an Iranian bomb is not taboo and thus to gradually win legitimacy on the international scene for this idea, or at least for the world to come to terms with this (see also Iranian Majlis Member Dr. Ahmad Bakhshayesh Ardestani In Interview With Iran's Roydad 24 News: 'Iran Is Slowly Making Preparations To Announce That It Has A Nuclear Bomb,' May 15, 2024).

A situation in which Tehran paints itself as a victim forced to respond to Western aggression allows it to continue with its false claim that a fatwa by Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei forbids Iran from developing or possessing nuclear weapons,[4] and at the same time to argue that its desire to obtain them is a response to Western aggression. In this way, Iran seeks to advance towards the strategic goal of gaining international recognition as a nuclear state, or at least, as noted above, of the world coming to terms with the idea.

This report will review calls by Iranian regime supporters and mouthpieces for Iran to become a nuclear state:

Report By Kuwaiti Daily Al-Jarida: 100 Iranian Politicians, Military Officials, And Scientists Call On Khamenei To Revoke His (Nonexistent) Fatwa Banning Nuclear Weapons

The Kuwaiti newspaper Al-Jarida quoted a source in the office of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei as saying that 100 Iranian politicians, military officials, and scientists had written to Khamenei, in a "top secret" letter, to demand that he revoke his alleged his fatwa (which does not exist) banning the manufacture, possession, and use of nuclear weapons by Iran.

The source was quoted as saying that the letter had been written and coordinated by the Center for Strategic Studies and Foreign Policy, which belongs to the Supreme Leader's office and is run by Khamenei advisor Kamal Kharrazi and Abbas Araghchi, who prior to his appointment as foreign minister in the Pezeshkian government was also secretary general of the Center. The letter, according to the source, said that revoking the fatwa would be Iran's strongest response to Israel and the U.S. for the Haniyeh assassination in Tehran.

The source added that after Iran received a threat from Israel via a European country that the former would attack Iran with nuclear weapons, Kharrazi and his group had begun working on a message calling for accelerating the revocation of the fatwa. Kharrazi also indicated, according to the source, that another reason for this urgency is that if Khamenei did not himself take the initiative to revoke the fatwa, it would be difficult for his successor to change or influence it.

Three Iranian diplomatic sources, one of whom is close to Araghchi – it should be noted that Araghchi is also a former Iranian ambassador to Japan – told the newspaper that Araghchi trusts Tokyo (as a victim of nuclear weapons) to play the role of mediator, sponsor, and guarantor of the agreement between Tehran and Washington.

Majlis Member Mohammad-Reza Sabbaghian Bafghi: "Iran Must Produce Nuclear Weapons"

On August 11, 2024, Iranian Majlis member Mohammad-Reza Sabbaghian Bafghi justified Iran's right to nuclear weapons. He called on the National Security Council to recommend to Supreme Leader Khamenei that he revoke the (alleged) fatwa prohibiting the production of nuclear weapons, and that Iran should produce them "under the new circumstances" and that in response to the assassination of Hamas leader Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran and the killing of Palestinians in Gaza, Iran should produce nuclear weapons. He asked why "bullies" are permitted to have them while Iran and other Islamic countries are not.

To view this clip on MEMRI TV, click here or below:

Iranian Academic Mohammad Gharavi: Iran’s Strategic Goal Is to Obtain Nuclear Deterrence Capabilities

Iranian academic Mohammad Gharavi, who is based in Beirut, said in an August 7, 2024 show on Hizbullah's Al-Manar TV that Iran's most important strategic goal is to obtain nuclear deterrence capabilities. Iran, he said, wants to be able to say that it can obtain nuclear capabilities at the "push of a button." He added that enriching uranium to 60% is tantamount to this, but that Iran still needs to reach the point where it has missiles that can carry nuclear warheads and the technology to protect them. Iran cannot show all its cards now, he said, but Israel needs to know that it has plans and means of deterrence and that "ultimately, nuclear power is only deterred by nuclear power."

To view this clip on MEMRI TV, click here or below:

IRGC-Affiliated Daily Javan: "Nuclear Weapons Are Also Considered An Important Deterrent... Do Not Push Iran Towards Nuclear Weapons With Your Own Hands!"

In an August 10, 2024 article, the Iranian daily Javan, which is affiliated with Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC), warned that Iran was being "pushed towards nuclear weapons" because of increased tensions with it. According to the article, titled "Netanyahu Is Pushing Iran Towards Nuclear Weapons," in recent years, and especially in the past year, these tensions have led to a decline in Iranian public opposition to the production and possession of nuclear weapons, and to increased support for them in Iran.

The article stated that public opinion in Iran is beginning to internalize the fact that nuclear weapons, "although frightening, dangerous, and destructive, are also considered a strategic and important deterrent." The shift in the view of Iran's security elites regarding the possession of nuclear weapons, it said, was the result of the blows exchanged by Iran and Israel, and these elites were wondering whether these blows, that culminated in the assassination of Haniyeh on Iranian soil, would have happened "as easily if Iran were a nuclear state in the full sense of the word."

In conclusion, the article stated that a continuation of tensions with Israel could prompt Iran to develop nuclear weapons as a response to additional attacks and Western sanctions.

The following is a translation of the Javan article:

"'Today, Iran is not carrying out key nuclear weapons development activity required for a nuclear facility that can be tested' – this is a quote from the U.S. National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) for 2022, for 2023, and for the preceding years, and [these words were] omitted from the intelligence assessment of July 2024 issued by the U.S. National Intelligence agency. Even in the February 2024 intelligence assessment (two months before the 18 days of tensions between Tehran and Tel Aviv in April), the Americans included this sentence in their assessment. But in the most recent version of the NIE (in July), it does not appear. Instead, this assessment gives special attention to statements by senior Iranian officials about the possibility of [Iran] changing [its] nuclear doctrine [from civilian to military], and the concern is raised that nuclear weapons development is no longer defined as taboo by Iranians (among leaders and in public opinion).

"While the U.S. intelligence community is monitoring the publicly expressed views of senior Iranian officials, including that of Kamal Kharrazi, an adviser to the Supreme Leader, who has warned that if Iran is 'forced to,' it will change its 'nuclear doctrine,' it is unlikely that they have ignored the significant shift in public opinion in Iran vis-à-vis its nuclear program. [A decade ago], a July 2014 poll by IranPoll [a Toronto-based polling institute focusing on Iran] showed that 71% of Iranians believed that developing nuclear weapons goes against Islamic principles.[5] These objections dropped to 66% in November 2019, and to less than 55% in July 2022. The shift in Iranian public opinion regarding development of nuclear weapons in 2024 is more concrete than ever, and stands before an historic turning point. According to a poll conducted between February 20 and May 26, 2024, about 71% of Iranian respondents completely or partially agreed that 'Iran needs nuclear weapons' (48% agree completely and 23% agree to some extent).

"The results of this survey, which are also reflected in senior Iranian officials' positions, are precisely what the NIE 2024 assessment pointed out in its opening sentence: 'This year, there has been a significant increase in official statements in Iran regarding nuclear weapons, indicating that this subject is less taboo.' The removal of the taboo on nuclear weapons – that is, that Iranian public opinion does not consider them to be only tools of destruction – may lead, in a gradual process, to a shift in Iran's strategic culture vis-à-vis the possession of nuclear weapons.

"The truth is that discussing nuclear weapons has, historically, been taboo among Iran's strategic elites and Iranian public opinion. That is, nuclear weapons were perceived by ruling elites, both before and after the [Islamic] Revolution [in 1979], as well as by the public, as only a means of mass destruction. Clear evidence, including the latest IranPoll survey and online statements, shows that this one-dimensional approach to nuclear weapons is being eroded, and that [Iranian] public opinion, like the strategic elites, is also beginning for the first time to internalize the fact that nuclear weapons, while frightening, dangerous, and destructive, are also considered an important deterrent.' Perhaps the outlook of some realists who argue that 'nuclear weapons are the only peacekeeping weapons ever seen in history' seems rhetorical or extreme. But the fact is that there are countries in the world that have already become addicted to possessing nuclear weapons, and are absolutely unwilling to give them up, and will refrain from using nuclear weapons in dangerous war situations only if they know that the rival country also has nuclear weapons.

"Obviously, today's Middle East is not like the World War II era, and Iran is not facing a risk at that scale. Nevertheless, the strategic elites of this current reality must get ready and prepare for worst-case scenarios. The Gaza war and Iran's support for its Palestinian allies after October 7, 2023 have caused a significant shift in how Iran's defensive-strategic elites view their surroundings, substantially changing their perspective. The 18 days of unprecedented tension between Iran and Israel in April 2024, starting with the attack on the consulate part of the Iranian Embassy in Damascus through Operation True Promise [the Iranian regime's missile and drone attack on Israel on April 14] and the subsequent five days (Israel's limited response to the Iranian attack), have significantly altered the views of the defensive-strategic elites in Tehran. For the first time, they found themselves at the height of an unprecedented crisis with Israel, which possesses nuclear weapons, in what could have become a full confrontation.

"It was only natural that they consider the scenario of a nuclear threat from Tel Aviv. The central question was, were Israel to present, at the height of that crisis, a kind of nuclear ultimatum (whether open or implied) to Iran, how would this be handled? Iran had already considered such a hypothetical scenario in January 2020, when tensions with America rose following the assassination of Qods Force commander [Qassem Soleimani], the missile attack on Ayn Al-Assad Base, and Trump's threat of attacking 52 Iranian sites. Probably even then, military-security policymakers thought that if Iran had nuclear weapons, America would not have entered into such a dangerous confrontation with Iran, or would have at least thought about it several times before entering into tensions on this level.

"The tension between Tehran and Tel Aviv during those 18 days in April 2024 highlighted the question 'How do you deal with an actor that possesses dozens of nuclear weapons?' both among the security elites and in the subconscious of public opinion. Among the decision-makers, in addition to Kamal Kharrazi's warning about changing Iran's nuclear doctrine, IRGC Brig. Gen. Ahmad Haq Taleb, who is in charge of security for Iran's nuclear facilities, said that a 'review of the Islamic Republic of Iran's doctrine and nuclear policy and deviating from previously announced limitations is entirely possible and conceivable.'[6]

"The shift in public opinion is also palpable. A survey by IranPoll showed that the percentage of Iranians who 'completely agree' with obtaining nuclear weapons rose from 40% prior to April 1, 2024 [when IRGC senior official Hassan Mahdawi was assassinated in Syria] to 48% (an 8% increase), while the percentage of those who only 'somewhat agree' with obtaining nuclear weapons decreased after April 1 from 27% to 23% (a 4% decline). This means that the public's doubts about obtaining nuclear weapons as a means of deterrence has decreased, and that now fewer Iranians question the strategic capability of possessing nuclear weapons. If the situation continues, and the international tensions Iran is facing continue to rise during the next 10 months of the Gaza war, the significance of a nuclear Iran, nuclear weapons, and their functionality will be far different than in any other period of the past decades.

"While tensions continue following the assassination of the Hamas political leader in the heart of Tehran, the chance is growing that theoretical scenarios will affect Iran's strategic awareness. The elites and public opinion, following [Haniyeh's] assassination on July 31, 2024, will increasingly consider whether adventures such as the assassination of Ismail Haniyeh, head of Hamas' political bureau, on Iranian sovereign soil would have happened as easily had Iran been a nuclear state in the full sense of the word, and whether Israel would have gone down the path of escalating tensions with Iran with such simplicity.

"Nuclear weapons have unique social impact. Just as nuclear countries do not boast of possessing nuclear weapons and do not threaten to use them against each other lightly (the nuclear taboo), they are also cautious and avoid conventional conflicts with one another. The July 2024 report by the American Central Intelligence Agency notes that Iran's nuclear taboo is weakening, and adds that Iran has the necessary infrastructure and experience to produce weapons-grade enriched uranium in several of its facilities should it choose to do so. The main point of the report is to warn of Iran enriching uranium to 90% 'in response to further sanctions, (potential) attacks or allegations against its nuclear program.' The second possibility mentioned, that potential attacks could expedite the Iranian nuclear program, is not new, and for some time now, arms control experts have been warning that military action will sway Iranian public and expert opinion in favor of those who support reliable strategic deterrence.

"Nevertheless, what is important is that an 'attack on Iran' as impetus for developing its nuclear program has now appeared for the first time in a public assessment by the American intelligence community. NIE-2024 is a wakeup call for players like Israel, who bang the drum of tension with Iran: 'Do not push Iran towards nuclear weapons with your own hands.'[7]