In the year 2008, a historic opportunity for a political settlement with the pro-independence Baluchi nationalists in the Pakistani province of Baluchistan was lost, undermined by the Pakistani military which is engaged in a bloody struggle to crush a four-year-old armed insurgency in the province. Now, with the Baluchi leaders hardening their stance against the Pakistani state, the Baluchi nationalist movement in the province is nearing a turning point. In order to understand the Pakistani Army’s role in preventing a political resolution of the Baluch problem, it is pertinent here to examine the following:
1) Baluchistan’s geostrategic position
2) Baluchis’ sense of historical deprivation
3) Pakistani Army’s role in Baluchistan
4) Historic opportunity for political settlement
5) The Conflict between the Pakistani army and the Pakistani government
1) Baluchistan’s Geostrategic Position
The broader region of Baluchistan is spread over parts of Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan. However, the territory under discussion here is the Baluchistan province, geographically the largest of Pakistan’s four provinces. Bordered internationally by the Arabian Sea in the south, by Iran in the west and Afghanistan to the north, the Baluchistan province has a geographical area of 350,000 square kilometers but less than 7% of Pakistan’s population. In recent years, it has acquired geostrategic importance for China, India, and Iran. Pakistan’s construction of a Chinese-funded port in the Baluchi town of Gwadar has added a new dimension to the regional geopolitics, with the port attracting the interests of the militaries of Pakistan’s powerful neighbors, especially India and Iran.
With the deployment of U.S. troops in Afghanistan since 2001, China too has shown enhanced interest in the region, indeed expediting the construction of the Gwadar Port. As the port was declared ‘‘fully functional’’ on December 21, 2008, a report by the Associated Press of Pakistan, a government-run news agency, highlighted its strategic significance, noting: ‘‘Gwadar will serve as an energy corridor for Central Asia, the Middle East, South Asia and the western part of Asia. The significance of Gwadar is great to both Pakistan and China. Pakistan will be able to have a strategic depth southwest from its naval base in Karachi.’’ [1] The Chinese investment in the multi-billion dollar project worries India, as it will vastly erode the Indian Navy’s dominance over the Indian Ocean. India has been often accused by Pakistani leaders of fomenting the Baluch insurgency. The port is located at the mouth of the Persian Gulf through which nearly 30 percent of the world’s oil supplies pass. Like India, Iran too views it as a threat to its security and economic dominance in the region.
2) Baluchis’ Sense of Historical Deprivation
Baluchistan is rich in natural gas, coal, iron, zinc, chromium, and other natural resources. Although it is Pakistan’s richest province in natural resources, its people are the poorest in the country and nurse a historical sense of deprivation. The Baluchi nationalists argue that the benefits of the natural resources are accruing to the non-Baluchi populations outside the province while they themselves are deprived of them. As an example of this historical deprivation, the nationalists point out that gas from Baluchistan was supplied to the Punjab province as early as 1964 but Quetta, the capital of Baluchistan, had to wait until 1986. Even today, only four of the 27 districts in Baluchistan are supplied with natural gas, whereas every village in the Sindh and Punjab provinces gets gas. If gas reaches the Baluchis, it does only after the Pakistani Army constructs a garrison in their area. [2] It has also been noted that of the 80 Billion Pakistani Rupees earned in revenue by Pakistan from gas every year, only about seven billion Pakistani Rupees reaches Baluchistan.
The Baluchis resent ‘‘Punjabi domination’’ on their province, a popular term that signifies the overwhelming presence of professionals from Punjab province in skilled jobs in Baluchistan. The Pakistani government has declared its plans to develop Gwadar as a free port in the model of Dubai, arguing that it will revolutionize economic development, export-oriented businesses and communications sector, thereby benefiting the people in Baluchistan. However, the Baluchis counter that its revenues will mainly accrue to Islamabad rather than to the provincial government; and since Baluchis are educationally and economically backward, the project’s benefits will reach the skilled workers from other provinces. [3] The Baluchis point out that in Gwadar, 65,000 acres of land has been allotted to the institutions of the Pakistani military and government officers at negligible prices, with the beneficiaries being overwhelmingly non-Baluchis.
The Baluchi nationalists also accuse Pakistan of occupying their state without a legal authority. On August 11, 1947 - i.e. four days before India and Pakistan became independent at the midnight beginning August 15, 1947 - the British acceded to the independence of Kalat state, which later came to be called Baluchistan, under its ruler Ahmed Yar Khan, the Khan of Kalat. The treaty was supported by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the founder of Pakistan. However, all such treaties signed by the British colonial rulers stood terminated as of August 15, 1947 under the Indian Independence Act 1947. The Khan of Kalat, therefore, issued a royal order on August 15, 1947, declaring Baluchistan to be an independent sovereign state. However, the Pakistani Army marched on Baluchistan on April 1, 1948 and within two weeks all members of the Kalat Assembly were imprisoned. Under duress, the Khan of Kalat had to align his state with the newly created Pakistan, but his brother Prince Abdul Karim left for the mountains to lead a guerrilla war against Pakistan. For more than past six decades, the Baluchis have been struggling to restore their sovereignty.
The Baluchi nationalist movement has broken into periods of armed insurgency in the 1950s, the 1960s and the 1970s. In the mid-1970s, an armed uprising was brutally crushed by the Pakistan Army. However, a new movement for political and economic rights, beginning around 2000, turned into another round of armed uprising in the year 2004, led by underground organizations called the Baluch Liberation Army and the Baluch Liberation Front, the former being formed a few years ago. The two organizations owe their intellectual origins to the Baluchistan Students Organization nurtured by the Baluchi tribal elders and intelligentsia. During 2004-2008, the Pakistani Army and the Baluchi fighters have fought pitched battles, the full details of which are yet to be known to the Pakistani and international media.
3) The Pakistani Army’s Role in Baluchistan
For the past four years, the Pakistani Army has been carrying out military operation at several places in Baluchistan, especially in the Dera Bugti and Kohlu districts where the armed insurgency is strong. The Baluchi nationalists claim that in recent years the Pakistani Army has carried out harshest military operations against the Baluchi people, forcing them to migrate out of the thinly-populated province. In May 2008, Brahamdagh Bugti, the 28-year-old underground nationalist leader and grandson of Nawab Akbar Bugti, the tribal elder killed by the Pakistani Army, told the media from his hideout that about 10,000 Baluchis have migrated to Afghanistan as a result of the Pakistani military action. Brahamdagh Bugti rejected the Pakistani government’s offer to convene talks to find a political solution, vowing instead to continue the armed struggle for independence from Pakistan. [4] As a result of the military operations about 250,000 people are also reported to be internally displaced. [5]
Since the current phase of armed insurgency began four years ago, a number of prominent Baluchi leaders, including Akhtar Mengal, a key nationalist leader, were put in secret jails by Pakistan’s intelligence agencies, with their relatives unable to know their whereabouts for several years. In popular Pakistani parlance, such individuals are known as ‘‘missing persons,’’ a reference mainly to the Baluchi nationalists but also to the Taliban and Al Qaeda militants and others who disappeared in recent years. It is estimated that about 1,100 people, mostly nationalist leaders and activists, are missing, picked up by Pakistani intelligence agencies during the Pakistan Army’s drive to suppress the Baluchi insurgency. [6] In 2006, Pakistan’s minister for internal security admitted that about 4,000 people were under arrest in connection with the Baluchi insurgency. [7] In June 2008, Hong Kong-based Asian Human Rights Commission reported that the Pakistani Army has established dozens of secret detention centers inside Baluchistan. [8]
In August 2006, the Pakistan Army, in its attempt to quell the low-intensity Baluchi insurgency, took the extreme step of killing the internationally respected Baluchi elder Nawab Akbar Bugti. The 79-year-old tribal chief is considered a hero by the Baluchis. The military-led government of General Pervez Musharraf had accused him of leading the armed insurgency. The armed insurgency has not been known for any high-profile attack; at best it has involved using small bombs, throwing grenades, killing opponents, and attacking gas pipelines. Nawab Akbar Bugti’s killing inflamed Baluchi sentiments and deepened their sense of grievance against the state of Pakistan.
There are two key lines of thinking in the Pakistani Army’s drive against the Baluchis. First, acceding to the demands of the Baluchis may lead to the disintegration of the Pakistani state, with the possibility of more demands for autonomy likely to emerge, for example, from the Sindhi nationalists. Secondly, the Pakistani Army sees greater involvement of India in Afghanistan and the region after 9/11. The U.S. forces removed the Taliban from Afghanistan in November 2001. The Taliban, who had been created and supported by the Pakistani Army, fled to Pakistan, paving the way for the Hamid Karzai government in Kabul, that is friendly toward India. Pakistan for the first time is friendless in Kabul.
Additionally, the Pakistani Army thinks that India is aiding the Baluchi insurgents, as several of their leaders are thought to be based in Afghanistan. This means that the Pakistani Army is motivated to crush the Baluchi insurgency militarily rather than permitting the country’s political leaders to negotiate a political resolution. It fears that Pakistan will lose strategic depth in Baluchistan in view of the perceived involvement of India, its traditional enemy. In its drive against the armed insurgents, the Pakistani Army has established a number of garrisons and more than 500 security checkposts across the state, while the Pakistani media is barred from reporting the military operations in the province.
In an illustration of how the Pakistani Army maintains tight control on Baluchistan, at least three times in recent years, the Pakistani and international aid agencies have been prevented from providing aid to the Baluchis in times of disasters. The United Nations and the Edhi Foundation, Pakistan’s most trusted Nobel-deserving non-governmental rescue service, made attempts to help a large number of Baluchis displaced by the military operation in Kohlu and Dera Bugti districts. Pakistani commentators point out that General Pervez Musharraf, who was accusing the West of not aiding the people affected by the 2005 earthquake in Kashmir, did not allow the UN or Pakistan’s own aid agencies to enter Baluchistan. Similarly, in July 2004, hundreds of Baluchis were killed and thousands of homes were destroyed in floods, but the military regime did not permit an appeal from Baluchistan’s the then Chief Minister Jam Muhammad Yusuf for international aid to go ahead. In 2008, an earthquake killed more than 200 Baluchis and thousands were displaces, but Pakistan’s own aid agencies were denied entry to the earthquake zone to help provide shelters. Pakistani commentators argue that the military wants to keep its operation against the Baluchi insurgents secret. The Pakistani media is totally barred from entering the Kohlu and Dera Bugti districts. In June 2008, a Pakistani daily accused the Pakistani military and its intelligence agencies of ruling over the province of Baluchistan. [9]
4) The Historic Opportunity for Political Settlement
Traditionally, the political leaders in Baluchistan have always been at odds with the federal government over the sharing of resources and revenues. However, in the wake of the February 2008 provincial and parliamentary elections in Pakistan, there did emerge a historic opportunity for dialogue and understanding between the Baluchi nationalists and Pakistan. Although the elections were boycotted by the nationalists, the victory of Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) both at the federal level and in Baluchistan created a new opportunity for peace. Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani and Chief Minister Nawab Aslam Raisani respectively formed governments in Islamabad and Baluchistan. Since both the leaders belonged to a single party, there were no differences between the federal and provincial leaders in their thinking about a way forward for the Baluchis. This new opportunity for a single party to formulate policies both at the federal level and in the province created new hope for political settlement.
In fact, the Gilani government, which had won the February elections on the promise of national reconciliation on the outstanding issues confronting Pakistan, took the historic step of apologizing to the Baluchis for the injustices committed against them over the years, signalling Islamabad’s serious attempt to resolve the issue politically. As a gesture of goodwill, Prime Minister Gilani released Baluchi nationalist leader and Baluchistan’s former Chief Minister Akhtar Mengal from prison in May 2008. He had been arrested by the military-led government of General President Pervez Musharraf in 2006. His release was seen as the new government’s serious commitment for reconciliation in Baluchistan. [10]
At the provincial level too, Aslam Raisani, the Chief Minister of Baluchistan, made an effort for reconciliation with the Baluchi nationalists, stating soon after taking the oath of office on April 9, 2008: ‘‘It will be incorrect to describe as terrorists those who took up arms to defend their rights in Baluchistan. The meaning of ‘terrorism’ will have to be changed. There is a need for foresight in handling the problems of Baluchistan.’’ [11] Aslam Raisani recognized that the release of Akhtar Mengal and other Baluchi nationalists would give a new impetus to the process of reconciliation in Baluchistan. [12]
On their part, the over-ground Baluchi leaders expressed readiness to negotiate. While the armed insurgency continued, Akhtar Mengal made a courageous offer of conditional talks with Islamabad for a political settlement. His offer of talks came despite serious opposition by hardline underground leaders in the Baluchi movement. Some of the demands Akhtar Mengal and others made during various public speeches included: an open inquiry into the killing of Nawab Akbar Bugti, a recognition in some form of the Baluchis’ right over their land and natural resources, closing down of garrisons in the province, withdrawal of Pakistani troops from Baluchistan, tracing the missing Baluchi leaders, protection for locals’ jobs against the non-Baluchi professionals and traders, and so on. In fact, these are also the demands made unanimously by the politicians of Pakistan’s ruling and opposition parties on the floor of the Pakistani Senate. [13] Even the religious parties have backed the Baluchi nationalists’ demands. There could not be a better-timed convergence of Baluchi nationalists’ viewpoint with that of the ruling and the opposition parties in Pakistan. Prime Minister Gilani, noting a moderation in Baluchi leaders’ approach, welcomed Akhtar Mengal’s offer of talks with the government, describing it as ‘‘encouraging’’ and promising to take steps to restore the confidence of the Baluchi people. [14]
It will be pertinent here to point out that the objectives of the Baluchi nationalist movement are sometimes not clear, though demands for independence or greater autonomy within Pakistan are raised publicly. This confused situation is extremely beneficial, as it gives space for negotiations for a political settlement. In releasing Akhtar Mengal from prison, the Gilani government was hoping to end the armed insurgency. However, rather than ending the insurgency, a political settlement now appears, more than ever, unlikely. This is due to two factors: first, a strong sense of grievance among the Baluchis; and second, the continued Pakistani military operations against the Baluchi fighters since 2004.
During 2008, the Baluchi leaders also realized, though not for the first time, that there were no takers for their offer of political dialogue to resolve the Baluchi issue because of the interference from the military establishment. This realization has been articulated by the key leaders of the Baluchi movement: Akhtar Mengal, Sanaullah Baloch, Talal Bugti and underground leader Brahamdag Bugti; as well as also by Nawab Raisani, the Chief Minister of Baluchistan himself.
A few weeks after his release, Akhtar Mengal noted that the February 2008 elections had brought no positive change in Baluchistan, adding: ‘‘After the elections, changes can be seen in other parts of the country, but the control of [the military intelligence] agencies is strong on Baluchistan.’’ [15] Mengal hinted to the Pakistani talks with the Taliban in the North West Frontier Province. Hardening his stance, he added: ‘‘History is witness to the fact that Baluchistan’s unification with Pakistan was brought about by force. And when a region is united by force, it is an occupied territory.’’ [16] He demanded that the Pakistani troops must withdraw before any talks for a political settlement. [17] Noting the hold of the military on the ruling establishment at the time when General Pervez Musharraf was still the president, he stated: ‘‘The killers of Nawab Akbar Bugti are still present in the government, legislatures and the Presidential Palace [President Musharraf]. We will continue our struggle. We will not relent.’’ [18]
At a public meeting in June 2008 in the town of Khazdar in Baluchistan, Akhtar Mengal asked the government of Pakistan to scrap the Chinese-backed Gwadar Port. He argued that only the Baluchis are the owners of land and urged the government to cancel land allotment to government officials and businessmen coming from other provinces to settle there. The Baluchi leader added that confidence-building measures are required before any talks with the government, noting that the talks can be held only if the government accepted the ownership of Baluchis on their land. [19] Significantly, Akhtar Mengal also demanded that the Pakistani government do not go ahead with the proposed Iran-Pakistan-India gas-pipeline that will run through Baluchistan. Under the U.S. pressure not to cut deals with Iran, India for now has withdrawn from the project. Pakistan nevertheless has stated that it will unilaterally sign the agreement with Iran, with the possibility of China becoming another partner. [20] One of the key principles that underpin the demands of the Baluchi leaders is an urge for the recognition of the native population’s rights over their land and natural resources. [21]
5) The Conflict between the Pakistani army and the Pakistani government
With the prospects of peace floundering, Baluchi nationalists and others have publicly accused the Pakistani Army of interfering in politics. In fact, Aslam Raisani, the Chief Minister of Baluchistan, too has gone on record to say that the Pakistani military is not allowing a political settlement to take place. Soon after taking the oath of office, Chief Minister Raisani had begun founding a conciliatory approach toward the Baluchi insurgents. However, not even into his second week in office, Chief Minister Raisani’s efforts for talks with Baluchi leaders encountered a roadblock from the military establishment. He noted: ‘‘Some people connected with the establishment are creating hurdles in our path [for reconciliation]. The military and the civil bureaucracy have been ruling this country [Pakistan].’’ [22]
In an editorial last June, the Urdu-language newspaper Roznama Jasarat - a pro-Jamaat-e-Islami daily that stands for Pakistan’s geographical and ideological unity - summed up the situation in Baluchistan: ‘‘[After the new government came to power] no real progress has been made for the resolution of the Baluchistan problem. Some foreign forces are taking advantage of the inflamed sentiments of the people of Baluchistan. In this regard, the role of Pakistan’s secret agencies is mysterious and doubtful.... On the pretext of the war against terror, Pakistan has practically turned into the [intelligence] agencies’ state, more than a police state. Thousands of youths of Baluchistan, were kidnapped by secret agencies and are missing.’’ [23]
In June 2008, the well-known Senator Sanaullah Baloch, one of the key Baluchi leaders, condemned the military operations in Baluchistan, Nawab Akbar Bugti’s killing and the arrest previously of Akhtar Mengal by the military-led government of General Pervez Musharraf, and at the end of his speech in the Senate, stunned the people of Pakistan, by announcing his resignation from the house. Sanaullah Baloch pointed out the discriminatory approach of the Pakistani establishment, arguing that if the Gilani government could expedite the implementation of Islamic Shari’a in the North West Frontier Province through executive orders, why it couldn’t resolve Baluchistan’s problems as quickly. [24]
Senior politicians present in the Senate realized the significance of his resignation. Leader of the House in the Senate Mian Raza Rabbani, along with other politicians from ruling and opposition parties, rushed to Sanaullah Baloch, apologizing for the military operation in Baluchistan. [25] Rabbani remarked that the resignation of Sanaullah Baloch was the bigger news than the assassination of Benazir Bhutto. [26] Several political leaders begged the Baluchi leader to re-consider his resignation. However, in a sign of growing hopelessness for a political settlement, Sanaullah Baloch, who had just returned from a 19-month self-exile from abroad, refused to reconsider his resignation. He added: ‘‘I am resigning from the House as per the decision of my party [Baluchistan National Party]; [1] will support the process of reconciliation even by being outside the House.’’ [27] On this occasion, 22 senators from Baluchistan also threatened, in a show of solidarity with him, to resign from the Pakistani Senate.
In October last, the Gilani government made another attempt for peace, presenting a plan for dialogue with the Baluchi leaders. However, the Baluchi leaders turned down the offer, demanding the release of hundreds of their detained comrades first. The leaders noted that the government’s claim that it has released 830 Baluchs as a goodwill gesture and closed down about 1,000 cases against them is incorrect. [28] The Baluchi leaders think that the government has to start a series of confidence-building measures before the talks could be held. Other than the release of Akhtar Mengal, the government has no such measures to show despite being ten months in power. There have been growing concerns now as to whether the Gilani government is able to, considering the opposition from the military establishment, seize the moment and engage with the Baluchi nationalists. [29]
Despite its best intentions, the federal government has indeed proved to be ineffective on many other fronts, with a sole claim to its short-lived fame of making controversial peace deals with the Taliban in the North West Frontier Province. Its efforts for political settlement in Baluchistan stand thwarted. At the end of 2008, it emerged again that the Pakistani Army is preventing a political rapprochement between the Baluchi leaders and the civilian political leaders in Islamabad. Talal Akbar Bugti, son of assassinated Baluchi elder Nawab Akbar Bugti, met with President Asif Zardari in late-December 2008 in Islamabad, demanding that the military operation be stopped immediately and the country’s intelligence agencies quit the province. His meeting with President Zardari can be interpreted as the Baluchi leaders’ flexibility to seek the realization of their objectives within the parameters of Pakistani constitution.
However, as Talal Akbar Bugti was meeting with the president, the Pakistani Army gave a contrary signal by stepping up its operation. On December 21, 2008, Talal Bugti warned: ‘‘We will not be silent on the excesses and injustices being committed in our province. If our voice is not heard and the current [Pakistani] rulers do not remedy the situation, the conditions here will become worse than [the conditions] in Eastern Pakistan [Bangladesh before its creation in 1971].’’ [30] This fact that the civilian government led by President Asif Zardari and Prime Minister Yousuf Raza Gilani is not in control of the situation on the ground in Baluchistan was specifically noted by Talal Bugti: ‘‘After the president’s assurances [for a political rapprochement], the military operation underway in Baluchistan has picked up momentum.’’ [31]
**Tufail Ahmad is Director of Urdu-Pashtu Media Project at the Middle East Media Research Institute (www.memri.org ).
Endnotes:
[1] Associated Press of Pakistan, Pakistan, December 21, 2008.
[2] Newsline, Pakistan, September 2006.
[3] Dawn, Pakistan, February 12, 2007.
[4] Roznama Jasarat, Pakistan, May 19, 2008.
[5] The Nation, Pakistan, June 12, 2008.
[6] Roznama Jang, Pakistan, May 28, 2008.
[7] Newsline, Pakistan, September 2006.
[8] Roznama Jasarat, Pakistan, June 6, 2008.
[9] Roznama Jasarat, Pakistan, June 1, 2008.
[10] Roznama Jasarat, Pakistan, May 10, 2008.
[11] Roznama Nawa-i-Waqt, Pakistan, April 10, 2008.
[12] The News, Pakistan, May 4, 2008.
[13] Roznama Jasarat, Pakistan, June 7, 2008.
[14] Dawn, Pakistan, May 30, 2008.
[15] Roznama Jang, Pakistan, June 1, 2008.
[16] Roznama Jang, Pakistan, June 1, 2008.
[17] Roznama Jang, Pakistan, June 1, 2008.
[18] Roznama Jasarat, Pakistan, May 10, 2008.
[19] Roznama Jang, Pakistan, June 8, 2008.
[20] Roznama Mashriq, Pakistan, May 28, 2008.
[21] Daily Times, Pakistan, June 10, 2008.
[22] Roznama Nawa-i-Waqt, Pakistan, April 17, 2008.
[23] Roznama Jasarat, Pakistan, June 1, 2008.
[24] Roznama Express, Pakistan, June 7, 2008.
[25] Roznama Express, Pakistan, June 7, 2008.
[26] Roznama Jasarat, Pakistan, June 7, 2008.
[27] Roznama Express, Pakistan, June 7, 2008.
[28] Roznama Jasarat, Pakistan, October 29, 2008.
[29] The News, Pakistan, May 4, 2008.
[30] Roznama Jang, Pakistan, December 22, 2008.
[31] Roznama Jang, Pakistan, December 22, 2008.
