Arab Reports On Cooling Relations Between Syria's Assad Regime And Iran

Since the war in Gaza began on October 7, 2023 with the Hamas invasion and massacres in southern Israel, in which over 1,200 Israeli were killed and over 240 were taken hostage, there have been indications that relations between Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad's regime and Iran have been cooling.[1] This comes after many years of close ties and cooperation between the two countries, particularly after the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War broke in 2011.

The relationship between the Assad regime and Iran have been a cause of concern for the U.S. and for the moderate Arab countries, due to the possibility that Syria might become a tool in the hands of the Iranians. However, today the Assad regime is apparently attempting to signal that its ties with Iran are weakening, with the hope that the international community might warm to it and loosen the Western sanctions against it, so that Arab funds can flow into it the country and ease the crisis caused by its economic situation and ruined infrastructure. Various signals sent by the Assad regime to the U.S. may also reflect a cooling in its relations with Iran. Moreover, several Arab media reports have said that Russia, a major ally of the Assad regime, has invested great efforts in distancing the regime from Iran in order to prevent the outbreak of any military conflict in Syria that could harm Russian interests in the region.

Yet another noteworthy indication of a slump in the relations between Syria and Iran – whose extent is a matter of controversy among commentators – is that Syria has refrained from becoming involved in the current conflict against Israel, in contrast to Iran's other allies in the region: Hizbullah in southern Lebanon, the Houthi Ansar Allah movement in Yemen, and the Iran-backed militias in Iraq. The Syrian regime has allowed (or has been forced to allow) Iran-backed militias[2] to sporadically fire drones and missiles towards Israel from its territory, but the Syrian military itself has avoided any involvement.

According to some reports, the Syrian regime has even denied explicit Iranian requests to launch a Syrian front against Israel. Moreover, Iran has suspicions that some of its military officials who were active in Syria were assassinated by Israel based on intelligence received from Syrian regime officials, including from senior Assad advisor Luna Chebel. Iran's suspicions towards the Assad regime could be the reason that it has withdrawn several senior military officers from Syria. Also noteworthy is that the Syrian regime recently appointed several new senior military officers who are not known for their loyalty to Iran, and has been delaying the implementation of various economic agreements signed with Iran.

The weakening relations between the Syrian regime and Iran has recently been widely covered in the Arab media, although it should be noted that some of these media outlets exaggerated the situation and published inaccurate reports.[3]

The current assessment is that this cooling of relations will not lead to a total cut-off between the two countries, particularly since Iran has strong economic, political, and military influence in Syria, as demonstrated by its ability to intervene in Syria's domestic and foreign policies and its important role in Syrian society, culture, and education.[4] In fact, several Syrian and Arab writers predict that the Syrian regime will have difficulty eliminating the Iranian influence in the country, and some have even expressed a doubt that any rift between the two countries actually exists.[5]

This report reviews some of the indications of a possible decline of the relations between Syria's Assad regime and Iran.

Report: The Assad Regime Denied Iranian Requests To Launch A Syrian Front Against Israel

As stated, since the outbreak of the Gaza war, the Syrian regime has refrained from carrying out any offensive operations against Israel, in contrast to other Iran-backed forces in the region, including Hizbullah in Lebanon, the Houthi Ansar Allah Movement in Yemen, and the Shiite militias in Iraq. Syrian territory has been used to launch a handful of missile and drone attacks on Israel, but, according to Syrian opposition websites, they were carried out by Palestinian, Iraqi or Syrian factions connected to Hizbullah, not by the Syrian military.[6] Immediately after the start of the Gaza war, and again in April, the pro-opposition Syrian Observatory for Human Rights (SOHR) reported that Syria's military leadership had explicitly banned Syrian soldiers stationed on the border with Israel's Golan Heights from carrying out any military operations against Israel.[7]

According to an October 28, 2023 report in the London-based daily Al-Quds Al-Arabi, at the beginning of the war the Syrian regime informed several countries that it was obligated to keeping the Syrian front quiet and to preventing Hizbullah and Iran from using it in the event that the war spreads throughout the region.[8]

The Syrian regime's behavior is inconsistent with the "unity of fronts" principle espoused by the Iran-led resistance axis, according to which any Israeli attack against one member of the axis is to be met with a response from all the members. Nevertheless, it is not surprising that the Syrian regime wishes to avoid being directly involved in a war with Israel, given that the Syrian civil war is not yet over and the regime is far from the peak of its power. The regime thus prefers to re-establish its authority in the country before becoming involved in another war. The Iran-led resistance axis, for its part, apparently respects these considerations of the Syrian regime, as indicated by Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah's August 6, 2024 speech, in which he justified Syria's decision.[9]

However, according to the Syria TV website, identified with the Syrian opposition, Nasrallah refrained from meeting with Syrian intelligence chief Hussam Luqa when the latter visited Lebanon in August because of the tension between Hizbullah and the Syrian regime over the latter's failure to join the war.[10] The Saudi Al-Majalla magazine asserts that Iran wanted to launch a Syrian front against Israel but the Assad regime did not comply,[11] instead heeding the advice of Arab countries (including the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Egypt), and of Russia, to stay out of the war.[12]

A report aired August 8, 2024 on the Saudi channel Al-Hadath TV likewise hinted that Assad wishes to keep the Syrian front quiet. Sources cited in the report said that Syrian Chief of Staff Abdul Karim Mahmoud Ibrahim has been cooperating with Iran and making decisions that "deepen the subordination" to it, such as agreeing to hand Syrian military equipment over to Hizbullah and agreeing to launch drone attacks against Israel from Syrian territory – but all without Assad's knowledge.[13]

Iran Suspects That Assad Regime Officials Are Collaborating With Israel Against It, Withdraws Military Officials From Syria

In addition to refraining from joining the war, the Syrian regime has avoided retaliating for Israeli airstrikes against Iranian assets in Syrian territory, which have been increasing in frequency since the war in Gaza broke out. The regime has not even made any public statements threatening response or revenge, despite the fact that several Iranian military officials have been killed on its soil.

According to several Arab media reports, Iran suspects that Syrian security officials have been providing Israel with intelligence that enabled it to kill Iranian officials in Syria. These suspicions peaked in April 2024, after Ali Reza Zahedi, an Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) officer who served as the commander of the IRGC's elite Qods Force in Syria and Lebanon, was killed in a suspected Israeli airstrike on the Iranian consulate complex in Damascus.[14] In light of these concerns, the IRGC reportedly launched an independent investigation into the incident and discovered that Syrian security officials were indeed in contact with Israel and leaked information about the Iranian officials killed in the strike, including Zahedi himself. The reports also claimed that the Iranian regime had demanded that the Syrian regime address such issues several months earlier, after the December 2023 assassination in Damascus of senior IRGC officer Sayyed Reza Musawi, but the matter was not addressed and the assassinations continued.[15]

Cartoon on Syrian opposition website shows Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad assisting Israel against Iran (Syria.tv, February 5, 2024)

Iran has also accused the Assad regime of informing Israel about the location of Iranian military headquarters and weapon storage facilities in Syria. The SOHR has reported that, on August 8, 2024, Israel carried out an attack against a Hizbullah missile and weapons storage facility in the base of a Syrian military battalion near the Al-Sha'irat airport, east of Homs. According to the report, the Iran-backed militias in the region believe that Syrian military officers leaked the location of the facility to Israel, and the militias harbor a lot of anger towards to Assad regime as a consequence.[16]

On the backdrop of these events, it has been reported that several senior Iranian officials and lower-ranking military officers have left Syria, out of concern that there is an intelligence breach. IRGC commanders who have remained in Syria have changed the location of their offices and minimized their public appearances.[17] In response to these reports, IRGC sources claimed that only a handful of senior officials had left Syria with the goal of concealing their whereabouts and exposing the spies from among the Assad regime.[18] Regardless of how many Iranian military officials have actually left, it is clear that there is a certain lack of trust between the two sides.

In early July 2024, the possibility was raised that prominent Syrian presidential advisor Luna Chebel had been collaborating with Israel and had provided it with information about Iranian officials in Syria. On July 2, Chebel was critically wounded in a car accident, and she died of her injuries three days later. Despite her prominent role in the Assad regime, Chebel's death was not covered by official Syrian TV outlets and no Syrian regime officials were present at her funeral,[19] leading to theories that Chebel's deadly car crash had not been an accident and that she had actually been assassinated.[20] According to some reports, in May 2024 Chebel was apprehended by the IRGC Qods Force and accused of heading a pro-Israel spy ring, and she was subsequently assassinated by Qods Force. In addition, reports have it that Luna Chebel's brother Mulham, who serves as an officer in the Syrian Republican Guard, has been under house arrest since the April 1 airstrike against the Iranian consulate in Damascus, on the grounds that he leaked information to Israel.[21]

Turkish journalist Ali Asmar has speculated that Chebel's "assassination" was a warning to the Syrian regime to "not play with fire" with Iran and that the IRGC can assassinate any senior Syrian official if the regime collaborates with any country.[22]

Additional Indications Of A Growing Official And Cultural Rift Between Syria And Iran

There have been other recent indications of a growing rift in the official, cultural, military, economic, and other ties between Syria and Iran. For example, several Syrian military officers and security officials who are not affiliated with Iran have recently been promoted, which was perceived as an attempt to limit Iran's influence in Syria's security forces.[23] According to a source in one of Syria's intelligence agencies, these changes began in early 2023 after a meeting between Syrian officers, held in Moscow, in which they discussed replacing pro-Iran officers due to the cooling of relations between the two countries.[24] According to some reports, the new appointments were the result of Russian pressure, as part of Russia's efforts to preserve Syria's stability amid Iran's attempts to provoke Israel and the U.S forces in Syria – provocations that Russia fears may harm its interests in the region.[25] The April 2024 appointment of Syrian military officer Maj.-Gen. Suhayl Al-Hassan, known for his ties to Russia, as commander of the Syrian Army's Special Forces instead of the Iran-aligned Mudhar Khaydar, was perceived as part of this trend.[26] Also conspicuous was the January 2024 appointment of Kifah Moulhem, who opposes Iran, as the chief of Syria's National Security office, a move that was reportedly regarded by Iran as an uncompromising effort to undermine its influence in the country.[27] According to one report, the Saudis have promised the Assad regime that they will support its forces if Iran's influence within them is curbed.[28]

It appears that the economic relations between the Syrian regime and Iran are deteriorating as well. According to the London-based daily Al-Araby Al-Jadid, in recent months the Assad regime has been delaying the implementation of agreements and projects signed with Iran under the pretext of the international sanctions that both countries are subject to. In response, and in order to encourage the Syrian regime to implement the agreements, Iran decided to halt its oil exports to Syria for 15 days, which led to a fuel crisis in the country.[29]

In another example, on April 5, 2024 an event honoring International Quds Day – which was instituted by Iran following the 1979 Islamic Revolution – was held at the Palestinian Yarmouk refugee camp in southern Damascus. Yet, unlike in previous years, this year's event was not attended by any Iranian representatives, and the photos of important Iranian personalities, such as the founder of the Islamic Revolution, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, did not appear on event-related posters in the refugee camp.[30]

Left: An International Quds Day poster from 2023, showing Ayatollah Khomeini, his successor Ali Khamenei, and slain IRGC Qods Force Commander Qassem Soleimani (Almanar.com.lb, April 14, 2023). Right: The 2024 poster, which does not feature any Iranian figures (Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, London, May 6, 2024)

In addition, official Syrian media outlets did not include Iran in the list of countries to which Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad sent holiday greetings for Ramadhan and Eid Al-Fitr this year.[31] It should be noted that the regime's official news agency SANA retroactively edited the Ramadan report, adding then-Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi (who has since died) to the list of leaders who had received a greeting.[32]

Yet another indication of a decline in the relations with the resistance axis is that official Syrian media outlets have uncharacteristically avoided airing recent speeches by Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah. As of this writing, Nasrallah's August 1 and August 6, 2024 speeches have not been aired in Syria, and official newspapers have only published brief summaries of these speeches, without any of the customary opinion pieces.[33]

According to Syrian opposition websites, popular anger towards Iran has been increasing as well, rooted in Iran's presence in Syrian residential neighborhoods, which has been placing the homes of Syrians at risk due to the increase in Israeli attacks against Iranian targets.[34] Much of this anger towards Iran has not been publicly expressed. However, in one instance, a regime-affiliated activist named Bashar Barhoum openly criticized Iran in an interview with Al-Mashhad TV (UAE). Barhoum demanded that the Iranian militias withdraw from Syria, asserted that Iran has caused great suffering among the Syrian people, and even said that he would be willing to be an agent for Israel and to inform it of the whereabouts of the Iran-backed militias in Syria so it can target them.[35] According to reports, Barhoum was arrested a few days later because of these remarks.[36]

Iranian Concerns That Ties Between The Syrian Regime And Turkey Are Warming

Iran is known to be concerned about recent efforts by Russia, Iraq and other Arab countries to advance normalization between the Syrian regime and Turkey.[37] Officially, Iran supports the renewal of Syria-Turkey relations, but in practice, it is concerned that such normalization will decrease its influence on the Syrian regime and might even undermine its presence in Syria.

According to several media reports, this led Iran to raise the subject of the Syrian regime's debts to it, which reportedly amount to $50 billion,[38] in an effort to pressure the regime and send it a clear warning against distancing itself from Iran's influence. In this context, in early July 2024 Iran's interim president, Mohammad Mokhber, submitted to the Majlis an updated draft of a long-term economic and strategic cooperation agreement between the Syrian regime and Iran.[39] The agreement, which centers on ways for the Syrian regime to pay off its debts to Iran, was first presented in 2015 and has undergone several updates. But this time, in an unprecedented and unusual move, its terms were revealed in Iranian media, which reported that the agreement would last 20 years and can be extended until all Syria's debts to Iran are paid off.[40] Several Syrian officials viewed the media's publication of the agreement as an attempt to embarrass the Syrian regime and to pressure it to not distance itself from Iran by exposing the degree of its economic dependence on this country, particularly on the backdrop of the reports of Syria-Turkey reconciliation.[41]

Alongside Signs Of Cooling With Iran, Indications Of Reconciliation Between The Assad Regime And The West

While relations between the Syrian regime and Iran appear to be cooling, there have been indications that relations between the regime and the West are warming. This has led several Arab pundits to suggest that President Assad hopes America and Europe will reward him for doing so, perhaps even by easing the sanctions on his regime, which would enable Arab countries that have already reconciled with it to invest capital in Syria.

One such indication of Syria's desire to draw closer to the U.S. was a remark made by Assad on April 21, 2024 to then-Abkhazian Minister of Foreign Affairs Inal Ardzinba. Assad told him that, despite his opposition to how the Americans have handled the Syrian issue, "we have been meeting with them occasionally," and added: "These meetings do not lead anywhere, but anything can change."[42]

A few months earlier, on January 28, amid reports of a decline in the relations between Syria and Iran, Syrian writer Firas Aziz Dib wrote an unusual column in the government Syrian daily Al-Watan that may have been aimed at sending a reconciliatory message to the U.S. He wrote: "Syria has never borne the slogan 'Death to America,' since we as Syrians do not want anybody's death… Despite America's sanctions policy that has been applied to Syria for decades, and even though relations with the U.S. have been shaky and cool, these [relations] nonetheless exist, to the extent that the presidents [of the two countries] have met… Syria is ready to cooperate with the U.S. in all fields, without exception, and is even ready to assist with regard to Americans whose fate is unknown [i.e. American citizens who have gone missing in Syria and which America claims are being held by the Syrian regime]." Dib added that Syria is not "subordinate" to Iran.[43]

The U.S., too, has apparently made some moves towards the Syrian regime. Conspicuous in this context was the Biden Administration decision in late April 2024 to not pass the Assad Regime Anti-Normalization Act, which would have banned the U.S. from recognizing or normalizing relations with any Syrian government led by Bashar Al-Assad, and would have expanded the American sanctions against the regime. Unless this Act is passed, the current sanctions against the Assad regime, which are dictated by 2019's Caesar Syria Civilian Protection Act,[44] will expire by the end of this year. According to a source in the White House, the Biden Administration chose  not to pass the Act on the grounds that it already has the necessary tools to take action against Assad and his affiliates, and also in response to concerns by international humanitarian organizations that expanding the sanctions will worsen the humanitarian crisis in Syria.[45] Some individuals affiliated with the Syrian opposition have speculated that this was the Biden Administration's reward to the Syrian regime for having denied Iran's requests to use Syrian territory to attack Israel. Bassam Barabandi, a Syrian dissident who previously served as a diplomat for the Assad regime, has even predicted that the Biden Administration will in the future remove several sanctions against the regime and ease the transferring of funds to it.[46]

An inclination to reconcile with the Syrian regime has been noticeable in Europe as well. Although reports on the subject have not linked this reconciliation with efforts to distance the regime from Iran, the inclination is significant enough that the regime may convey to Iran that it can roll back its relations with it due to alternatives that have begun to present themselves.

Several European countries – particularly the Netherlands, Italy, Poland, Malta, Austria, the Czech Republic, Romania, and Cyprus – have expressed increasing concern regarding the large number of Syrian refugees in Europe, and have begun to work on improving their relations with the Syrian regime in order to coordinate the repatriation of these refugees. In this context, the pro-opposition Syria.tv website reported that the intelligence chiefs of Italy and Romania have visited Syria, and that they expressed a desire to renew relations with the Syrian regime and even raised the subject of lifting some of the European sanctions against it.[47] The website also reported that Syrian intelligence chief Hussam Luqa met in Beirut with Hizbullah Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah – who is considered to be Iran's representative in Lebanon – and informed him that the Syrian regime has been in contact with several European countries, which are seriously contemplating renewing their relations with it.[48]

* O. Peri is a research fellow at MEMRI.