Confidential NATO, U.S. Responses To Russian Demand For Security Guarantees, Known As 'Putin's Ultimatum,' Prior To Invasion Of Ukraine

INTRODUCTION

On February 2, 2022, the Spanish newspaper El País published the full text of NATO's and Washington's confidential responses to Russia's demand for security guarantees in the form of a proposed treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation, known as "Putin's ultimatum." The documents were then republished by the Russian news agency TASS.

Russia's Demand For Security Guarantees In The Form Of A Proposed Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Russian Federation

In December 2021, Russia sent to the U.S. and made public a draft treaty between the Russian Federation and the United States on security guarantees and an agreement on measures to "ensure the security" of Russia and NATO member states. As explained by renowned Russian expert Dr. Vladislav Inozemtsev, in the draft, Moscow openly argued that "several countries that spent some time being a part of either the Soviet Union or the Russian Empire cannot be considered fully sovereign (this is a rather old Russian approach) and so have no right to join any other military alliances except those of which Russia itself is a part." Inozemtsev stated: "The Kremlin also openly insisted that the West refrain from setting up military bases or installations in post-Soviet nations and even to withdraw all foreign (i.e., American) forces from the nations that joined NATO in or after 1997. This move made Russia the most profound challenger to the existing world order."[1]

NATO And U.S. Responses

NATO stated that it is a "defensive alliance" and "poses no threat" to Russia. NATO reiterated its support for "Ukraine's sovereignty" and "territorial integrity," including Crimea. NATO also reaffirmed its commitment to NATO's "open-door policy" and asked Russia to withdraw troops from Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova.

The U.S. stated that it continues to strongly support NATO's open-door policy. Yet Washington expressed "its willingness to discuss measures to ensure mutual openness and commitment on the part of the United States and Russia to renounce the deployment of offensive land-based missiles and regular troops on Ukrainian territory."

(Source: El País)

Following are Russia's drafts of its demand for security guarantees in the form of a proposed treaty (translated from Russian from TASS) and NATO's and Washington's confidential responses.[2][3]

Russia's Demand For Security Guarantees Against NATO Expansion

Treaty Between The United States Of America And The Russian Federation On Security Guarantees

"The United States of America and the Russian Federation, hereinafter referred to as the 'Parties'

"guided by the principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations, the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, as well as the provisions of the 1982 Manila Declaration on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes, the 1999 Charter for European Security, and the 1997 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the Russian Federation,

"recalling the inadmissibility of the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations both in their mutual and international relations in general,

"supporting the role of the United Nations Security Council that has the primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security,

"recognizing the need for united efforts to effectively respond to modern security challenges and threats in a globalized and interdependent world,

"considering the need for strict compliance with the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs, including refraining from supporting organizations, groups or individuals calling for an unconstitutional change of power, as well as from undertaking any actions aimed at changing the political or social system of one of the Contracting Parties,

"bearing in mind the need to create additional effective and quick-to-launch cooperation mechanisms or improve the existing ones to settle emerging issues and disputes through a constructive dialogue on the basis of mutual respect for and recognition of each other's security interests and concerns, as well as to elaborate adequate responses to security challenges and threats,

"seeking to avoid any military confrontation and armed conflict between the Parties and realizing that direct military clash between them could result in the use of nuclear weapons that would have far-reaching consequences,

"reaffirming that a nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought, and recognizing the need to make every effort to prevent the risk of outbreak of such war among States that possess nuclear weapons,

"reaffirming their commitments under the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Measures to Reduce the Risk of Outbreak of Nuclear War of 30 September 1971, the Agreement between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Incidents On and Over the High Seas of 25 May 1972, the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Establishment of Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of 15 September 1987, as well as the Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Prevention of Dangerous Military Activities of 12 June 1989,

"have agreed as follows:

Article 1

"The Parties shall cooperate on the basis of principles of indivisible, equal and undiminished security and to these ends:

"shall not undertake actions nor participate in or support activities that affect the security of the other Party;

"shall not implement security measures adopted by each Party individually or in the framework of an international organization, military alliance or coalition that could undermine core security interests of the other Party.

Article 2

The Parties shall seek to ensure that all international organizations, military alliances and coalitions in which at least one of the Parties is taking part adhere to the principles contained in the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 3

The Parties shall not use the territories of other States with a view to preparing or carrying out an armed attack against the other Party or other actions affecting core security interests of the other Party.

Article 4

The United States of America shall undertake to prevent further eastward expansion of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and deny accession to the Alliance to the States of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

The United States of America shall not establish military bases in the territory of the States of the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics that are not members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, use their infrastructure for any military activities or develop bilateral military cooperation with them.

Article 5

"The Parties shall refrain from deploying their armed forces and armaments, including in the framework of international organizations, military alliances or coalitions, in the areas where such deployment could be perceived by the other Party as a threat to its national security, with the exception of such deployment within the national territories of the Parties.

"The Parties shall refrain from flying heavy bombers equipped for nuclear or non-nuclear armaments or deploying surface warships of any type, including in the framework of international organizations, military alliances or coalitions, in the areas outside national airspace and national territorial waters respectively, from where they can attack targets in the territory of the other Party.

"The Parties shall maintain dialogue and cooperate to improve mechanisms to prevent dangerous military activities on and over the high seas, including agreeing on the maximum approach distance between warships and aircraft.

Article 6

"The Parties shall undertake not to deploy ground-launched intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles outside their national territories, as well as in the areas of their national territories, from which such weapons can attack targets in the national territory of the other Party.

Article 7

"The Parties shall refrain from deploying nuclear weapons outside their national territories and return such weapons already deployed outside their national territories at the time of the entry into force of the Treaty to their national territories. The Parties shall eliminate all existing infrastructure for deployment of nuclear weapons outside their national territories.

"The Parties shall not train military and civilian personnel from non-nuclear countries to use nuclear weapons. The Parties shall not conduct exercises or training for general-purpose forces, that include scenarios involving the use of nuclear weapons.

Article 8

"For the United States of America

"For the Russian Federation

Agreement On Measures To Ensure The Security Of The Russian Federation And Member States Of The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

"The Russian Federation and the member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), hereinafter referred to as the Parties,

"reaffirming their aspiration to improve relations and deepen mutual understanding,

"acknowledging that an effective response to contemporary challenges and threats to security in our interdependent world requires joint efforts of all the Parties,

"determined to prevent dangerous military activity and therefore reduce the possibility of incidents between their armed forces,

"noting that the security interests of each Party require better multilateral cooperation, more political and military stability, predictability, and transparency,

"reaffirming their commitment to the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations, the 1975 Helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe, the 1997 Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the 1994 Code of Conduct on Politico-Military Aspects of Security, the 1999 Charter for European Security, and the Rome Declaration 'Russia-NATO Relations: a New Quality' signed by the Heads of State and Government of the Russian Federation and NATO member States in 2002,

"have agreed as follows:

Article 1

"The Parties shall guide in their relations by the principles of cooperation, equal and indivisible security. They shall not strengthen their security individually, within international organizations, military alliances or coalitions at the expense of the security of other Parties.

"The Parties shall settle all international disputes in their mutual relations by peaceful means and refrain from the use or threat of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations.

"The Parties shall not create conditions or situations that pose or could be perceived as a threat to the national security of other Parties.

"The Parties shall exercise restraint in military planning and conducting exercises to reduce risks of eventual dangerous situations in accordance with their obligations under international law, including those set out in intergovernmental agreements on the prevention of incidents at sea outside territorial waters and in the airspace above, as well as in intergovernmental agreements on the prevention of dangerous military activities.

Article 2

"In order to address issues and settle problems, the Parties shall use the mechanisms of urgent bilateral or multilateral consultations, including the NATO-Russia Council.

"The Parties shall regularly and voluntarily exchange assessments of contemporary threats and security challenges, inform each other about military exercises and maneuvers, and main provisions of their military doctrines. All existing mechanisms and tools for confidence-building measures shall be used in order to ensure transparency and predictability of military activities.

"Telephone hotlines shall be established to maintain emergency contacts between the Parties.

Article 3

"The Parties reaffirm that they do not consider each other as adversaries.

"The Parties shall maintain dialogue and interaction on improving mechanisms to prevent incidents on and over the high seas (primarily in the Baltics and the Black Sea region).

Article 4

"The Russian Federation and all the Parties that were member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as of 27 May 1997, respectively, shall not deploy military forces and weaponry on the territory of any of the other States in Europe in addition to the forces stationed on that territory as of 27 May 1997. With the consent of all the Parties such deployments can take place in exceptional cases to eliminate a threat to security of one or more Parties.

Article 5

"The Parties shall not deploy land-based intermediate- and short-range missiles in areas allowing them to reach the territory of the other Parties.

Article 6

"All member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization commit themselves to refrain from any further enlargement of NATO, including the accession of Ukraine as well as other States.

Article 7

"The Parties that are member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization shall not conduct any military activity on the territory of Ukraine as well as other States in the Eastern Europe, in the South Caucasus and in Central Asia.

"In order to exclude incidents the Russian Federation and the Parties that are member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization shall not conduct military exercises or other military activities above the brigade level in a zone of agreed width and configuration on each side of the border line of the Russian Federation and the states in a military alliance with it, as well as Parties that are member States of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

Article 8

"This Agreement shall not affect and shall not be interpreted as affecting the primary responsibility of the Security Council of the United Nations for maintaining international peace and security, nor the rights and obligations of the Parties under the Charter of the United Nations.

Article 9

"This Agreement shall enter into force from the date of deposit of the instruments of ratification, expressing consent to be bound by it, with the Depositary by more than a half of the signatory States. With respect to a State that deposited its instrument of ratification at a later date, this Agreement shall enter into force from the date of its deposit.

"Each Party to this Agreement may withdraw from it by giving appropriate notice to the Depositary. This Agreement shall terminate for such Party [30] days after receipt of such notice by the Depositary.

"This Agreement has been drawn up in Russian, English and French, all texts being equally authentic, and shall be deposited in the archive of the Depositary, which is the Government of ...

"Done in [the city of ...] this [XX] day of [XX] two thousand and [XX]."

NATO'S Response Stating Its Commitment To The Open-Door Policy

"We Reiterate Our Support For Ukraine's Sovereignty And Territorial Integrity, Including Crimea"

"1. NATO is a defensive alliance and poses no threat to Russia. We have always strived for peace, stability and security in the Euro-Atlantic region and for Europe to be whole, free and peaceful. It continues to be our goal and unwavering aspiration.

"2. We firmly believe that conflicts and disagreements should be resolved through dialogue and diplomacy, with no threats or use of force. With the consistent, groundless, unjustified and continuing Russian military build-up in and near Ukraine and its borders, as well as in Belarus, we call on Russia to immediately reduce tensions – this must be done in a verifiable, timely manner and for the long term. We reiterate our support for Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity, including Crimea, within its internationally recognized borders. A solution to the Ukrainian conflict in accordance with the provisions of the Minsk agreements and on the basis of the mutually agreed formats could significantly improve the security situation in Europe and the prospects for stability.

"3. NATO remains strongly committed to the fundamental principles and agreements that form the basis of European security. We regret that Russia has betrayed the true values, principles and commitments that helped develop or formed a basis for NATO-Russia relations. NATO members believe that the best way to strengthen Euro-Atlantic security for the common good is for all countries to adhere to the purposes and principles of the UN Charter, the established international world order, and the package of documents they have signed of their free will – the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, the Paris Charter of 1990 and Istanbul Charter for European Security 1999. Russia is equally responsible for complying with the principles of these documents.

"4. Stable and predictable relations between NATO and Russia are our mutual interest. During the Russia-NATO Council meeting on January 12, 2022, we had the first discussion where everyone could express their security concerns. NATO members called for continued dialogue in the Council on ways to strengthen the security of all parties. Alliance members are ready to discuss security problems with Russia. Our dialogue should continue on the basis of reciprocity and key principles of European security, and should strengthen the security of all parties.

"5. Keeping in mind the security proposals presented by Russia and our own sources of concern, NATO members have identified areas in which we can engage in constructive and meaningful dialogue. Our goal is to achieve tangible and mutually beneficial results. We support the proposal by the Chair of the NATO-Russia Council to hold a series of thematic meetings to discuss the Russian-NATO relationship and the security situation in Europe, including in and around Ukraine, as well as risk reduction, transparency and arms control issues.

"6. Euro-Atlantic security can be reinforced by adopting the following proposals.

"7. The state of NATO-Russian relations:

•  "maximize the use of the existing channels of military communication to increase predictability, transparency, and reduce risk;

•  "restore the mutual presence of NATO and Russia in Moscow and Brussels, respectively;

• "work on Russia's proposal for a civilian telephone hotline to maintain emergency communication.

"8. European security, including the situation in and around Ukraine:

• "all countries shall respect and adhere to the principles of sovereignty, inviolability of borders and territorial integrity of States, and refrain from the threat of use of force;

• "all states shall respect the right of other states to choose or change security arrangements and to decide their own future and foreign policy without outside interference. In this vein, we reaffirm our commitment to NATO's open door policy under Article 10 of the Washington Treaty;

• "Russia shall withdraw troops from Ukraine, Georgia, and the Republic of Moldova, where these troops have been deployed without the consent of the host nation;

• "all parties shall participate constructively in a variety of conflict resolution formats of which they are members, including the Normandy format, the trilateral contact group, the Geneva international discussions, and the 5+2 talks.

"9. Risk reduction, transparency and arms control. NATO allies have a long history of promoting arms control, disarmament and nonproliferation regimes. We remain open to constructive dialogue and discussion with Russia on mutual transparency and confidence-building measures, including the following proposals.

• "Continuing the practice of exchanging briefings on Russian and NATO exercises within the NATO-Russia Council to increase predictability, transparency, and risk reduction.

• "Constructive engagement to modernize the Vienna Document at the OSCE.

• "Increase the transparency of exercises and dawn raids by lowering thresholds for notification and surveillance.

• "Preventing dangerous military incidents through increased transparency and risk reduction efforts.

• "Mutual briefings on NATO-Russia nuclear policy and the development of further potential mutual strategic risk reduction measures.

• "Consultations on ways to reduce threats to space systems, including efforts to promote responsible behavior in space; Russia's commitment to refrain from testing anti-satellite missiles that create large amounts of debris.

• "Promoting a free, open, peaceful and secure cyberspace through consultations on ways to reduce cyber threats, continuing efforts to enhance stability through compliance with international legal obligations and voluntary standards of responsible behavior of states in cyberspace; refusal of all states to engage in malicious cyber activities.

• "Consultations on specific ways to prevent air and sea incidents in order to restore confidence and improve predictability in the Euro-Atlantic region.

• "All States undertake to comply fully with and abide by the letter and spirit of all their obligations and responsibilities in the field of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, including full compliance with the Chemical Weapons Convention and the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons.

• "Russia will resume implementation of the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE), will rejoin the Joint Consultative Group meetings, and provide the detailed annual data and information required by the CFE Treaty.

• "In light of concerns among Allies about Russia's State Arms Program (SAP), including its stocks of non-strategic nuclear weapons (NSNWs) and the growing number and types of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles and launchers, urge Russia to: negotiate with the United States on future arms control and disarmament agreements and arrangements that cover all U.S. and Russian nuclear weapons, including non-strategic nuclear weapons, non-deployed nuclear warheads, and all means of delivery of nuclear weapons to intercontinental ranges; engage in serious dialogue with the United States on intermediate-range and shorter-range land-based missiles and their launchers as part of a broader discussion, including with all Allies, on future steps, and within the NATO-Russia Council.

"10. For more than 30 years, NATO has worked to build a partnership with Russia. During the 1990 summit in London, as the Cold War was drawing to a close, the alliance extended a hand of friendship, offering dialogue and partnership instead of confrontation and mistrust. In subsequent years, NATO formed the Partnership for Peace, with NATO and Russia signing the NATO-Russia Founding Act and establishing the NATO-Russia Council (NRC), which is a unique format and a symbol of the alliance's openness toward Russia. No other partner has been offered this relationship or a similar format. However, Russia has undermined the trust that underpinned our cooperation and challenged the fundamental principles of the global and Euro-Atlantic security architecture.

"11. We keep striving for a constructive relationship with Russia, as long as its actions make it possible. We urge Russia to engage in a meaningful dialogue on issues of concern to all members of the NATO-Russia Council in order to achieve meaningful results. Winding down Russia's military build-up in and around Ukraine will be paramount to meaningful progress.

"12. NATO is not seeking confrontation. However, we cannot and are not ready to compromise the principles on which our alliance and security in Europe and North America relies. Allies are firmly committed to the fundamental Washington treaty of NATO, including the provision that an attack on an ally would be considered an attack against all, as stated in Article 5. We will take all necessary measures to protect our allies, and will not miss an opportunity to do so."

U.S. Response Stating Its Commitment To The Open-Door Policy

"Washington Expresses Its Willingness... To Renounce The Deployment Of Offensive Land-Based Missiles And Regular Troops On Ukrainian Territory"

• "Areas Of Interaction To Strengthen Security

"The United States is getting ready to reach further understandings with Russia – along with its allies on the other side of the Atlantic and partners – on security issues of interest. We are poised to consider arrangements or agreements with Russia on issues of concern to both sides, including the signed written documents, that take into account our respective security considerations. In reply to Russia's request for a direct written response from the United States with regard to the proposed Russian draft bilateral treaty, and in keeping with our commitment to bring our own issues of concern to the table, below are the issues with respect to which the United States is prepared to discuss mutual obligations or actions. The venues for discussing each issue should be taken into account. Some issues will require more than one venue for discussion to ensure appropriate participation by allies and partners.

"We are poised to engage Russia bilaterally in the U.S.-Russia Strategic Stability Dialogue (SSD), in the NATO-Russia Council and in the OSCE to achieve specific security improvements in Europe. As part of these dialogues, the United States is open to discussing security issues of concern with Russia, the United States, our allies and partners. Issues related to NATO, including those raised in Russia's proposed treaty with NATO, will be addressed by the alliance individually. The United States will discuss all issues that affect security in Europe with our allies and partners. The United States continues to strongly support NATO's open-door policy and believes that the NATO-Russia Council is the appropriate forum to discuss this issue (Article 4 of the bilateral treaty proposed by Russia).

"The United States is entering this process in good faith and with the purpose of strengthening Euro-Atlantic security. Meanwhile, Russia has deployed over 100,000 troops on the border with Ukraine, occupied Crimea, and ignited the conflict in Donbass. In its proposed treaties, Russia has advanced certain requirements that undermine the principles to which Russia has committed itself in previous documents. It is imperative that discussions be guided by the key fundamental documents on European security, including the Helsinki Final Act, the NATO-Russia Founding Act, and the Charter of Paris, along with the UN Charter, which enshrine the principles of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and the right of every state to choose its own security arrangements and alliances, in addition to respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression, freedom of peaceful assembly, and religious freedom (Article 2 of the bilateral treaty proposed by Russia).

"We are also ready to discuss the indivisibility of security – and our respective interpretations of such a concept – as stated in Article 1 of the draft bilateral treaty proposed by Russia. We note that it is one concept among a large number of commitments that the OSCE member States have made to each other, and cannot be considered independently. We have a strong commitment to the mutually agreed concept of comprehensive, collective, equal and indivisible security outlined in the 2010 OSCE Astana Summit Commemorative Declaration, in which both the United States and Russia reaffirmed the inherent right of each participating state to freely choose or modify its security arrangements, including treaties of alliance.

"Throughout this process, the U.S. will not retreat from its values and obligations under international law or internationally recognized rules. Washington, along with NATO and partners, will continue to voice concerns about Russia's actions that affect security in the Euro-Atlantic region.

"1. The balance of forces in Ukraine (discussed within the framework of the U.S.-Russian dialogue on strategic security, the OSCE, and the Normandy format).

• "U.S. position: under the circumstances, Washington expresses its willingness to discuss measures to ensure mutual openness and commitment on the part of the United States and Russia to renounce the deployment of offensive land-based missiles and regular troops on Ukrainian territory. We will continue consultations with Ukraine on this issue.

• "Issues of concern: The U.S. is concerned about Russian formations and equipment on Ukrainian territory, in particular, the further military buildup in Crimea and near the Ukrainian border. The U.S. concern stems from the fact that Russia violates its obligations under the Budapest Memorandum on Security Guarantees whereby Russia pledged, inter alia, to 'respect the independence and sovereignty and existing borders of Ukraine' and to 'refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of Ukraine.' Russia has proposed limiting the deployment of intermediate-range and shorter-range land-based missiles (Russia's proposals under the bilateral treaty, Article 6).

2. "Military exercises (discussed within the framework of the U.S.-Russian dialogue on strategic security, the Russia-NATO Council and the OSCE).

• "U.S. Position: In the course of discussions with NATO and allies, Washington has expressed its willingness to discuss confidence-building measures for ground-based military exercises in Europe, including commitments to notify and modernize the Vienna Document. We, NATO and partners, have explicitly stated our proposals for modernizing the Vienna Document at the OSCE. We welcome the strengthening of military cooperation, which is important in reducing the risk of misunderstanding and misjudgment. The United States, in consultation with NATO and partners, and on the basis of similar commitments by Russia, has expressed its willingness to develop in an appropriate context a system of notification of military exercises and measures to reduce nuclear risks, in particular, based on strategic platforms for nuclear deterrence.

• "Issues of concern: The U.S., NATO, and allies have explicitly stated their concerns about large-scale Russian military exercises, and other actions that were carried out without prior notice or proper transparency. Russia's failure to comply with its Vienna Document commitments undermines the foundations of European security. Russia has put forward proposals to limit military activities and improve mechanisms for preventing dangerous actions (Russia's proposals under the bilateral treaty, Article 5).

3. "Military exercises (proposed forums: PRS, NRC, and OSCE).

• "U.S. Position: The U.S., in consultation with allies and partners, is poised to consider additional measures to prevent incidents at sea and in airspace that will not erode fundamental principles of international law, including discussion of additional steps to strengthen the Treaty on Maritime Incident Prevention and establish additional bilateral conflict prevention mechanisms. The U.S. and our NATO allies and partners are still willing to discuss proposals to strengthen the risk reduction provisions of the Vienna Document.

• "Issues of concern: The U.S. is concerned about Russia's unsafe maneuvers around U.S. and allied ships and aircraft in neutral waters and in international airspace. The U.S. is also concerned about Russia's actions which undermine the rights and freedoms of navigation and international trade in the Black Sea and the Sea of Azov. In addition, Russia's failure to comply with its risk reduction commitments under the Vienna Document is a source of concern to the U.S. and other OSCE partners. Russia has called for restrictions of military activities and improvement of mechanisms to prevent dangerous activities (Article 5 of the bilateral treaty proposed by Russia).

"4. Intermediate-range and shorter-range land-based missiles (suggested forums: LTA, additional consultations with NRC).

• "U.S. Position: The United States, in consultation with allies and partners, is ready to initiate discussions under the LTA on the control of intermediate-range and shorter-range land-based missiles and their launchers.

• "Issues of concern: The United States and our allies and partners are concerned about Russia's gross violations of the INF Treaty while it was still in force, and about Russia's continued production and deployment of the SSC-8 (9M729) missile system, including other intermediate-range and shorter-range missile systems. Russia has proposed restrictions on the deployment of intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles (Article 6 of the bilateral treaty proposed by Russia).

"5. US, NATO and Russian military capabilities (suggested forums: LTA, NRC and OSCE).

• U.S. position: the existing U.S. and NATO military capabilities are limited, proportionate and fully consistent with the commitments made under the NATO-Russia Founding Act. We continue to refrain from 'additional deployment of significant combat units on a permanent basis,' and from deploying nuclear weapons to Eastern European countries. U.S. forces in Europe are a quarter of what they were at the end of the Cold War. Further Russian military build-up or aggression against Ukraine will force the U.S. and its allies to strengthen their military capabilities. The U.S. is poised to discuss disagreements and explore opportunities to consider concerns about conventional forces and weapons, including increased transparency and risk prevention under the Vienna Document to address mutual concerns.

• "Issues of concern: The United States and our allies are concerned about Russia's growing comprehensive military build-up, its more assertive position, new types of military capabilities, and provocative actions, including near the borders of NATO allies, as well as large-scale military exercises conducted without warning, continued occupation and military build-up in Crimea and near Ukraine's eastern borders, the deployment of advanced dual-use missiles in Kaliningrad and repeated incursions into the airspace of NATO allies. Russia has proposed establishing limits for military activities and improving mechanisms to prevent dangerous activities (Article 5 of the bilateral treaty proposed by Russia).

"6. Aegis Ashore (proposed platform: strategic security dialogue with additional consultations at the Nuclear Regulatory Commission).

• "U.S. Position: The United States is poised, in consultation with the allies and, where appropriate, with their consent, to discuss a transparency mechanism to prove the absence of Tomahawk cruise missiles at Aegis Ashore facilities in Romania and Poland, provided that Russia provides a transparency response with respect to two land-based missile facilities of our choice on Russian territory. We should consult with our NATO allies, including Romania and Poland, on this issue.

• "Issues of concern: Russia has proposed restrictions on the deployment of intermediate-range and shorter-range land-based missiles (Article 6 of Russia's proposed bilateral treaty) and has previously stated that the US could launch Tomahawk medium-range cruise missiles from Aegis Ashore facilities.

"7. Replacement for START III (proposed platform: Strategic Security Dialogue).

• "U.S. Position: We support the goal of preserving the limits of intercontinental delivery that are subject to START III: intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and nuclear-armed heavy bombers. In addition, we must include new types of intercontinental nuclear weapons delivery systems in future arms limitation treaties. We must also address non-strategic nuclear weapons and off-alert nuclear warheads. We propose that we immediately start discussing the measures that will replace START III. The U.S. is ready to discuss, as part of the strategic security dialogue, how future arms control treaties and mechanisms will include all Russian and U.S. nuclear weapons, including the so-called non-strategic nuclear weapons. We have also expressed a willingness within the Nuclear Regulatory Commission to exchange mutual briefings on Russian and NATO nuclear policy and to promote transparency and risk reduction efforts.

• "Issues of concern: The United States, as well as our allies and partners, are very concerned about the large and uncontrolled stocks of non-strategic nuclear weapons, and the development of new types of intercontinental nuclear weapons delivery systems that are not subject to START III. In addition, the U.S. and NATO allies are concerned about Russia's efforts to increase the size and diversity of its nuclear arsenal, and its deployment of dual-use and non-strategic nuclear weapons near the borders of NATO allies. Russia has proposed a ban on the deployment of nuclear weapons outside the national territory [of the nuclear-weapon states] (Article 7 of the bilateral treaty proposed by Russia). Russia has expressed its concerns about the U.S. readiness to begin discussions on a treaty that would replace START III.

"Together with our allies and partners, the U.S. supports efforts to improve Euro-Atlantic security and believes that dialogue on issues of concern has the potential to yield meaningful results. Such a dialogue should take place in appropriate formats, including the OSCE and the NATO-Russia Council, and should support the basic principles of European security that are enshrined in fundamental documents such as the Helsinki Accords. The U.S. government's position is that progress on these issues can only be achieved in the context of de-escalation with respect to Russia's threatening actions toward Ukraine."