The Great Game In The Horn Of Africa

The deadly game has been ongoing for centuries. Mediterranean powers pushed south, deep into Africa with dreams of conquest, or at least of treasure – gold, wild animals, slaves. The ancient Egyptians did so, as did Roman legions, until stopped by a warrior queen in what is now Sudan. With the coming of Islam, armies of Arab slavers again pushed south along the Nile, destroying local pagan and Christian kingdoms.

Egyptian online publicity celebrating new ties with Somalia (August 2024)[1]

By the 16th century, Northeastern Africa was part of the global struggle of empires. A great Islamic conqueror, the Somali Ahmed Ibn Ibrahim Al-Ghazi (also known as Ahmed the Lefthanded) all but crushed Christian Ethiopia. Imam Ahmed's forces in 1529 included Turkish (or Yemeni) matchlock-men and this was reportedly the first time the Ethiopians had faced guns and artillery in battle, an innovation that was initially devastating. The Ethiopians appealed to Portugal, also a rising power, and an expedition was sent from India led by Cristóvão da Gama, the fourth son of the famous navigator. Although da Gama was killed in battle, the Portuguese and Ethiopians were able to defeat and kill Imam Ahmed at Wayna Daga in 1543. The Portuguese had come with their own guns and primitive cannon to match those of the Turks.

Foreign intervention in the Horn of Africa would continue with a British expedition sent from India in 1867 actually invading and defeating Ethiopia's Emperor Tewodros II, who had taken Western hostages. The British did not stay. A decade later, it was Egypt that sought to conquer the region with the Ethiopians emerging triumphant against an invading Egyptian Army (whose chief of staff was an American, a former Confederate general). Egyptian hegemony over Ethiopia's coast would be replaced by Italy, while the French, British, and Italians would parcel among themselves the Somali coast (what are today Djibouti, Somaliland, and Somalia).

The 20th century saw further colonial and imperial adventures in the region. Such efforts probably reached their height during the Cold War when the Americans and Soviet Union essentially switched sides in the ancient confrontation between Ethiopia and Somalia. The overthrow of pro-Western Emperor Haile Selassie by leftist army officers in 1974 would lead the Soviet Union to abandon their support for Somali dictator Muhammad Siad Barre. The leftist Siad Barre would then become a collaborator of the Americans (and the Chinese) while the Soviets relied on a Cuban expeditionary force to maintain control in Ethiopia. When Siad Barre invaded the Ethiopian-ruled Ogaden in 1977, he would be defeated by the Cubans.

It was the overthrow of Siad Barre in 1991, an event that would lead to the destructive Somali Civil War and famine in the Horn of Africa, that would trigger the next spate of regional and superpower interest. UN peacekeepers would be augmented by an elite American taskforce sent in by President Clinton in 1993 leading to the infamous "Battle of Mogadishu" in October 1993. The image of dead American helicopter crew members stripped naked and dragged through the streets would electrify Jihadists worldwide, including a young Osama bin Laden. Bin Laden would write of the Americans in Somalia in a 1996 fatwa: "You left the area carrying disappointment, humiliation, defeat, and your dead with you."[2]

The subsequent 30 years would see repeated international attention, interventions and peacekeeping or humanitarian operations in Somalia, Ethiopia, and Sudan. Strategic Djibouti would welcome American, Chinese, French, Japanese and Italian bases. Ethiopia would invade Somalia in 2006, removing an Islamist regime and leading to the rise of an Islamist insurgency. UN and African peacekeepers (some of the peacekeepers are Ethiopian) would come and go. American interest would wax and wane. And new players would emerge.

Turkey was one of them. In 2011, President Erdoğan became the first non-African head of state to visit Somalia since George Bush spent New Year's with American troops there in 1992-1993. Extensive Turkish economic and humanitarian ties have increasingly included a military component with Ankara setting up a large military base (Camp TURKSOM) in 2017 to help train thousands of Somali soldiers.[3]

Meanwhile both Ethiopia and the United Arab Emirates would forge new ties with the self-declared state of Somaliland (the former British Somaliland), an area considered a breakaway region by the central government in Mogadishu. Ethiopia wants access to the sea.[4] Both the UAE and Ethiopia also maintained ties with the Mogadishu government. Indeed, an Al-Qaeda-linked Al-Shabaab terrorist attack in Mogadishu in February 2024 killed three trainers from the UAE and one from Bahrain at a military base near the Somali capital.[5]

As Ethiopia, Turkey, the UAE, the Americans, and others work to project power, forge ties and extend regional spheres of influence, still another regional power has appeared on the scene. Ethiopia's open embrace of Somaliland has created an opportunity for an old adversary. Egypt announced a military cooperation agreement with the Somali government in August 2024.[6] This includes not only training but weapons shipments and the presence of Egyptian troops in Somalia as part of an expected new African Union peacekeeping force (AUSSOM) in January 2025.[7] Somalia has refused to extend the mandate of the current AU force (ATMIS), which includes Ethiopian soldiers. News of the upcoming Egyptian deployment has angered the Ethiopians.[8] Egypt and Ethiopia also support different sides in the brutal Sudanese Civil War.

Egyptian online publicity celebrating new military ties with Somalia (August 2024)[9]

In a speech earlier this year, Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi declared that "Somalia is an Arab country, it has the right of joint defense according to the Charter of the Arab League, we do not threaten anyone and we will not allow anyone to threaten Somalia." The first two Egyptian military cargo planes with weapons for Somalia arrived in late August 2024. These are the first Egyptian arms delivered to Mogadishu in 40 years.

The Egyptian deployment of up to 10,000 soldiers, described in the media as the largest by Egypt since the 1990 Gulf War, has been well-received by Egyptian public opinion and by the mostly state-controlled or influenced Egyptian press.[10] It can be seen in the context of Egypt's continuing rivalry – an ancient one, as we have seen – with Ethiopia, which in recent years has been focused especially on the question of the Nile waters and Ethiopia's building of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (GERD) on the Blue Nile. Negotiations between Egypt and Ethiopia on this extremely sensitive topic have ended as far as Egypt is concerned but the tension remains extremely high.[11] This new Egyptian presence in Somalia is seen as one way to exert direct pressure on Ethiopia in its perceived "backyard."  

Egyptian peacekeeper welcomed by Somali children (official photo, August 2024)[12]

So far, the presence of foreign powers in the region have not led to outright conflict between the outsiders. Countries like the UAE and Turkey, have attempted to – despite their preferences – maintain ties with most local players. Turkey has promoted indirect talks between Somalia and Somaliland. Whether this Egyptian deployment is destabilizing is the question. Ironically, it seems to place Egypt on the side of Turkey (and Turkey's financial patron Qatar), an adversary of Cairo's in other arenas, such as Libya. Meanwhile the UAE has important ties with both Ethiopia and Egypt. How the correlation of allies and forces ultimately lines up is not yet set in stone.

It also remains to be seen how the Egyptian deployment will develop even if it does not lead to open confrontation with Ethiopia. Will it weaken or hasten Somaliland's embrace of Ethiopia? How much will it cost Cairo at a time of economic pressure at home? Will Egyptian troops become targets of Somalia's Jihadists? Almost certainly. But the decision taken by Egypt is certainly a bold one and likely to be "a major turning point in its foreign policy."[13] The question is whether such boldness will be rewarded and whether it will be a turning point for the better or the worst.

*Alberto M. Fernandez is Vice President of MEMRI.