In light of the difficulties encountered in the direct negotiations with Israel and the pessimism among the Palestinians regarding the chances of making headway in these talks, the subject of alternatives to the negotiations has gained prominence in the Palestinian public agenda. Fatah Central Committee member Muhammad Dahlan said that the Palestinian leadership has formed a committee to examine such alternatives, to be employed in case the U.S. fails in its efforts to halt construction in the settlements.[1]
The alternatives being discussed are: on the diplomatic level, seeking a United Nations Security Council recognition of an in dependent Palestinian state, while circumventing the American power of veto; and taking steps against Israel, including a reassessment of the agreements already signed with it. On the level of action on the ground, an alternative frequently mentioned is intensifying the resistance, especially the unarmed popular resistance, as an exclusive policy or concurrently with the talks.
Following are excerpts from statements and articles on this issue:
Abbas: Our First Choice Is to Resume Direct Negotiations, but There Are Other Alternatives as Well
At the Sirt Summit in Libya, PA President Mahmoud Abbas mentioned the following alternatives to negotiations: seeking U.S. and Security Council recognition of an independent Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, or asking to the U.N. General Assembly to place the Palestinian territories under international custody.[2]
In an interview with the Kuwaiti daily Al-Anba, Abbas said: "We will start with a halt to [construction in] the settlements and a return to negotiations. That is the first option, and if we [i.e., the Palestinians and the Israelis] see eye to eye, we will start negotiating the issues of security and the borders. If this first option does not work, we will appeal to the U.S. and ask it to intervene and set out a framework [for an agreement]. We are prepared to propose a framework [of our own], which [the Americans] can either accept or amend. This will be presented to the two sides as the final settlement. If that does not succeed [either], there are other alternatives, such as [appealing to] the Security Council and the General Assembly... One option is for the Security Council to ask the countries of the world to recognize a Palestinian state within the 1967 borders, [but] we will take this option only if we have no choice, when all other alternatives are gone. We do not want to appeal to the Security Council or the General Assembly, but if Israel insists on rejecting the negotiations and refusing to halt [construction in] the settlements, where [else] can we go? Who [else] can we appeal to? There has to be someone to whom we can turn – [namely] the Security Council and the international legitimacy [i.e., the U.N. resolutions]."[3]
'Adel Al-Rahman, a columnist for the Palestinian Authority daily Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, responded to Abbas's proposals at Sirt: "Regarding [the option of] urging the Security Council to impose an international resolution recognizing a Palestinian state in the 1967 borders: even if this option has generated some enthusiasm, sober consideration reveals that it will not lead anywhere, because the U.S. administration will never allow the Arabs and Palestinians to attain such a [Security Council] resolution... As for [appealing to] the General Assembly for [international] custody: even if this step has positive aspects, on the face of it, in practice it does not represent a way out of the Palestinian crisis. The Palestinian people does need international protection, but what it needs most of all is an independent state... [However,] if the Arabs and Palestinians work with the U.S. as the main sponsor [of the bid to attain] recognition [for a state] in the '67 borders – with a certain degree of land-exchange as the basis for a two-state solution – this may well be an achievable [goal], because the [American] administration believes in it and supports it."[4]
Wasel Abu Yousef, a Fatah Executive Committee member from the Palestinian Liberation Front (PLF), mentioned the alternatives of revoking past agreements with Israel, dismantling the Palestinian Authority and returning the occupied territories to Israeli management, gaining U.S. recognition for a state within the 1967 borders (including the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem), and employing all types of popular resistance against the separation fence and the settlements.[5]
A Bid to Circumvent the U.S. Power of Veto
Referring to the possibility that the U.S. would veto a Security Council resolution recognizing the establishment of a Palestinian state, 'Azzam Al-Ahmad, head of the Fatah party in the Palestinian Legislative Council, said: "The Arab [Peace Initiative] Follow-Up Committee has told the relevant international bodies that if the U.S. administration fails to create an atmosphere conducive to direct negotiations, [the Follow-Up Committee] would refer the issue to the U.N. institutions – the Security Council or the General Assembly – on the basis of the 'Uniting for Peace' Resolution,[6] and this in order to avoid an American veto."[7]
Saudi Arabia took a similar tack when it demanded, during the 56th General Assembly, to "limit the use of the veto by obligating permanent members to refrain from using this power in connection with steps aimed at implementing past Security Council resolutions."[8]
Reconsidering the PLO-Israel Agreements
PLO Executive Committee Secretary-General Yasser 'Abd Rabbo said: "We will not take reckless measures... At the same time, there are agreements between the PLO and Israel, and it is inconceivable that one side should be forever beholden to them while the other side violates them to the point of nullifying them. If the Israelis continue this policy, there may come a time when we will reconsider these agreements."[9]
Salam Fayyad: Dismantling the PLO Is Not an Option
In an interview in the London-based Saudi daily Al-Hayat, Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad said: "I do not see the dismantling of the PLO as an option. The PLO is an enterprise of state-building, that is to say the achievement of independence, which is the most important step. Therefore, [the existence of the Palestinian Authority] is a national necessity [even] before it is a day-to-day necessity of the Palestinian people. This is what was stipulated in the biannual plan initiated by the PLO in August 2009 under the title 'Palestine: Ending the Occupation and Establishing a State.'" [10]
Abbas: I Am Not Resigning, but I Will Not Run in the Next Elections
Responding to rumors that he intends to resign, Abbas clarified: "I [never] hinted that I intended to resign. I set out a principle, and I am determined to follow it: If national reconciliation is achieved and there are elections, I will not present my candidacy."[11] In an interview with the independent Palestinian news agency Maan, Palestinian chief negotiator Saeb 'Ereqat emphasized that the rumors about dismantling the PLO and about Abbas's resigning were groundless.[12]
Returning to the Path of Struggle
Addressing the option of intensifying the non-violent popular struggle, Talal 'Ukal, a columnist for the PA daily Al-Hayat Al-Jadida, said that the PLO needed to reassess the situation without ruling out negotiations but also "without leaving [negotiations] as the sole option for achieving peace..." He added: "[Having] numerous alternatives does not necessarily mean opting [only] for resistance, which some limit solely to armed activity, though this too is a viable option... The PLO and the factions should have employed all the options from the beginning – negotiations accompanied by the intensification of the national, political, combative, and legal struggles, while [also] engaging in a diplomatic campaign in the U.N."[13]
Columnist Makram Muhammad Ahmad, head of the Egyptian Journalists Association, wrote that "Alongside an appeal to the [U.N.] Security Council to recognize the declaration of a Palestinian state, we [also] have an opportunity to reassess the [Palestinian] peace policy. It would not harm the Palestinians to agree on a new enterprise of resistance – one aimed at settlers and soldiers, which would not turn the world against them."[14]
Withdrawal of the Arab Peace Initiative
Khaled Al-Dahil, a Saudi academic and a columnist for the United Arab Emirates daily Al-Ittihad, wrote: "Appealing to the U.N. will not change the [power] balance one whit, considering the current and foreseeable circumstances. There is another alternative: although war, as a [joint] Arab [policy], is not an option – and perhaps justifiably so – it is unwise to stick to the option of negotiations and allow Israel to use it as a cover for expansion and settlement. A proper [course of action] would be to think seriously about withdrawing the Arab [peace] initiative, forcing [internal] reconciliation among the Palestinians, and [providing] Arab backing and support for the alternative of resistance – as long as the Palestinians agree to this and have a clear political plan that is agreed-upon and not subordinate to one Arab regime or another."[15]
The Inter-Palestinian Schism – An Obstacle to Finding Alternatives to Negotiations
Senior Fatah and PLO officials argued that the Fatah-Hamas schism was hindering attempts to propose alternatives to negotiations. Hani Al-Masri, a top official in the PA Information Ministry and a columnist in the PA daily Al-Ayyam, claimed that "no one can take seriously the Palestinian discourse regarding an alternative to direct negotiations, if at the heart of this discourse there is no serious action [towards] ending the schism and restoring national unity – because these [issues] are the top national priority, without which no true alternative can be [implemented]. Appealing to the U.N. Security Council and General Assembly, or the attempt to gain American and international recognition of a Palestinian state – all these are meaningless when we are divided. They are fictitious alternatives, which are not in our own hands but in the hands of others."[16] Ahmad Qurei', chairman of Fatah's Jerusalem Department, stated that, aside from the alternatives Abbas had mentioned, the first option was that of internal Palestinian reconciliation and unity.[17] Similar statements were made by Fatah official Qadura Fares.[18]
*C. Jacob is a research fellow at MEMRI.
[1] Al-Hayat (London), October 3, 2010.
[2] www.maannews.net, October 9, 2010.
[3] Al-Anba (Kuwait), November 4, 2010.
[4] Al-Hayat Al-Jadida (Palestinian Authority), October 10, 2010.
[5] Al-Quds (Jerusalem), October 31, 2010.
[6] United Nations General Assembly Resolution 377(V), the "Uniting for Peace" Resolution, states that, in cases where the United Nations Security Council fails to act in order to maintain international peace and security, owing to a veto imposed by one of its members, the matter shall be considered by the General Assembly within 24 hours using the mechanism of the emergency special session. The General Assembly shall consider the matter with a view to making appropriate recommendations for collective measures, and if these are approved by the majority of members, the recommendations may be implemented, including by establishing an international military force. (http://www.un-documents.net/a5r377.htm).
The significance of this resolution is that the General Assembly can not only recommend collective measures but can also approve them – which gives it the power to bypass a veto in the Security Council.
[7] Al-Ayyam (Palestinian Authority), October 2, 2010. A similar view was expressed by Palestinian chief negotiator Saeb Ereqat.
[8] Al-Quds (Jerusalem), October 5, 2010.
[9] Al-Hayat Al-Jadida (Palestinian Authority), October 24, 2010.
[10] Al-Hayat (London), October 29, 2010.
[11] Al-Anba (Kuwait), November 4, 2010.
[12] www.maannews.net, November 1, 2010.
[13] Al-Ayyam (PA), October 7, 2010.
[14] Al-Quds (Jerusalem), October 10, 2010.
[15] Al-Quds (Jerusalem), October 5, 2010.
[16] Al-Ayyam (PA), October 26, 2010.
[17] WAFA (PA), October 18, 2010.
[18] Al-Quds (Jerusalem), October 19, 2010.
