Escalation Games: Syria's Deterrence Policy - Part II: Regional And International Factors

Washington is ambivalent about Bashar Assad's regime. Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Al-Hariri, who recently visited Washington and met with President Bush, said in a press interview that "members of the [Lebanese] delegation sensed the Bush administration's desire to cooperate with the Syrian President, Dr. Bashar Assad. [The American message] went beyond expressing good intentions; it also addressed [Bashar Assad's] fine qualities. In this way [President Bush] wished to deliver a message to Damascus through Beirut."[1]

However, it is hard to imagine a true thaw in relations between the US and Syria, given the strengthening of Syrian-Iraqi cooperation, especially concerning oil, but also on the diplomatic and political level. Secretary of State Colin Powell visited Damascus a number of months ago, with the aim of convincing the Syrian leadership to refrain from violating international sanctions on Iraqi oil, but to no avail. Syrian Oil Minister, Maher Jamal, said in Paris that, "Syria is preparing a project to lay a new [oil] pipeline from the Iraqi border to the mouth of the Banyas." When asked about Bashar Assad's promise to President Bush to transfer all of the oil from Iraq via the existing pipe, in accordance with the UN resolution, the minister responded that the old pipe has leaks.[2] Journalist Ibrahim Hamidi, explained that there was a "misunderstanding" between Washington and Damascus, because Secretary of State Powell mistakenly understood from President Assad, that Syria intends to include the existing oil pipe in the framework of the UN resolutions, while the Syrian president referred to the new pipeline it plans to lay down.[3]

Furthermore, in recent weeks Damascus has invested extra energy to enhance its cooperation with Baghdad. The Syrian oil minister visited Baghdad, "in order to broaden the industrial and economic cooperation with Iraq." It was reported that the Syrian President will soon make the same trip, the first made by a Syrian president in twenty years.[4] At the same time, Damascus sent a diplomat, Muhammad Tawwab, to open a Syrian bureau in the Algerian Embassy in Baghdad. An Iraqi bureau was opened in Damascus a year ago.[5]

The Syrians are trying to play to both Washington and Baghdad. On the one hand, they do not want to officially oppose the US proposed the new sanctions regime because they need the US to pressure Israel and don't want to jeopardize the "international legitimacy," which is so important to them. Therefore, Syria officially expressed only "great caution" regarding the new planned sanctions on Iraq. According to the same tactics, the Syrian Foreign Minister, Faruq Al-Shar', refused to discuss the Iraqi issue with the American ambassador, Edward Walker, a month ago, claiming that Syria believes that first there must be "firm positions regarding the Israeli aggression against the Arabs."[6]

At the same time, Syria is working to improve relations with Iraq and to be the first to reap the expected fruits of the new sanctions regime. Hamidi reports that Syria wishes to receive the "lion's share"[7] in the economic agreements that Iraq will sign after the civil sanctions are lifted.[8] Damascus wants to broaden its exports to Iraq to a range of one billion dollars. Therefore, Syria is anxious to settle the new oil pipe project, the opening of borders between the two states, and other economic agreements. Syria is well aware of the outline of the new sanctions plan, since American Ambassador in Damascus, Ryan Crocker, gave a copy of the proposed sanctions to Syrian Deputy Foreign Minister, Walid Mu'allem. After the Syrians read the document, they decided to accelerate the economic agreements with Iraq.[9]

It seems, in this case, that the Syrian choice between the US and Iraq has already been made. Bashar Assad's recent slew of anti-Semitic statements will not make improving relations with Washington any easier.

Between Washington and Damascus: The Blue Line

The Syrians and their Lebanese proxies were disappointed by the American administration's position concerning the border between Israel and Lebanon ("The Blue Line"). American Ambassador in Beirut, David Satterfield, has recently announced that, "there should be no dispute over the Shab'a Farms, since the Lebanese government officially agreed a year ago to the "Blue Line", and there is no reason to raise this issue again."[10] Syria's Lebanese partners, on the other hand, claim that this was a misunderstanding, because Lebanon was to consent to this agreement only following a consultation with Syria. This consultation was not completed until June 16, 2000, the day the UN General Secretary declared that Israel had fulfilled UN Resolution 425.

Therefore, if the Syrians -- who see the American administration as their main bargaining chip in their deterrence policy -- hoped for an official change in the American position following the Israeli bombing of the radar station - they were in for a disappointment. The Americans continue to support the Israeli position on the issue of Hizbullah's attacks, and call for restraint from "all sides".

On the other hand, the American administration has interests with Syria. Although Syria completely ignores the American interests, both on the Israeli issue and the Iraqi issue, Washington has an interest in maintaining ties with Damascus, in order to facilitate the management of the Middle East crisis and in order to prevent a regional escalation. Therefore, there is no reason to assume that the administration's understanding of Israel's one-time attack on a Syrian target in Lebanon, serves as a green light for Israel to change the "rules of the game".

The Lebanese Factor

Following Hizbullah's previous attack on Israeli forces, Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Al-Hariri criticized its "bad timing" in his newspaper, Al-Mustaqbal. On the eve of his trip to Washington, Al-Hariri feared that Hizbullah's attack would make it difficult for him to gain Washington's and the international community's support for his reform plan to save Lebanon's collapsing economy.

While Syria has now been dealing with the growing Lebanese opposition to its military presence in Lebanon, and with the international demand to deploy the Lebanese army in South Lebanon in order to prevent Hizbullah attacks, it responded by canceling Al-Hariri's planned meeting with Bashar Assad. Some Syrian proxies in Beirut even announced that Al-Hariri's criticism of Hizbullah was a green light for Israel to retaliate on the Syrian radar station.

Furthermore, the Syrian Foreign Minister implied that if there is a conflict of interest, Hizbullah's operations will take precedence over Al-Hariri's economic reforms. "A government that does not enjoy popular support, cannot succeed, even if it receives foreign aid,"[11] Al-Shar' said while visiting Lebanon. Former Lebanese Prime Minister Omar Karami was invited to meet with President Bashar Assad, after the cancellation of Al-Hariri's visit, supposedly because of the Syrian President's "busy schedule", which prompted a wave of rumors in Beirut about "expected changes in the government."

This served as a signal to Al-Hariri that if he does not 'mend his ways', he will be replaced. Upon his return from the US, Al-Hariri had to explain that the editorial in his newspaper, criticizing Hizbullah's attack, was not properly understood. Al-Hariri said that the Bush administration did not raise the issue of Hizbullah's attacks at all, and this is a sign that the administration's economic aid to Lebanon does not depend on stopping Hizbullah's attacks. Hizbullah's "test" attack gave Al-Hariri another opportunity to publicly 'mend his ways' and to announce that "the operation is part of Hizbullah's right to struggle for the liberation of its land from Israeli occupation."[12] These statements paved the way for the May 22, 2001 meeting between Assad and Al-Hariri in Damascus, where coordination was re-set to Syria's satisfaction.

Conclusion

By exposing possible scenarios of escalation in public statements and reliable leaks to the press, Syria is trying to establish a policy of deterrence against Israel, in order to prevent Israel from changing the "old rules of the game," according to which Israel retaliated against Lebanese - not Syrian - targets. This deterrence policy has yet to prove itself on the ground. Hizbullah's last missile attack was meant to be the first test of Syria's deterrence policy. Israel did not retaliate because there were no casualties. Therefore, this first test was not sufficient. Bashar Assad's immediate return to Damascus after the Israeli Security Minister announced that Israel places the responsibility on Syria, indicates that Israel's policy is still an unknown for the Syrian leadership. "The Rules of the Game" will be assessed through Hizbullah's next attacks.

Another unknown is the position of the Bush administration, regarding possible escalation scenarios. The Syrians are relying on American pressure to restrain the Israeli responses. This does not keep Syria from eagerly promoting a thaw in relations with Iraq for the sake of being the first to reap the benefits of the new sanctions regime, in complete contradiction to the American interests. The Bush administration has felt out the new Syrian regime, both by Secretary of State Powell and his deputy, Walker, but these assessments have not indicated any possibility of tightening cooperation between Washington and Damascus. Syria rejected the American proposal to resume negotiations with Israel, and ignored the American position on the Iraqi issue and the American demand to restrain Hizbullah. The Bush administration's attitude toward the Syrian regime, both on the Israeli issue and the Iraqi issue, are the main factors that will shape US policies towards Syria.

*Yotam Feldner is MEMRI's Director of Media Analysis.