The Fourth Political Theory - Russian Anti-Liberal Philosopher Dugin: The Alternative To Liberalism Is 'Returning To The Middle Ages'

During an interview with the Russian Orthodox-nationalist Tsargrad TV station, anti-liberal philosopher Alexander Dugin explained the Fourth Political Theory.[1] Dugin classified three political theories in order of appearance that characterized the 20^th century: liberalism (the first theory), communism (the second theory), and fascism (the third theory). Fascism emerged later than the other major political theories and disappeared before them. The alliance between the first political theory (liberalism) and the second political theory (Communism) and Adolf Hitler's geopolitical miscalculations were responsible for the third political theory's demise. Fascism's disappearance cleared the battlefield for the first and the second political theories whose Cold War dual created a bipolar world that lasted nearly half-a-century. The 1991 collapse of the Soviet Union signaled the victory of the first political theory (liberalism) over the second (socialism). Thus, by the end of the 20th century, liberalism remained the only theory standing.

Dugin amplified: "This means that you can be right-wing or left, you can be of the third or the second theory, but only in the framework of the first theory. And this is where we're at today. The first political theory is no longer a theory among others like it was earlier. It's become part of us. We don't think of anything outside of liberalism. There is only one theory for us. It's simply written in the constitution of the European Union that the EU recognizes those states that share the values of the EU, i.e., democratic liberalism."

However, now that only liberalism remained, Dugin claimed that it was currently obvious that all three political theories are totalitarian and therefore liberalism could be described as "the carrier of the last form of totalitarianism." Dugin explained: "They [the liberals] say the same as the communists and fascists: if you are liberal, then you have the right to be anyone you want in the framework of liberalism and democracy. If you are outside of liberalism and democracy, then you're a dangerous extremist, a fanatic, a terrorist..." Describing globalization, Dugin defined it as "the process of imposing the affirmation of the totalitarian reinforcement of liberalism as the only inevitable ideology. It can be said that globalization is a consequence or a process."

However, liberalism itself has become increasingly decadent. "Today's liberalism is so rotten within that it's easy enough to throw out now, because it itself has recognized progress, freedom, and development to be absolute fictions. Liberalism has recognized that it is a kind of particular totalitarian approach. Behind all these ideas of liberation, freedom, equality, individualism, etc., stands none other than the will to power," Dugin explained. Therefore, to avoid backsliding into communism and fascism, Dugin suggested that a Fourth Political Theory is needed, whose premises are based on the rejection of post-modernity, the post-industrial society, liberal thought realized in practice, and globalism. Hence, one of the first steps towards a Fourth Political Theory is the "global rehabilitation of tradition." Dugin, whose philosophy is influenced by the writings of the mystic Russian philosopher Nikolay Berdyaev (1874 –1948), [2] underlined the need to return to the Middle Ages or looking to them for inspiration. In his book "The End Of Our Time", Berdyaev analyzes the crisis of European civilization in the aftermath of the Great War and the Russian Revolution. Berdyaev tells us that "the modern age, with its failed Humanism, is being replaced by a new epoch: 'the new middle ages,' an epoch of darkness, an epoch of the universal night of history. Berdyaev asserts that this night is a good thing: in this darkness, which is a return to the mysterious life of the spirit, the destruction inflicted by the previous period of 'light' will be healed."[3] Berdayev defined medieval civilization as "a renaissance in opposition to the barbarism and darkness which had followed the fall of the civilization of antiquity, a chaos in which Christianity alone had been the light and the principle of order." [4]

As for Russia's future, Dugin explained that the only way to ensure its survival was to embrace a fourth theory that rejects Western liberalism, since there is no room for Russia in the "brave new world of world globalism, post-modernity and post-liberalism." Dugin said: "The problem is that all of Russian history is a dialectical argument with the West and Western culture, a battle for the assertion (sometimes grasped only intuitively) of its own Russian truth, its messianic idea... The best Russian minds saw clearly that the West is moving to an abyss, and today, looking at where neoliberal economics and the culture of post-modernity have brought the world, we can be entirely sure that that intuition, pushing a generation of Russian people into a search for alternatives, was absolutely well-founded." Hence, according to Dugin,"It is clear that Russia has to go another way. Its own way... In order for Russia to be able to save itself and others, it is not enough to think up some technical means or dishonest gimmicks... In such a situation, the future of Russia depends directly on our efforts at working out the Fourth Political Theory. While locally looking over variants which a globalized regime offers us with but a superficial correction of the status quo, we will not go far; we will only lose time."

Below are excerpts of Katehon.com's interview with Dugin:[5]

(Source: Facebook.com/pg/katehoncomnews)

Dugin: 'Liberalism Simply Won In 1991... And Suddenly... [Liberals] Became The Representatives Of A Third Form Of Totalitarianism'; '[Globalism And Totalitarianism] Are Directly Connected'

Kuzichev: "... There is a fourth political theory, then according to the philosophical rule of the negation of the negation, it's obvious that it somehow negates the previous three. So maybe let's hear a few words about the previous theories."

Dugin: "Yes, of course. This is necessary. In fact, if we closely examine the political and ideological results of the 20th century, then we see that in this century which ended not too long ago, three ideologies fought amongst each other. The first political theory which emerged earliest of all was liberalism, whose roots date back to the 18th century but which in the 20th century acquired full ideological embodiment... There's the liberal political theory, and the second arises as an antithesis - communism and socialism, all the versions of the leftist critique, which we call critical theory. This is left, communist, socialist ideology with all its nuances. The third political theory is overall nationalism or fascism, which attempted to provide a critique of the previous ones, liberalism and communism. All of these three political theories - liberalism, communism, and fascism - were locked in a life and death struggle in the 20th century. First liberalism and communism defeated fascism together, then, as we know, the Cold War began between communism and liberalism. Then in 1991, liberalism defeated communism on a global scale.

Thus, the first, liberalism, won in the battle between these three theories. And now we live with liberalism and everything else falls into line based on this conclusion. If we understand the point of this and draw conclusions with enough intellectual clarity and attention so that our listeners and viewers understand what I've just said, this means that we have arrived at the possibility of understanding what remains. We can group liberalism, communism, and fascism as three political ideologies, three political doctrines, and if we can apply these three political theories to the history of the 20th century, the world wars, the Cold War, the events surrounding the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, and the changes in the world system tied to this, then we are already at the threshold of understanding the need for a fourth political theory."

Kuzichev: "So we have the first, second, and third - this is a chronology..."

Dugin: "Yes, in terms of their emergence... We can speak of a chronology of their emergence as well as, in reverse order, their disappearance, because fascism, which emerged the latest of them all, was the first to disappear. Afterwards, communism, the second to emerge, was defeated. Liberalism, which was the first of the political theories and modernity with which everything began with capitalism, liberalism, Adam Smith, individualism, and civil society, is alive to this day."

Kuzichev: "Moreover, as you said, it won, but not a final victory..."

Dugin: "And this is the most interesting part..."

Kuzichev: "... Where was the flaw in the two defeated ideologies? In thought itself or in application to reality, where it turned out that the thought, even if beautifully constructed, didn't withstand the onslaught of gravity?"

Dugin: "... Insofar as we are now speaking about this on a deeper level and are trying to find an assessment which is not in itself an ideology, doesn't stand on one position, and is not understood as an absolute dogma, we can say that we don't have an answer to this question and there cannot be one. We're just recording, ascertaining that the first ideology appeared, then the second and third which made mistakes in the 20th century and disappeared in the reverse order. We live in the world of victorious liberalism whether we want this or not. This is also important: liberalism simply won in 1991 and globalization, the End of History,[6] etc., are tied to this. It won in 1991 and then said 'now it's me, the only operating system. You can be right-wing liberals, left-wing liberals, but you can't not be liberals. You can't be representatives of the second political theory because Stalin, the Gulag, etc. We'll arrest you'."

Kuzichev: "The third political theory even more..."

Dugin: "Even more. If you say even a word about how you don't like another nation, you're going to jail. In the West, it's very harsh. If you call a black a black, that's it, you're off to jail. It's very harsh. This means that you can be right-wing or left, you can be of the third or the second theory, but only in the framework of the first theory. And this is where we're at today. The first political theory is no longer a theory among others like it was earlier. It's become part of us. We don't think of anything outside of liberalism. There is only one theory for us. It's simply written in the constitution of the European Union that the EU recognizes those states that share the values of the EU, i.e., democratic liberalism.

"If a state doesn't share liberal democratic values, i.e., doesn't have the separation of powers, a parliament, free press, freedom of movement, then these states become outlaws. People professing ideologies other than the first political theory become outlaws. They're deprived of human rights."

Kuzichev: "This strongly resembles the third political theory, but we won't need to speak aloud about this. It reminds us of some of the suffering."

Dugin: "Absolutely right. This resembles both the third and second political theories because all three of these political theories - and this is most interesting - are totalitarian. All three of them. As for fascism, it is obvious - concentration camps. It's totalitarian and it doesn't hide it – 'we are a totalitarian ideology. We're Aryans and for all who aren't - death, we'll intern them.' The Bolsheviks did not call themselves totalitarian ideologues, but of course they acted with purely totalitarian methods. If you don't like something, it's the Gulag, a psychiatric hospital. They insisted that being a human means being a communist or not yet a communist, but in the least sympathetic."

Kuzichev: "Or 'non-party'..."

Dugin: "Yes, you have to be a communist or just 'non-party', but 'non-party' means semi-communist. For a long time, liberals ideologically criticized communism and fascism for this totalitarianism while presenting themselves as the bearers of freedom. They were, but only in relation to fascism and communism. As soon as fascism and communism disappeared, only the liberals remained. And suddenly, interestingly enough, they became the representatives of a third form of totalitarianism. And they say the same as the communists and fascists: if you are liberal, then you have the right to be anyone you want in the framework of liberalism and democracy. If you are outside of liberalism and democracy, then you're a dangerous extremist, a fanatic, a terrorist..."

Kuzichev: "Yes, and you will be fought, shot down. Political death, but also even physical."

Dugin: "Yes. And now liberalism which, of course, compared to the open totalitarianism of communism and fascism, which didn't claim anything else - the communists hinted at it and the fascists said 'yes, we're totalitarian - accept us as such' - the liberals won the whole time because they were hidden totalitarians while the others were open. And now that only the liberals remain in today's global society, we see that liberalism is the carrier of the last form of totalitarianism."

Kuzichev: "Global society is maybe another thing, maybe not. I feel that globalism and totalitarianism are connected."

Dugin: "They are directly connected."

Kuzichev: "... Globalism is a declaration of universality by a theory which is simply, by definition, indulgent of its correctness because it is universal. Remember how Marx's doctrine is omnipotent because it is true. Whether this is in somebody's interest or is the natural development of a political theory, globalism itself is an attempt at global, universal application."

Dugin: "All three political theories claim universality. All three political theories simply believed themselves to be right and that they would prove this over the course of confrontation, prove their correctness, and defeat the others. This was the essence of the 20th century. This worked out for one but not the rest. We can examine success in the temporal, historical world, on the ground, as proof of truth. But this is far from so. For example, our God was crucified. He lost. He was killed. They eliminated him, condemned him."

Kuzichev: "Not in this sense a success, of course."

Dugin: "It's difficult to call this a success. But d a 2,000-year culture and our victory is baseon this victim. A moral victory is not measured by the volume of success or material acquisitiveness. Bringing up, for example, life after death or higher spiritual premises leaves all notions of success, prosperity, and victory to immediately vanish. Therefore, I would not like to scientifically judge just how universal liberal values are. I would just like to state that this is a totalitarian ideology. Here I completely agree with Fukuyama that in the 1990's, liberalism claimed victory, making any alternative extremely marginal or irrelevant. Even China, which, conditionally speaking, clings to the position of the second political theory, fully accepted liberalism's operative system and built all of its successes on opening markets, etc. This defeat was not declared, but ideologically and economically it is a complete defeat. Accordingly, everyone accepted liberalism. According to Fukuyama, this means that it became a global phenomenon, became the only system. I completely agree with Fukuyama on this. We genuinely discussed this in depth and agreed that ideas have meaning. It was the concept of liberalism that claimed victory, simply the concept, no matter whether it appears to be true or scientific. It was ideas that claimed victory and in this case the ideas of liberalism. Globalization is the process of imposing the affirmation of the totalitarian reinforcement of liberalism as the only inevitable ideology. It can be said that globalization is a consequence or a process."

Dugin: 'We Need To... Leave The Matrix. We Have Already Discovered That It Is Not So Easy To Get Out Of The Matrix Because If We Don't Like Liberalism, Then The First Attempt At Rejecting It Is Choosing Something Already Checked In This Matrix'

Kuzichev: "... Let's talk about the fourth political theory. What lies at its heart?"

Dugin: "At its heart is the understanding of everything that came before which we've spoken of. Every word we've said has fundamental meaning in order to understand why a fourth political theory. Besides this, at its heart lies at least one thing: disagreement with liberalism, totalitarianism, the doctrine of the individual subject,[7] and disagreement with the world in which we live. It is a rejection of liberal democracy, a rejection of the notion that liberalism is universal..."

Kuzichev: "Disagreement is a very fragile foundation."

Dugin: "A sufficient one."

Kuzichev: "Yes? Only you have to propose alternatives, obviously."

Dugin: "Disagreement is far from a bad foundation. In fact, if we firmly know what we disagree with and if this disagreement is not simply with something or some kind of annoyance, but if this disagreement, this rejection becomes an opposition and a serious ideological, economic, geopolitical, and cultural object, if we reject this world in which we live, then this is very formidable. Many religions and philosophies are founded on this. "There are religions which say ok, we accept everything, and there are religions which say we reject everything. The case is the same in ideology, in the sphere of political ideology. If we fundamentally do not accept the capitalist, liberal, global world today and all of its institutions..."

Kuzichev: "Then we must propose some kind of other system..."

Dugin: "Of course. If we seriously and genuinely reject this and if this becomes a part of our lives, just as in America how people rejected Clinton's globalism and accepted Trump, without even knowing what he specifically stands for. He didn't say anything in particular, simply 'I am not liberalism, not globalism,' and the people said 'let him be president, tell us more.' This is a very serious factor. You can say yes, sign onto, and accept liberalism and this totalitarian, victorious, unipolar world. You can include yourself in it, be a part of this coding system. Or you can say no. And with this 'no' begins the Fourth Political Theory. If all of it satisfies you, which is almost no one in the forms that it is, not a single person in the world, but many are incapable of reaching a deep analysis of what it is they don't like. What we don't like and what we reject turns out to have a philosophical designation: globalism and the first political theory. Today we have confronted it face to face. Today, it has become a domination over our being, and everything that does not satisfy us in our being is liberalism. If Clinton proposed to 'blame the Russians' for everything she didn't like, to blame Russia and Putin, then Trump proposed to change something. You don't like globalism? Clinton is globalism. Hedge your bets, vote. If we do not like where the world is heading, if we don't like liberalism, if we don't like globalization..."

Kuzichev: "Got it. Even if there is no other proposed direction..."

Dugin: "And here it gets interesting. When we begin to understand that we don't like liberalism specifically and we draw this conclusion like half of Americans have - and I don't think that Americans are so intellectually, deeply immersed in studying Descartes or Hegel, but they understood this, and if even the American people understood globalism can be accepted or rejected and that an alternative can be chosen without even understanding the alternative - then surely Russians can understand this, even with difficulty. And now we move on to the following. If we reject liberalism in the framework of this coding system of modernity in which we live, then we logically are left with going back and saying: communism wasn't bad..."

Kuzichev: "That's what many people are doing."

Dugin: "Many people are doing this. This is like a natural reaction or gag reflex. If someone fed us, we think that we'll go back to this food which didn't make us sick. Now only liberalism is feeding us and we're sick from this, and we feverishly remember what was before, we try to grapple with this, and think about how things once were, how we weren't sickened by this, and how we could get on living. And someone will say: fascism wasn't that bad at all and it was also an alternative to liberalism. And so on. So, in fact, herein arises the Fourth Political Theory. If we analyze further what we propose against this globalization and liberalism, if we propose, alas, communism of the second political theory or fascism of the third political theory, then we can't propose anything more against liberalism.

"Liberals themselves rub their hands at the sight of this. As soon as we begin to criticize globalization, they say these are fascists and communists. When they begin to explain that there is something else, they're told no. 'You're just justifying communism and fascism, you're just hidden communists and fascists! You're either hidden fascists or hidden communists.' In this system of the political philosophy of modernity, there is no concept of a fourth. The meaning of the Fourth Political Theory starts with this assumption that there is none, but there should be. It is necessary in order to defeat liberalism without falling into the trap of communism and fascism. Maybe we can once again go along the same path and build a socialist, totalitarian society in which there will be a lack of freedom, and sooner or later the liberals will come and it all happens again. We can build a fascist state somewhere, as is being attempted in Ukraine, until people will understand that they don't have enough freedom and that racism, nationalism, and chauvinism are repugnant. And then we return to the same liberalism once again."

Kuzichev: "What you've said is quite right. I'll take it from the other side. It is clear that the main word which is embroidered in gold letters on the banner of liberalism is freedom. This is their key word."

Dugin: "But whose freedom? The freedom of the individual. And freedom from what? Freedom from the state, religion, gender, and from all formalities..."

Kuzichev: "From moral customs, and so on..."

Dugin: "From all forms of collectivity; from the state, authority, everything."

Kuzichev: "I think 'justice' was written in gold letters on the red banner of communism..."

Dugin: "Equality."

Kuzichev: "Equality, justice, yes. On the black banner of fascism, there's 'above all' probably written in Ukrainian. The chosen ones."

Dugin: "Yes, the chosen ones over others."

Kuzichev: "But in the Fourth Political Theory, what will be embroidered in gold letters?"

Dugin: "You know, that's passing..."

Kuzichev: "Only 'no' or what?"

Dugin: "Passing over three centuries of philosophy, Descartes' development which as we've said is at the basis of it all, passing higher mathematics, calculations, we can say that it's like a hammer with which we can drive in the nail. It will be clear what will be written a lot later, after a long time."

Kuzichev: "I understand that for now we have only one understanding. Here we are at the North Pole and we need to take a step because any step from the North Pole will be south in one direction..."

Dugin: "We need to take a step in another direction, some other way in the geometry of thinking. We need to find an entirely different approach, leave the coded region, leave the matrix. We have already discovered that it is not so easy to get out of the matrix because if we don't like liberalism, then the first attempt at rejecting it is choosing something already checked in this matrix."

Dugin: 'One Of The First, Simplest Movements In The Direction Of The Fourth Political Theory Is The Global Rehabilitation Of Tradition'

Kuzichev: "All right. We've talked about three centuries of history. But maybe there is something 350 years ago?"

Dugin: "Here is what I propose to do. In order to escape this coded field of coded thinking, we need to deconstruct all of modernity. If we transcend the borders of modernity, we see a different society, a different notion of man, a different view of the world, a different notion of politics and the state. First of all, we finish the Cartesian [notion of the] subject [as the individual] and see something else. Let's search for what there is in this other world. In sociology, this is called the transition from modern society to traditional society. The notions of tradition, religion, and pre-modernity already offer us an undoubtedly broader spectrum of alternatives. If we reject the laws of modernity such as progress, development, equality, justice, freedom, nationalism, and all of this legacy of the three centuries of philosophy and political history, then there is a choice. And it is in fact very broad in the least. This is what I have been saying. This is traditional society. One of the first, simplest movements in the direction of the Fourth Political Theory is the global rehabilitation of Tradition, the sacred, the religious, the caste-related, if you prefer, the hierarchical, and not equality, justice, or freedom. Everything that we reject together with modernity and everything that we completely rework..."

Kuzichev: "Could be the basis of a new 'new time'..."

Dugin: "Exactly. This is what [Nikolai] Berdyaev spoke of: the return to the Middle Ages [in the book 'The End Of Our Time']. Returning to the Middle Ages or turning to them to look for inspiration, and I am not speaking of merely reproducing - that's impossible to do. But we have stood on the path of modernity. We've stood on the path of modern totalitarianism regardless of whether of the first, second, or third theory. We've exhausted all of their possibilities, built all three models. We've built liberal civilization, communist civilization as part of such an experiment, and we've even built fascism. We can now compare everything before us. And if all of this does not satisfy us, this means that the most important mistake was made not in the 20th century and not even in 1991..."

Kuzichev: "But at the time of the first step?"

Dugin: "At the first step. This means beginning to move in the direction of the Fourth Political Theory, exiting the confines of these three political theories and, if such pleases, going back further, because the idea of progress, the idea that we only need to move forward - this idea came together with modernity when they justified themselves, imposed such on us for 300 years, and told us that there is no regression, that development is everything, and everything that came before was bad but now everything is good. We are programmed by this totalitarian ideology of progress, development, liberating or improving humanity's material criteria which, although true, becomes only a restricting factor when we reject the spirit and when everything for us must be here and now. But before Descartes and modernity, people believed in the immortality of the soul..."

Kuzichev: "So you and I have been saying the same thing, but have not yet formulated the word that should be on the banner. It turns out that this word is 'faith'."

Dugin: "Faith, Tradition, Religion, but not only..."

Kuzichev: "Faith, Tradition, Religion?"

Dugin: "Yes, this is the set embodied in the empire. There's caste society, hierarchy..."

Kuzichev: "You know what, wait, I have to think this through for a second. You know, I am looking from the point of view and perspective of a journalist, and I understand that you purposefully use 'we' the whole time - what we should realize, we must move, etc. But in order for "us" to be engaged, it needs to be attractive, but not only attractive, and not only interesting as a conversation for our viewers. This is a fantastically interesting conversation, and incredibly simple. I'll thank fate for bringing me together with Alexander Gelyevich [Dugin]. But in order for 'us' to be engaged, people have to be proposed something that they will want to embody. You understand just how strong language is when we speak of returning to traditions. They'll call you an "obscurantist" and you yourself have mentioned the word 'Middle Ages.' This implicitly causes the feeling that this can't be what Alexander Gelyevich is offering us."

Dugin: "You know, you're rightly speaking of selling and making things attractive. We are already arriving at modernity. Modernity is the cause of merchants, spin doctors, those people who sell and must be sold to..."

Kuzichev: "You can sell anything, it's true."

Dugin: "Absolutely correct. This is not my cause. I don't have to advertise anything to anyone. I don't have to sell to merchants. I'm not a merchant by caste or in my ways. I'm a thinker. I'm a philosopher. From the point of view of Plato, not modernity, philosophers are the human type who should rule."

Kuzichev: "Ok, then I propose that..."

Dugin: "Modernity is meant to serve merchants and shopkeepers, but they are an entirely different function. In modern times, someone sells something..."

Kuzichev: "Well, alright."

Dugin: "As a rule, if someone sells someone something, this means that it is illiquid. I think that when people heavily advertise something, this means that no one needs it. If someone is poisoning something for advertising, this means that he is trying to force upon people something that is not benign. All good people find things themselves, look, and learn that something is really valuable. This, incidentally, distinguishes us from Catholics. We, Orthodox, always believed that we are the bearers of truth who are ready to accept everyone, say everything, welcome, provide shelter, but we don't have to push this. If you don't want to listen to us, then don't listen. You're free, simply come to us."

Kuzichev: "Sure. Alexander Gelyevich is now speaking philosophically. If some advertiser comes to our channel, we won't chase him off."

Dugin: "We'll accept him like Orthodoxy accepts people."

Kuzichev: "Yes, we'll accept him. Now a few words about 'progress.' It has such a pessimistic appeal. The word "progress" has been deeply drummed into us or, according to your terminology, encoded in us to the point that it is a synonym for what is right, good, and is generally synonymous with the right direction. I would like to ask just how deep, in your understanding, is this coding and over how many generations can it be removed from the matrix, even if only linguistically?"

Dugin: "These are the most interesting things, and responding to your question can only be done with great difficulty because, you know, progress ends together with modernity. If the modern world ends, progress will end as well. But with contemporary post-modern philosophy, we are arriving at how we can overcome these three political theories not by appealing to tradition and religion, not by going backwards, but by going forwards. It has already prepared the soil for what I am speaking about now and this has become clear not only to Traditionalists, but also primeval conservatives, and not only to believers or representatives of traditional societies which either have some kind of genetic links to the past or have made the traditionalist choice. But modernity itself and liberalism itself are in the process of post-modernity, subjecting to destruction everything they believed in.

"Today's liberalism is so rotten within that it's easy enough to throw out now, because it itself has recognized progress, freedom, and development to be absolute fictions. Liberalism has recognized that it is a kind of particular totalitarian approach. Behind all these ideas of liberation, freedom, equality, individualism, etc., stands none other than the will to power. The last generation of philosophical thinkers of the liberal West feel within themselves despair, the exhaustion of all the possibilities of modernity, and they have finally showed that this is all a play - progress and development, perfection, and all these so-called moral aspects of modernity were all nothing other than simply a form of political spin doctoring, propaganda, advertising, and sale of some kind of defective product in order to realize the will to power of the greedy, cowardly, cynical, totally racist global elites. And it is not us saying this as conservatives who only need our own and defend traditional values, but the bearers of the Western world, from within this world, who perfectly understand its internal mechanics and who are doing the work of dismantling and decoding these patterns in post-modernism... Today, yes today, what is happening is that the post-modernist who looks at tomorrow from the position of liberalism says that all of these myths by which modernity lived are absolutely unworkable. So they throw their hands up and say there is simply nothing more. They don't believe in an alternative, in a fourth political theory, but say: 'It's horrible that we live so disgustingly. Well, let's just perish in this liberalism together with all of its not working, unattractive, inoperative myths.' These myths have become obsolete, but these myths are not traditional, sacred ones, but the post-sacred, anti-traditional myths of modernity."

 

APPENDIX I – The Fourth Political Theory – Alexander Dugin - Katehon.com

End of the 20th Century – The End of the Epoch of Modernity

"The 20th century ended, but we're only now beginning to realize that. The 20th century was the century of ideology. If in the previous century religions, dynasties, aristocracies and nation-states played a big role in the life of peoples and societies, then in the 20th century politics redeployed into a strictly ideological region, reshaping the map of the world, ethnic groups and civilizations in a new mold. In part, political ideologies embodied in themselves previous, deeper civilizational tendencies; in part they were absolutely innovative. All the political ideologies, having reached the peak of their dissemination and influence in the 20th century, were the outcome of 'the new time' [i.e. the Modern Era]; and embodied, although differently and by different signs, the soul of Modernity. Today we are freeing ourselves from this epoch in leaps and bounds. Thus, everyone speaks more and more often of 'the crisis of ideology', even of 'the end of ideology'. (Thus, in the constitution of the Russian Federation the existence of a government ideology is directly denied.) It is high time to occupy ourselves with this question more attentively.

"The Three Main Political Theories and Their Fate in the 20th Century

"The three foundational ideologies of the 20th century were:

• Liberalism (right and left)

• Communism (including together with Marxism both socialism and social-democracy)

• Fascism (including National-Socialism and other variants of the 'Third Way', the National Syndicalism of Franco, Justicialism of Peron, the regime of Salazar, etc.)

"They fought amongst themselves to the death, forming along the way the whole dramatic, bloody political history of the 20th century. It is logical to assign to these ideologies (political theories) ordinal numbers according both to their meanings and to the order of their appearances, as was done above.

"The first political theory is liberalism. It appeared first (back in the 18th century) and turned out to be the most stable and successful, having beaten its opponents in the historical battle at last. By means of this victory it proved along the way its claim to the full inheritance of the Enlightenment. Today, it is clear: precisely liberalism more exactly than any another political theory conforms to the epoch of modernity. Although, earlier, this was contested (for that matter, dramatically, actively, and sometimes convincingly) – by communism.

"It is fair to call communism (together with socialism in all its variations) the second political theory. It appeared after liberalism, as a critical reaction to the establishment of the bourgeois-capitalist system, the ideological expression of which was liberalism.

"And, finally, fascism is the third political theory. Laying claim to its interpretation of the soul of modernity (many researchers, in particular Hannah Arendt, rightly see totalitarianism as one of the political forms of modernity) fascism turned together also to the ideas and symbols of traditional society. In some instances this resulted in eclecticism; in others, in the striving of conservatives to head a revolution rather than resisting it and bringing society into the opposite direction (Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, D. Merezhkovsky, etc.).

"Fascism appeared after the other major political theories and disappeared before them. The alliance of the first political theory and the second political theory and the suicidal geopolitical calculations of Hitler defeated it at take-off. The third political theory died a violent death, not having seen old age and natural decomposition (in contrast to the USSR). That's why this bloody, vampirical specter, shaded with the aura of 'world evil', is so magnetically appealing for the decadent tastes of post-modernity and why it is still so scary to humanity.

"Fascism, having disappeared, freed up space for a battle of the first political theory with the second. This took place in the form of the 'Cold War' and threw up the strategic geometry of the 'bi-polar world', which lasted almost half a century. In 1991, the first political theory (liberalism) defeated the second (socialism). That was the decline of world communism.

"And so, at the end of the 20th century, of the three political theories capable of mobilizing many millions of masses in all areas of the planet, only one remained – liberalism. But when it was left alone, everyone in unison started speaking of 'the end of ideology.' Why?

The End of Liberalism and Post-Liberalism

"It happened that the victory of liberalism (the first political theory) coincided with its end. But this paradox is only apparent. Liberalism initially showed itself forth as an ideology; not as dogmatic as Marxism, but no less philosophical, well-built and precise. It was ideologically opposed to Marxism and fascism, waging with them not only a technological war for survival, but also defending its right to a monopolistic formation of the way of the future. While other concurrent ideologies were alive, liberalism remained and grew stronger particularly as an ideology; that is, a totality of ideas, opinions, and projects peculiar to a historical subject. Each of the three political theories had its own subject.

"The subject of communism was the class; the subject of fascism was the State (in the Italian fascism of Mussolini) or the race (in Hitler's National-Socialism). In liberalism the subject was the individual, freed from all forms of collective identity, from all kinds of 'attachments' (l'appartenance).

"While the ideological fight had formal antagonists, entire narodi [peoples] and societies (at least theoretically) could select which subject to address themselves to; to the class-based, the racial (Statist), or the individual. The victory of liberalism answered that question: the normative subject at the limits of all humanity became the individual.

"And soon, the phenomenon of globalization, the model of a post-industrial society, and the beginning of the epoch of post-modernity [all] appear. From now on the individual subject is no more the result of a choice but some kind of compulsory given. A man is freed from 'attachments', the ideology of 'human rights' becomes standard (at least in theory) and, in fact, compulsory.

"Mankind, composed of individuals, is naturally drawn to universalism, becomes global and integrated. Thus is born the project of 'world government' and 'world rule' (globalism).

"The new level of technological development allows people to reach independence from the class structures of industrial societies (post-industrialism). The values of rationalism, science and positivism are recognized as 'disguised forms of totalitarian repressive strategies' (big narratives) and are exposed to criticism – with a parallel glorification of complete freedom and independence of individual from any restraining factors, for that matter from reason, morality, identities (social, ethnic, even gender), discipline, and so on (post-modernism).

"At this stage liberalism stops being the first political theory, but becomes the only political practice. 'The end of history' comes; politics is replaced by economics (by the global market); government and nations are drawn into the melting pot of world globalization.

"Having won, liberalism disappears, transforming into something entirely different: post-liberalism. It no longer has a political dimension; it is not a matter of free choice but becomes a peculiar kind of 'fate' (from which comes the thesis of post-industrial society: 'economics is fate').

"And so the start of the 21st century coincides with the moment of the end of ideology, of all three ideologies. They all had various endings: the third political theory was destroyed in the period of its 'youth', the second died of decrepitude, the first was reborn as something entirely different, as post-liberalism, as a "global market society". But in any case in that state in which the three political theories existed during the 20th century they are no longer available, suitable or relevant. They explain nothing and do not help us understand what's happening or to respond to the global challenge. From this statement there follows the necessity of moving to a Fourth Political Theory.

The Fourth Political Theory as Opposition to the Status-Quo

"The Fourth Political Theory will not happen by itself. It might appear, but it might not. The premise of its appearing is disagreement: disagreement with post-liberalism as a universal practice, with globalization, with post-modernity, with 'the end of history', with the status quo, with the inertial development of the cardinal civilizational processes at the start of the 21st century.

"The status quo and inertia presuppose no political theories at all. The global world must operate with only economic laws and the universal morality of 'the rights of man'. All political decisions are replaced by technological ones. Technique and technology displace all else (the French philosopher Alain de Benoist calls this "la gouvernance", "governance"). Instead of politicians, who make historical decisions, come managers and technicians, optimizing the logistics of administrative leadership. Masses of people are compared to the mass of individual objects. Thus, the post-liberal reality (more precisely, virtuality, more and more displacing reality from itself) leads straight to the abolition of politics.

"It could be objected that liberals "lie" when they speak of "the end of ideology", that "in fact" they remain believers in their ideology and merely refuse the right of all others to exist. This is not entirely so. When liberalism from an ideological preference becomes the only content of the available social and technological reality, it is no longer "ideology"; it is a fact of life, an "objective" order of things, which to call into question is not only difficult but absurd. In the epoch of post-modernity, liberalism is transposed from the sphere of the subject to the sphere of the object. This, seen in perspective, will amount to the complete replacement of reality with virtuality.

"The Fourth Political Theory is conceived of as an alternative to Post-Liberalism; not like an ideological attitude in relation to another ideological attitude, but like an idea set against material, like the possible, coming into conflict with the actual, like a not yet existing or being undertaken assault against the already existing.

At the same time, The Fourth Political Theory cannot be a continuation of the Second or Third one. The end of fascism, as well as the end of communism, was not simply an accidental misunderstanding, but the expression of the clear logic of history. They challenged the spirit of Modernity... and lost.

That means that the war with the post-modern metamorphosis of liberalism in the form of post-modernism and globalism must be qualitatively different, must be based on different principles and must offer new strategies.

"Moreover, the starting point of this ideology – the possible one, but not guaranteed, not fated, not predetermined; issuing from the free will of man, from his soul, but not from impersonal historical processes – is precisely a rejection of the very essence of post-modernity.

"However, this essence (as with the discovery of the earlier, unknown, hidden motives of Modernity itself, which so fully realized its content that it drained its inner possibilities and went over into a routine of the ironic recycling of prior stages) is something entirely new, previously unknown, and only intuitively and in part guessed at during the earlier stages of ideological history and the ideological struggle.

"The Fourth Political Theory is a 'Crusade' against:

• Post-modernity

• The post-industrial society

• Liberal thought realized in practice

• Globalism and its logistical and technological bases.

"If the Third Political Theory criticized capitalism from the right, and the Second from the left, then in the new stage this old political topography no longer exists: in relation to post-liberalism it is impossible to determine where the left is and where the right. There are only two positions: agreement (center) and disagreement (periphery). Both one and the other are global.

"The Fourth Political Theory is a concentration in a common project and common impulse of everything that turned out to have been thrown away, toppled and degraded on the way to the erection of the 'spectacle-society' (Post-Modernity). 'The stone that the builders rejected has become the cornerstone' (Mark 12:10). The philosopher Alexander Sekatsky rightly points out the importance of 'marginalia' for the formation of a new philosophical zone, offering as a metaphor the expression 'the metaphysics of garbage'.

The Battle For Post-Modernity

"The Fourth Political Theory is concerned with the new rebirth of the old enemy. It disputes liberalism as did the Second and Third Political Theories of old, but it disputes it in a new condition. The principal novelty of this condition consists in the fact that, of the three great political ideologies, only liberalism won the right to the legacy of the soul of modernity and received the right to form 'the end of history' on the basis of its premises.

"The end of history could theoretically have been a different one: 'the planetary Reich' (in the case of the victory of the Nazis), 'world communism' (if the communists had been right). But 'the end of history' turned out to be namely liberal (a fact that the philosopher [Alexandre] Kojeve was one of the first to assess correctly, though his idea was later used by Fukuyama). But since it turned out to be liberal, then any appeals to modernity and its variants, which in one or another degree the representatives of the Second (mostly) and Third political theories urged, lose their relevance. They lost the battle for modernity (the liberals won that). Therefore the theme of modernity (as, by the way, of modernization), is no longer the topic of the day. Now begins the battle for post-modernity.

"And it is here that new perspectives open up for the Fourth Political Theory. That post-modernity, which today is realized in practice (post-liberal post-modernity), itself annuls the strict logic of modernity – after the goal has been reached, the steps toward it lose their meaning. The pressure of the ideological corpus becomes less harsh. The dictatorship of ideas is replaced by the dictatorship of things, 'login-passwords', bar codes. New holes are appearing in the fabric of post-modern reality.

"As in their time the Third political theory and the Second political theory (understood as eschatological version of traditionalism) tried 'to settle modernity' in its battle with liberalism (the first political theory), today there is a chance to complete something analogical with post-modernity, using precisely these 'new holes'.

"Against the straightforward ideological alternatives, liberalism worked out perfectly functioning means on which its victory was based. But precisely that carries in itself the greatest risk for liberalism. It is necessary only to find these new points of danger for the new global system, to decipher the access codes, to break the system. At least, to try. The events of 9/11 in New York demonstrate that this is possible even technologically. The network society can give something even to its convinced opponents. In any case it is necessary, first of all, to understand post-modernity and the new situation not less deeply than Marx understood the structure of industrial capitalism.

"In post-modernity, in the abolition of the Enlightenment program and the attack of the society of simulacra, the Fourth Political Theory must draw on its 'personal enthusiasm', understanding this as a stimulus to battle, but not as a fatalistic given. From that one can make a few practical inferences relating to the structure of the Fourth Political Theory.

Reconsideration of the Past and of Those Who Lost

"The second and third political theories positioned themselves as contenders for the expression of the soul of modernity. And these contentions fell to pieces. Everything connected with these unwarranted intentions in the previous ideological theories is least interesting to the founders of the fourth political theory. But the very fact that they lost is worth attributing sooner to their virtues than to their vices. Since they lost, they proved by that very loss that they do not belong to the soul of modernity, which, in its turn, transformed into a post-liberal matrix. And precisely in that are their good qualities. Furthermore, this signifies that the representatives of the Second and Third political theories – consciously or unconsciously – stood on the side of traditionalism, although they did not make from this the necessary conclusions or were not admitting it at all.

"It is necessary to rethink the Second and Third political theories, setting aside what should be thrown away, and what has some worth in itself. As finished ideologies, insisting on themselves literally, they are useless, both theoretically and practically – but some marginal elements, as a rule unrealized and remaining on the periphery or in the shade (reminding ourselves again of the "metaphysics of garbage"), can turn up unexpectedly as incredibly valuable and saturated with meaning and intuitions.

"But in any case the Second and Third political theories must be rethought in a new key, from new positions, and only after the refusal to believe those ideological constructs on which were held their 'orthodoxy'. Their orthodoxy – that is the most uninteresting and useless in them. A more productive approach would be a combined reading: "Marx through the positive views from the right" or "Evola[8] through the positive views from the Left". But such an engaging "National-Bolshevik" beginning (in the spirit of N. Ustryalov or E. Niekisch) is not enough by itself, since the mechanical joining of the Second political theory and Third political theory won't get us anywhere by itself. Only retrospectively will we be able to delineate their common area, which was harshly opposed to liberalism. This methodological event is healthy as a warm-up before the full working out of the Fourth Political Theory.

"Truly, the important and decisive reading of the Second and Third political theories is possible only on the basis of the already existing Fourth Political Theory, where the most important – although radically rejected as a value! - object is Post-modernity and its conditions: a global world, governance, the market society, the universalism of the rights of man, 'the real domination of capital', and so on.

A Return to Tradition and Theology

"Tradition (religion, hierarchy, the family) and its values were overthrown with the dawn of modernity. Strictly speaking, all three political theories were thought of as the artificial ideological constructs of people, reflecting (in different ways) on 'the death of God' (Nietzsche), 'the demystification of the world' (Weber), and 'the end of the sacred'. The heart of the modernity consisted in this: in the place of God came man; in the place of religion: philosophy and science; in the place of Revelation: rational, volitional, and technological constructs.

"But if in post-modernity, modernity is exhausted, then together with that ends the period of 'theomachy'. To post-modern people, religion is not inimical but indifferent. Moreover, specific aspects of religion, as a rule, relating to the regions of hell (the demonic textures of the post-modern philosophers) are rather attractive. In any case, the epoch of the persecution of tradition has ended, although following the very logic of post-liberalism this will most likely result in the making of a new world pseudo-religion, founded on disconnected fragments of syncretic cults, unrestrained chaotic ecumenism and 'tolerance'. And although such a turn of events is in some ways more frightening than straightforward and simple atheism and dogmatic materialism, the weakening of persecutions of faith has a chance if the carriers of the Fourth Political Theory will be consistent and uncompromising in defense of the ideals and values of tradition.

"That which was put beyond the laws of the modern epoch one can bravely assert today in a political program. And this will no longer be seen as so ridiculous and absurd as it once was. Although that is perhaps because generally everyone in post-modernity looks ridiculous and absurd, including the most 'glamorous' sides: it is no accident that the heroes of post-modernity are 'freaks', 'monsters', 'transvestites'; this is a law of style. Against the background of world clowns, nothing and no one will look 'too archaic', even people of tradition, ignoring the imperatives of modern life. The justice of this arrangement shows not only the serious successes of Islamic Fundamentalism but also the revival of the influence of extremely archaic Protestant sects (Dispensationalists, Mormons, and so on) on the politics of the U.S. (Bush started the war in Iraq because, in his words, 'God told me Strike Iraq' -- entirely in line with the soul of his Protestant teacher-Methodists).

"Thus the Fourth Political Theory can calmly appeal to what preceded modernity and draw therefrom its inspiration. The acknowledgement of 'the death of God' stops being 'a categorical imperative' for those who want to remain relevant. The people of post-modernity are already so reconciled to these events that they can no longer understand: 'Who, who do you say has died?' But for the developers of the Fourth Political Theory it is possible in the very same way to forget about these 'events': 'We believe in God, but ignore those who teach of his death as we ignore the ramblings of madmen.'

"Thus returns theology. And it becomes the most important element of the Fourth Political Theory. But when it returns, post-modernity (globalization, post-liberalism, the post-industrial society) is easily recognized as 'the kingdom of the anti-Christ' (or its analogy in other religions – 'Dadjal' for the Muslims, 'Erev Rav' for the Jews, the 'Kali-Yuga' for Hindus, and so on). And now this is mobilizing a mass of metaphors; this – the religious fact, the fact of the Apocalypse.

Myth and Archaics in the Fourth Political Theory

"If for the Fourth Political Theory the atheism of the modern age stops being something obligatory, then also the theology of the monotheistic religions, which displaced in its own time other sacred cults, will also not be the truth in the final instance (more exactly: maybe, but maybe not). Theoretically, nothing limits the depths of the attention to ancient archaic values, which, correctly discerned and considered, can occupy a definite place in the new ideological construct. Free from the necessity of having to develop theology under the rationalism of modernity, the carriers of the Fourth Political Theory can neglect entirely those theological and dogmatic elements, which in monotheistic societies (especially in their late stages) were touched by rationalism, which, by the way, led to the ruin of Christian culture in Europe first in deism, and later in atheism and materialism, in the course of a phased development of the programs of the modern age.

"Not only the highest and wisest symbols of faith can be taken up anew as a shield, but also those irrational moments of cults, rituals and legends, which confused divines in previous eras. If we dispose of progress as an idea characteristic of the modern epoch (which, as we see, has ended), then everything more ancient acquires for us a value and persuasiveness by the mere fact of being more ancient. More ancient means better. And the more ancient, the better. The most ancient creation is heaven. The carriers of the Fourth Political Theory must strive to its new discovery in the future."

Heidegger And 'The Event'

"At last we can mark the deepest – ontological! - foundation of the Fourth Political Theory. Here it is recommended to turn not to theology and mythology, but to the depths of the philosophical experience of the thinker who made a unique attempt to build a fundamental ontology – the most summarizing, paradoxical, profound and piercing teaching about being. I am speaking of Martin Heidegger.

"Heidegger's conception, in short, is this. At the dawn of philosophical thinking, people (more exactly: Europeans; even more exactly: Greeks) put the question of being at the center of their attention. But thematizing it, they risk being confused by the nuances of the difficult relationship between being and thinking, between pure being (Seyn) and its expression in things (Seiende), between human being (Dasein) and being in itself (Sein). This error occurs already in the teaching of Heraclitus about physis and logos; later it is seen clearly with Parmenides, and at last, with Plato, who put ideas between man and things, and who determined truth as correspondence (the referential theory of knowledge), it reaches its culmination. From here is born alienation, which gradually leads to the emergence of 'calculating reason', and later to the development of technology. Little by little man loses pure being from view and turns to the path of nihilism. The essence of technology (based on the technological relation to the world) expresses this constantly accumulating nihilism. In the modern age this tendency reaches its culmination; technological development (Gestell) finally displaces being and elevates 'nothing' to the throne. Heidegger despised liberalism ferociously, reckoning it the expression of 'the calculating beginning', which lay at the base of 'Western nihilism'.

"Post-modernity, which Heidegger did not live to see, is in every sense the final oblivion of being, 'midnight', where nothing (nihilism) begins to ooze from every fissure. But his philosophy was not despairingly pessimistic. He supposed that nothingness itself is the opposite side of the purest being, which – in such a paradoxical manner! - reminds humanity of itself. And if the logic of the development of being is correctly deciphered, then thinking humanity can save itself, and with lightning speed, at that, in the very moment when the risk will be maximal. 'There, where the risk is greatest, there lies salvation,' quotes Heidegger from [Friedrich] Hölderlin.

"Heidegger calls this sudden return of being by a special term 'Ereignis', 'the Event'. It occurs exactly in the middle of world midnight, in the darkest point of history. Heidegger himself constantly vacillated regarding the question of whether that point had been reached or 'not quite yet'. The eternal 'not quite yet'. For the Fourth Political Theory, the philosophy of Heidegger can turn up as the most important axis on which everything else will be strung, from the rethinking of the Second and Third Political Theories to the return of theology and mythology.

"In this way, at the center of the Fourth Political Theory, as its magnetic center, is placed the vector of approach to 'Ereignis' ('The Event') in which is embodied the triumphal return of being precisely in that moment when mankind finally and irreversibly will forget about it; yes, even as the last traces of it disappear.

The Fourth Political Theory and Russia

Today, many guess intuitively that there is no room for Russia in the 'brave new world' of world globalism, post-modernity and post-liberalism. Never mind that world government and world administration are constantly countermanding all national governments. The problem is that all of Russian history is a dialectical argument with the West and Western culture, a battle for the assertion (sometimes grasped only intuitively) of its own Russian truth, its messianic idea, its version of 'the end of history', however that would express itself – through Muscovite Orthodoxy, the secular empire of Peter, or the world communist revolution. The best Russian minds saw clearly that the West is moving to an abyss, and today, looking at where neoliberal economics and the culture of post-modernity have brought the world, we can be entirely sure that that intuition, pushing a generation of Russian people into a search for alternatives, was absolutely well-founded.

"Today's world economic crisis – this is only the beginning. The worst is yet to come. The inertia of post-liberal processes is such that it is impossible to change course; 'emancipated technology' (Spengler) will seek for the salvation of the West all the more effective but purely technical, technological means. This is a new stage of the dawn of Gestell, the spreading of the nihilistic spots of the world market over the entire planet. Going from crisis to crisis, from bubble to bubble (thousands of Americans demonstrate during the crisis with signs that read frankly: 'give us another bubble!') the globalized economy and the structure of post-industrial society make the night of mankind more and more black; so black that we gradually forget that it's night. 'What is light?' people ask themselves, never having seen it.

"It is clear that Russia has to go another way. Its own way. But just here there is a question. To diverge from the logic of post-modernity in one 'separately taken country' cannot easily succeed. The Soviet model collapsed. After that the ideological situation changed irreversibly, as did the strategic balance of power. In order for Russia to be able to save itself and others, it is not enough to think up some technical means or dishonest gimmicks. World history has its own logic. And 'the end of ideology' is not an accidental falling-out-of-step, but the beginning of a new stage; by all signs, of the last stage.

"In such a situation, the future of Russia depends directly on our efforts at working out the Fourth Political Theory. While locally looking over variants which a globalized regime offers us with but a superficial correction of the status quo, we will not go far; we will only lose time. The challenge of post-modernity is extraordinarily serious: it is rooted in the logic of the oblivion of being, in the retreat of man from his being-related (ontological) and soul-related (theological) sources. To respond to it with hat-throwing initiatives and PR substitutes is impossible. Consequently, in order to decide urgent problems – the global economic crisis, resistance to the unipolar world, the preserving and conserving of sovereignty, and so on – we must turn our attention to the philosophical bases of history, must make a metaphysical effort.

"It is difficult to say how the process of working out this theory will unfold. Only one thing is obvious: this cannot be an individual matter or the undertaking of a limited circle of people. It must be a universal, collective effort. We can be helped greatly in this question by representatives of other cultures and peoples (both European and Asian), who also sharply perceive the eschatological tension of the present moment and who also seek desperately an escape from the global dead-end.

"But first we can affirm that the Fourth Political Theory, founded on the rejection of the status-quo in its practical and theoretical dimensions, in its Russian version will be oriented to the 'Russian Ereignis', to that 'Event', sole and unrepeatable, which many generations of Russian people lived for and waited for from the beginnings of our people to the arrival of the last days."