Map courtesy: outlookindia.com
On June 15, the Pakistan Army launched a military operation, code-named Operation Zarb-e-Azb, against the Taliban and other non-Pakistani jihadis present in North Waziristan Agency (NWA), one of the seven tribal districts situated along the Afghanistan border.[1] There were indications that the army might launch the operation, and some jihadi fighters had in fact begun leaving the district in search of safe places, mostly in Afghanistan but also elsewhere in Pakistan.
In recent years, the Pakistani military establishment had rejected international calls for a military operation in North Waziristan, hitherto a major hub of Pakistani Taliban, Afghan Taliban, Al-Qaeda, as well as Uzbek, Chechen and Uyghur militants. However, the timing of Operation Zarb-e-Azb ("Strike Of Prophet Muhammad's Sword" – "Azb" being the name of the sword he used) is in question, with pro-military advocates saying the June 8-9 Taliban assault on the Jinnah International Airport of Karachi was the immediate cause, while others argue that Operation Zarb-e-Azb was timed to push the pro-Pakistan militants into Afghanistan and garner strategic influence there ahead of the U.S. troop withdrawal.
The matter is also complicated because the Pakistani establishment continues to harbor a number of jihadi organizations which roam freely in Punjab province, namely Jaish-e-Muhammad (JeM), Ahle Sunnat Wal Jamaat (ASWJ, which is also known as Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan or Lashkar-e-Jhangvi), and Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT). These groups survive with the complicity of the Pakistani military, and questions remain whether the military will act against them.
Below are excerpts from two recent articles that appeared in the Pakistani press - one by columnist Dr. Mohammad Taqi and another by columnist Hussain H. Zaidi. Both assess the motives and likely outcomes of Operation Zarb-e-Azb, and whether or not it marks a shift in the Pakistani military's mindset, which over the years has relied on using jihadi fighters against Afghanistan and India, especially in Kashmir.
"Sadly, How The Offensive Is Playing Out And The [Military] Establishment's Domestic And Transnational Shenanigans Indicate That It Is Another Tactical Maneuver, Not A Policy Shift [To Fight The Taliban]"
The following are excerpts from Dr. Mohammad Taqi's article:[2]
"The army has deflected international pressure since at least 2010 to act decisively against the terrorists in NWA [North Waziristan Agency. The former army chief, General Ashfaq Parvez Kayani, had stubbornly refused to carry out the operation, while analysts echoing the establishment's thinking described the terrorists as assets that 'would protect the country's western flank [along Afghanistan].' The devastating domestic blowback, with thousands killed in the slew of suicide bombings, almost each one traced back to NWA, could not convince the ex-chief of Army staff … [Parvez Kayani] to act. Does one thank the stars that the stalling has ended, or is the offensive, christened Zarb-e-Azb … too little and too late?
"The operation has to run the full gamut for one to say anything conclusive, but what seems certain is that the timing and scope is of the army's choosing, as General Kayani had stated … in August 2012: 'We might, if necessary, undertake operations in NWA, in the timeframe of our choosing and determined only by our political and military requirements. It will never be a result of any outside pressure.' There is nothing wrong with striking the enemy on one's own terms, but what about the loss of thousands of lives, hundreds of thousands of Pashtun internally displaced persons (IDPs), and a ravaged economy thanks to this procrastination? Better late than never to begin indeed, but what about the thousands of families ruined as a direct consequence of this disastrous delay? No, they did not delay the operation out of respect for democracy.
"Sadly, how the offensive is playing out and the [military] establishment's domestic and transnational shenanigans indicate that it is another tactical maneuver, not a policy shift [to fight the Taliban]. Just like the 2009 Operation Rah-e-Nijat in the South Waziristan Agency was announced a good six months in advance, the current one has been in the pipeline for quite some time. The Karachi airport attack [of June 8-9] was supposedly the last straw, but there have been umpteen such attacks, many of which were arguably more lethal and more high-profile. The security forces did not budge when their own headquarters came under brazen attack. or the civilians in mosques, imambargahs [Shia religious places], churches, and bazaars were blown to bits. We have argued in this column for years that the Pakistani plan for handling the hornet's nest that it had allowed NWA to become is to neutralize a few so-called 'bad' Taliban and offload the 'good' pliable ones into Afghanistan.
"If the objective were for this operation to be as broad of a spectrum as the armed forces communiqués claim, the military logic would have been a hammer and anvil assault when a panoply of international forces were ready to partner from the western side of the Durand Line [which divides Afghanistan and Pakistan]. But the U.S. and Afghan desire to apply such a squeeze was rejected off the bat. The jihadi groups and religious parties were let loose to raise a ruckus against the highly effective drone strikes. How is it that the same groups and their chief cheerleader Imran Khan did not let out even a peep when the U.S. drones carried out repeated strikes in NWA this time around?"
"Is The Pakistani Security Establishment Ready To Cut The Punjab-Based Jihadis Loose Too? Unfortunately, That Does Not Seem To Be The Case; The India-Oriented Jihadists Are Living Large In The Pakistani Heartland"
"The Pakistani calculus has always been that the U.S. will leave behind a power vacuum in which the 'good' Taliban, like the Haqqani Network (HQN), would lead the charge [for Pakistani interests]. Indications are that the HQN ringleaders, including its head honcho, Sirajuddin Haqqani, and midlevel operatives, have already evacuated NWA [before the operation]. Scores of Taliban cadres of all shades have reportedly been moving out to the Lower Kurram Agency, Orakzai Agency, and the Tirah Valley straddling the Kurram and Khyber agencies. The claims of the dozens of Taliban killed on a daily basis in fighting are not verifiable, as outside journalists are not allowed into NWA.
"One Mehsud journalist told a foreign radio service that in an area where the [military] authorities claimed killing over 55 Uzbek terrorists, the locals saw only a dead pigeon. The Taliban, like any guerilla force, never stay back to fight en masse. They leave behind small bands of fighters and booby-trapped buildings to engage the government forces, while the bulk of the terrorists melt away into the region. Mullah Omar's Taliban did it in 2001 and those of Mullah Fazlullah repeated it in 2009 [during the operation in Swat district].
"A significant number of Taliban are said to be escaping unscathed this time, too. However, regaining the territory will certainly be a welcome development that could deny the jihadis their primary sanctuary and logistics hub from which attacks have been conducted as far away as Kabul and Karachi. The Taliban have almost always taken some time to regroup after suffering such losses. Bracing for the retaliation is absolutely imperative but it is relatively unlikely that the Taliban can project power in a sustained manner inside Pakistan, and they certainly cannot do so without the massive logistical support from the sprawling seminary and religio-political groups' network.
"And therein lies the rub. Is the Pakistani security establishment ready to cut the Punjab-based jihadis loose too? Unfortunately, that does not seem to be the case. The India-oriented jihadis are living large in the Pakistani heartland. In fact, they have the audacity to actually endorse the operation in NWA. The jihadi groups are still being used to neutralize the nationalists in Baluchistan, and yet others have ostensibly been facilitated to stoke the fires in the Middle East. It is only a matter of time before these 'good' jihadis turn on their mentors. One operation in one tribal agency is certainly too little, if not too late. The good/bad jihadi distinction is untenable, and will have to be nixed for Pakistan to come out of this quagmire of its own making."
"Terrorism Cannot Be Weeded Out Unless The Militants' Safe Havens Are Uprooted - And North Waziristan Has Been The Safest Of Them; It Is In Such Sanctuaries That The Militants Plan … Brainwash, And Train Breeds Of Suicide Bombers"
The following are excerpts from Hussain H. Zaidi's article:[3]
"Irrespective of the outcome of Zarb-e-Azb, it was necessary to clean up North Waziristan. Terrorism cannot be weeded out unless the militants' safe havens are uprooted – and North Waziristan has been the safest of them. It is in such sanctuaries that the militants plan and coordinate their activities, brainwash, and train breeds of suicide bombers and dispatch them to the nook and cranny of the country. Places like these, where law-enforcement agencies dare not enter and outlaws rule the roost, are a potent symbol of the terrorists' strength. Since the war on terror has a psychological dimension as well, it was essential on this account to raze such symbols if the war was to be won.
"Located on the 2,560km Pak-Afghan border, North Waziristan Agency has been the proverbial state within a state. The federal government-appointed Political Agent [the chief administrator of the district] was no more than a titular figure. It has been a territory where the outlawed Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) and other militant outfits reigned supreme, and which was the hub of terrorists from Middle East, Central Asia, and elsewhere. Following the operation some terrorists may slip into Afghanistan or in settled areas of Pakistan, if they have not already done so, from where they will continue to mastermind their clandestine activities.
"It is also important how Kabul responds to Islamabad's request to seal its side of the border to prevent terrorists escaping into Afghanistan and take measures to eliminate TTP sanctuaries inside the country. Kabul's response will in part be shaped by its perception of Islamabad's Afghanistan role post-drawdown. But at any rate, Zarb-e-Azb will eat up the terrorists' capacity to strike. More important than that, it sends the message that acts of terrorism on Pakistan's soil will not be tolerated. Again, it's a mind game. In a conflict situation, one side's freedom of action is constrained by the expected response from the other side.
"If one of the adversaries believes that the other will respond meekly to its aggression, its response will be different from when it believes that the other side will not tolerate any adventurism. It was the government's dilly-dallying over the use of the military option that had made the TTP feel it could strike at will. So they attacked army (GHQ Rawalpindi), air force (Kamra), and naval (Mehran) installations."
"The North Waziristan Operation, Even If It Runs Full Steam Ahead And Reaches Its Logical Conclusion, Will Not Be Sufficient To Root Out Militancy [From Pakistan]; Counterterrorism Campaigns Are A Drawn-Out Affair"
"That said, the North Waziristan operation, even if it runs full steam ahead and reaches its logical conclusion, will not be sufficient to root out militancy [from Pakistan]. Counterterrorism campaigns are a drawn-out affair. It took Sri Lanka more than two decades to put down the Tamil insurgency. But once the state had set its teeth into the problem, there was no one stopping it. Incidentally, valuable assistance, in terms of both hardware and software, to Colombo had come from Islamabad.
"Merely destroying militants' safe havens, though exceedingly important, will not make the fight against militancy successful. Such fights are not won only by armies, however committed or powerful they may be. The whole society has to throw its weight behind the government's efforts. Both the people and the politicians need to fully support the armed forces, instead of wasting their energies and public resources on organizing and combating rallies and sit-ins.
"The operation will beget backlashes; the militants in desperation will try to hit both soft and hard targets. The Peshawar airport has already come under fire [when a plane was fired at and one person died on June 24]. But such incidents should not tone down our resolve to defeat them. The militants have found sanctuaries in settled areas from which they can plan and execute their activities. The agencies and the people have to be on the watch. In particular, seminaries need to be closely monitored.
"Tens of thousands of people will be displaced as a result of the operation. A big chunk of national resources will thus be devoted to the operation and its aftermath. But that cost will be far less than the economic, human, and psychological cost caused by the militancy. In the fight against terror, we can only choose between handing over the country to the militants or putting down the militancy root and branch. There's no middle way."
