Palestinian Senior Officials, Writers: It Is Doubtful Whether a Bid to the U.N. Will Benefit the Palestinian Cause

In the summer of 2009, PA Prime Minister Salam Fayyad initiated his government's two-year state-building blueprint, titled "Palestine: Ending the Occupation, Establishing the State," which aimed at building up the necessary institutional, administrative, and social infrastructures necessary to establish an independent Palestinian state. Fayyad expressed his belief that practical state-building would help advance the diplomatic process with Israel by proving to the world and to Israel itself that the Palestinians are capable of managing their own state. Fayyad hoped that by the time this diplomatic process with Israel was concluded, the Palestinians would already have a state on the ground.[1]

During the past two years, since launching his program, Fayyad has worked determinedly to build the institutions needed for a future Palestinian state, to strengthen the Palestinian economy, to attract investors, and to reduce Palestinian dependence on foreign aid, and has done so regardless of the diplomatic situation. Now, as the program's scheduled end date draws near, Fayyad has repeatedly stressed the original goals of his plan. According to him, the Palestinians will not be accepted in the U.N. as a member state, nor will a declaration of statehood in the General Assembly change the situation on the ground. At the same time, he has not altogether rejected the option of turning to the General Assembly as a means to garner the widest possible support for the Palestinian cause and as part of the Palestinians' general strategy to promote their cause internationally.

I. A U.S. Veto Would Block Our Acceptance in the U.N.

At a July 6, 2011 press conference, Fayyad explained that September 2011 was originally intended to mark the end of his state-building program, aimed at facilitating the political processes needed to establish a state. Only later, he said, had the Palestinians begun discussing a September bid to the U.N.: "In all humility, I was the first to speak of [statehood in] September, in accordance with... [my] program, which was intended to prepare us for [establishing] the state of Palestine within two years... and to turn the state of Palestine into an inescapable fact. We had hoped that the political process would bring the occupation to an end by this time, and that, if the occupation had not ended by then, the achievement itself would place the political process under great pressure so that we could achieve what is needed. We were the first to speak of this approach..."[2]

At a press conference in Ramallah some two weeks earlier (June 21), Fayyad claimed that the Palestinian attempt to gain membership in the U.N. was bound to fail due to a U.S. veto in the Security Council, and that the Palestinians therefore needed to reassess their situation: "When [diplomatic] options were proposed, their point of departure was that we could go to the U.N. and be recognized [as a member state] there. It is [now] utterly clear that this would necessitate a recommendation by the Security Council, in other words, that no country with veto power in the council opposes [this move] and that we win nine votes in favor [of it]. And when we have a stance based on a [given] understanding, which later turns out to be erroneous, we must not cling to this same position, but examine the matter [anew] and determine what it means to turn to the U.N. Of course, we will [ultimately] make our bid to the U.N., and we expect [other countries] to declare [their] recognition of the state of Palestine...

"Have we [in fact] reached the point where the international community is prepared to gird its loins and assume direct responsibility for ending the occupation, or have we not? If the answer is in the affirmative, let us move forward without hesitation. But if the answer is negative, let us pause in order to examine and assess our tools, especially in light of the options that will likely be proposed to us in New York... We have yet to reach the point where, based purely upon the justice of our cause, the world [will be] prepared to do what is required [and bring about] a resolution in the Security Council, in accordance with Chapter VII [of the U.N. Charter], to end the occupation... Whoever thinks that we have reached this point is delusional..."[3]

II. Declaring Statehood Will Not Change the Facts on the Ground

Fayyad claimed that a hasty declaration of statehood in the General Assembly – the Palestinians' planned course of action, as mentioned, should their bid to the Security Council fail – would not bring about actual change on the ground, and that the Palestinians, therefore, had no use for such declarations: "We must know what we are ultimately going to accomplish. If the issue is a declaration [of statehood] – the late president Abu 'Ammar [Yasser 'Arafat] already declared [statehood] in October 1988. And if we want to renew this declaration, it would be better to infiltrate the Old City in Jerusalem and declare it there, [as] this would make a better impression. We [already] have a declaration, and for this reason the issue is not declaring statehood but the state [itself]. Therefore, let us do away with all the excuses and complete our preparations, and [ensure] that Gaza be part of them. There can be no state without Gaza."[4]

In a June 28, 2011 interview with the Associated Press news agency, Fayyad once again addressed the question of whether recognition of a Palestinian state in the U.N. would actually change matters on the ground: "My answer to you is no. Unless Israel is part of that consensus, it won't [change things], because to me, [the real issue is] ending Israeli occupation."[5]

III. We Must Rally Europe Around the Palestinian Cause

In a July 6, 2011 press conference, Fayyad claimed that even though a General Assembly resolution would not lead to actual change, the Palestinians must continue working toward it as part of a strategy aimed at garnering international diplomatic support, especially among the European countries: "We must be clear with people. If we are talking about the U.N. General Assembly, then the impact [of a resolution] will not be decisive in the short term. The situation on the ground after September will not [immediately] improve, as the occupying force will continue its occupation...

"We must look at September in accordance with the existing data, as a factor that we will try to put to our greatest advantage so that it will aid our diplomatic efforts even more, as a strategic operation and not a maneuver. We must develop efforts to internationalize the Palestinian cause, as leaving things to Israel, the occupying force, will not achieve anything we can accept. I am not saying that we should waive negotiations, but we must be realistic – as negotiations without a source of authority will not produce results. Therefore, we must advance the diplomatic struggle in order to internationalize the Palestinian cause effectively.

"Let us be realistic. The Security Council resolutions have not been implemented [until now] and neither have resolutions by the U.N. General Assembly. Therefore, we must determine what could [actually] augment our strength strategically... We must consider what influence this activity could have within the E.U. It is important that we try as much as possible to ensure that our activity keep the E.U. united on the Palestinian cause, and ensure us 27 votes in the U.N. General Assembly – rather than going [to the U.N. to find out] that the 27 [E.U.] countries are [divided into] yeas, nays, abstentions, and absentees. We [already] successfully united them in December 2009[6]...

"I have no need for a resolution that will not be to my advantage in the future; [what I need] rather is partners. I look at September from a purely strategic viewpoint. We must present our cause according to these definitions... When I say that nothing dramatic will happen, I mean no disparagement. I am among the first to call for action, and it must be strategic action in coordination with the people."[7]

IV. The Economic Crisis Does Not Preclude Establishment of a State

In a July 3, 2011 press conference in which Fayyad announced that the PA would pay civil servants only half their monthly salaries due to budgetary deficit – which he attributed to fewer contributions than expected from donor countries – he stated that the economic crisis had no bearing upon the PA's readiness to establish a state and turn to the U.N.: "The economic problems with which the [PA] is currently grappling do not mean it is unprepared to establish a state, in accordance with the government's program to 'End the Occupation and Establishing the State.' Some say: If the [PA] is incapable of paying its workers [their] salaries, how can it be ready to establish a state? This is wrong. There are existing countries, including industrialized countries – and everyone knows which – that face grave economic difficulties. Our people has decided to appeal to the U.N., and it will continue with its preparations for establishing the Palestinian state."[8]

V. There Will Be No State without Unity; Israel Must Be Isolated

In the domestic sphere, the Palestinians are preoccupied with the Fatah-Hamas reconciliation document signed in early May 2011, the implementation of which has been delayed due to disputes over who will serve as interim prime minister. In this regard, Fayyad cautioned that there would be no Palestinian state without true Palestinian unity: "Everything they say about September [as the deadline for a bid for statehood] is theoretical, and will remain thus until everyone – and first and foremost the international community – understands that there is Palestinian unity and that the Palestinian state will be established on all the Palestinian territories occupied since 1967 – the West Bank, the Gaza Strip, and East Jerusalem.

"The closer we get to September... the more difficult and theoretical the situation will become [if we go to the U.N.] without [first] restoring the unity of the homeland. We must continue working to push Israel into a corner and isolate it, to get other countries to recognize the future Palestinian state and the rights of the Palestinians [that will be restored] with the end of the occupation... The Palestinian people does not [want] empty declarations of statehood. We aspire for and insist on the declaration of a real, sovereign, and independent state."[9]

Fayyad reiterated that the Palestinians would strive to isolate Israel until it ended the occupation: "In [our] diplomatic efforts, we have persistently tried, through our contacts and plans, to emphasize that, as long as the occupation continues, we will [take steps]... to push Israel into a corner. This is what must inform our diplomatic activity, which is to say [that we must] continue initiating [such steps]. If Israel agrees to work in earnest toward fulfilling its commitments, we will welcome this, and if not – it will be isolated... Our goal increasingly must be the increased isolation of every Israeli government, as long as it does not cooperate with our aim to end the occupation."[10]

Former Palestinian Observer to U.N. Nasser Al-Qidwa: Don't Mislead the Palestinian People

Nasser Al-Qidwa, former Palestinian observer to the U.N., called on the Palestinian leadership not to mislead the Palestinian people regarding the possibility of being accepted as a U.N. member state in September. He stressed that only persistent efforts would lead to recognition of a Palestinian state by the General Assembly and perhaps even U.N. membership for this state: "It is impossible for Palestine to become a member in the U.N. because this necessitates a resolution by the [Security] Council. The charter is clear, and it is impossible to circumvent the Security Council, [where a Palestinian bid for statehood is expected] to meet with American opposition. And the situation might even be worse, as no one is making promises as to the positions of the other [member] states regarding such a move...

"We must be honest with the Palestinian people in terms of what is possible and what is not. Membership in the U.N. for a Palestinian state is impossible. The activity in the U.N. [must not] be sporadic, nor is it an alternative to an arrangement via negotiations. There must be efficient, permanent, and pressuring diplomatic activity in the U.N., a daily and accumulative struggle, and a permanent diplomatic confrontation with the other side, in order to achieve independence. [This independence] will not be achieved in the General Assembly, but [nevertheless] we must work... to achieve a resolution [there that will lead others] to regard [us as] a Palestinian state. This will be the start of an additional move in the international sphere, and perhaps will [ultimately] lead to membership [in the U.N.]."[11]

Senior Fatah Official Nabil 'Amr: Postpone the U.N. Bid for a Year

Senior Fatah official Nabil 'Amr called to take the Palestinian bid for statehood to the U.N. only if the Palestinians first obtained written guarantees from the European countries promising to vote in their favor: "I am among those who call to consider and calculate [a bid to the U.N.] with the utmost meticulousness, since the aim in going to the U.N. is not just to gain advantages for the Palestinian cause. There must be written guarantees – not just [verbal] promises – from the countries of caliber, that is, the western European [countries], that they will vote in our favor. Otherwise, we must seek another means, or at least postpone the matter. We must reconsider things and reach the appropriate resolution. If going to the U.N. will not produce any worthwhile progress, we must study other alternatives. The PLO must go to the U.N. armed with agreements that will ensure the benefit in doing so. Otherwise, new and dangerous doors will be opened before us."[12]

Towards the July 27 meeting of the PLO Central Committee, in which the U.N. bid is scheduled to be discussed, 'Amr called to postpone the move for a year, admitting that the Palestinians had "climbed the highest tree" without making sure they could safely climb down again. "I, personally, will propose postponing the U.N. bid for another year, so that we can plan for it better than we have done to date... while taking action in order to prepare better means to renew negotiations... Among the Palestinians, there is recklessness and a miscalculation of the reactions [to the bid for statehood]... I anticipate a diplomatic campaign in which we shall lose many [countries] with which we have essential ties. The idea of turning to the U.N. was, in the past, a brilliant idea, because it was a simple act and the voting was always in our favor. Now, however, we stand to lose some of the most important votes. The world will look not at how many votes [we garnered], but at who voted. The Americans are not hiding their positions or their threat of sanctions, not [only] against us but against anyone who votes for us. This... will cause us damage... The Palestinians have climbed the highest tree, and there is no guarantee that they can safely climb down from it."[13]

Former PA MP Ziad Abu Ziad: The Bid Would Be an Unnecessary Challenge to the U.S.

In an article in the Jerusalem-based daily Al-Quds, former PA MP Ziad Abu Ziad claimed that what had begun as Salam Fayyad's blueprint for building up the necessary state institutions by September 2011 had turned into a plan to make a bid to the U.N. for recognition of a Palestinian state. He said that this would constitute an unnecessary challenge to the U.S. and its president, and that the Palestinians should either coordinate all diplomatic efforts with the U.S. or give up on the bid completely: "Salam Fayyad was the first to talk about building the state within two years and about September 2011. Such talk drew its inspiration from [U.S. President Barack] Obama's 2009 speech, in which he said he hoped to see a Palestinian state as a U.N. member within two years. Salam Fayyad began speaking of and acting toward building a state with proper institutions, and the world began speaking about 'Salam Fayyad's program.' People [quite close to the decision-making circle] looked upon the state-building program and upon the September 2011 [plan] with some scorn and indifference.

"However, as [Fayyad] continued with his program, these [people] realized that the world was taking 'Salam Fayyad's program' seriously, and suddenly, they changed their fancy and began speaking of September as the deadline... for a bid to the General Assembly and a request for state membership there. The issue turned from a program to build up the state's institutions... and to demand that President Obama fulfill his commitments and our dream, into a challenge to President Obama in a [game] in which he holds all the cards.

"At the height of this internal Palestinian change of heart, Israel worked quickly, exploiting America's domestic considerations and the fact that it is to hold presidential and congressional elections next year, and [our] supportive friends turned into advisors and then into opponents. Instead of Israel suffering from international isolation due to its refusal to freeze [construction] in the settlements and to engage in serious negotiations, we are the ones who are standing on the threshold of international isolation. We are seeking a way out [of this situation], but we fail to recognize that there is no use confronting America in the corridors of the U.N...

"The General Assembly resolutions have moral value, but cannot be imposed. This is the case, for example, of Resolution 194, which affirms the right of return and reparations for [Palestinian] refugees...

"On the international political level, we must recognize that any diplomatic activity in the U.N. must be coordinated with the U.S. administration. If we are unwilling or unable to coordinate [with it], we must relinquish the notion of diplomatic action and replace it with popular action or the [popular] struggle in its various forms – which is a far cry from diplomacy and its slippery slopes – in which case whoever chooses [this] path will bear responsibility for it and its consequences."[14]

Palestinian Writers: No Use in Declaring Statehood; A New Strategy Is Needed

I. Al-Ayyam Columnist: We Achieved More through the Intifadas than We Will Out through a Bid to the U.N.

Hamada Fara'na, columnist for the PA daily Al-Ayyam, wrote that although the Palestinians would achieve an international resolution recognizing a Palestinian state, this state would not be granted U.N. membership: "The main activity of the Palestinian leadership focuses on September as the deadline for [U.N.] recognition of a Palestinian state within the [1967] borders and for its acceptance as a full-fledged U.N. member state... [Although] the path has already been paved for the first [goal to be achieved] – [as we expect] to gain an appropriate number [of votes in favor of] recognizing a state on the June 4, 1967 borders – the path to the second [goal] remains obstructed by [U.S.] veto, since [U.N.] membership is dependent upon a resolution by the Security Council, which [in turn] hinges on America's decision [not to exercise its veto power], and the latter refuses point blank to accept the state of Palestine as an active U.N. member state."

Fara'na wrote that even if the Palestinians were granted U.N. membership, this would not change the situation on the ground, and the Palestinian state would remain occupied by Israel, like the Syrian Golan Heights: "If, for the sake of argument, we assume that both goals [i.e., U.N. recognition and membership] are achieved, the result will be that we will have an occupied Palestinian state without sovereignty. This situation exists in Syria... which has lands that have been occupied since 1967, and which is incapable of liberating its lands in the Golan from Israeli occupation... If the Palestinian leadership succeeds in gaining U.N. recognition and membership, will Palestine become a state occupied by another? This is the best case scenario – that the resolutions and definitions will change, but the situation of the Palestinians, [trampled] under the military boots of the occupation and subject to its decisions and moves, will not.

"The cases in which the PLO achieved political gains – whether [the case of] the Oslo Accords, [which led to] Israel's gradual withdrawal from Palestinian cities in the Gaza [Strip] and the Jericho [region] and to the birth of the PA as a prelude to statehood, or whether [the case of] Israel's unilateral withdrawal from the Gaza Strip – [the gains were] the direct result of the popular civilian Intifada of 1987 and of the armed Intifada of 2000. This means that action on the ground is the basis, and the decisions made at the [negotiations] table are merely the outcome of this action on the ground."[15]

In another article, Fara'na cautioned that unless the intra-Palestinian reconciliation agreement was implemented, the Palestinians would be unable to defeat Israel in the international arena: "The Palestinian situation is in a general crisis, and continued schism will exacerbate it and will be a gift to the enterprise of the occupation, which maintains its supremacy and pride. In this state of crisis, the Palestinian people will not advance even a single step [on the path] to victory, to the isolation of the occupation, and its being cut off by the international community."[16]

II. Political Commentator: We Must Remain Steadfast and Strengthen the Resistance

In an article in the PA daily Al-Ayyam, political commentator Hani Al-Masri called for the Palestinians to adopt a new strategy based on national unity, all-out resistance, and diplomatic activity against Israel – of which the U.N. bid, he said, should be just one aspect: "The [harsh] occupation of Palestinian land and the offsetting of the balance of power are what is preventing the de facto establishment of a state and the realization of the rest of the Palestinian rights. Without a new Palestinian strategy that could unite all the Palestinians and channel their abilities, their efforts, their factions, and their creativity into a single outlet, it will be impossible to achieve freedom, the [Right of] Return, or independence – no matter how much time passes or how costly the sacrifices are. The bid to the U.N. is of importance only insofar as it is a component of this new strategy, rather than being a strategy in and of itself. The Palestinian state will not be established in the U.N. but on the soil of Palestine, and full membership in the international organization will be thwarted by the U.S. veto that will be exercised against it in the Security Council...

"Do we want to remain forever stuck in the transitional period that ended in 1999, which is to say at the mercy of the Oslo Accords and its security, political, and economic obligations? Or has the time come to declare an end to this phase and the beginning of a new phase – one that will begin with declaring the end of the transitional stage, the relinquishment of [our] commitments [as defined by the Oslo Accords], and the changing of [our] political course? [This new course] will be based first and foremost on the Palestinians relying on themselves, on the unity of their people within and outside the homeland, and on the increased steadfastness of the people; on launching all-out resistance and restoring the Arab aid to the Palestinian cause, which has become possible since the Arab Spring; and on initiating dynamic political activity worldwide, until we reach a situation in which the occupation will cost Israel dearly – at which point it will consider withdrawing and signing a peace agreement."[17]

Palestinian Economists and Columnists: How Can a State Be Established When Its Economy Lies in Ruins?

Hani Al-Masri called upon the Palestinian leadership to abandon its hypocritical stance in which it was on the one hand, declaring that it was ready for statehood, while on the other hand, warning that it would not be able to prevail without a continued flow of taxes from Israel and aid from the West, on the other: "The [PA] must think a thousand times before forming an [interim] government as long as there is a real possibility that Israel might stop the transfer of the taxes it collects, and that the U.S., and perhaps several European countries, might cut off aid to the [PA]. Why isn't the [PA] preparing for this possibility, especially [in light of the facts] that the negotiations have been at a standstill since the end of 2008 and that Obama has withdrawn his assurances regarding the freeze on settlements and the establishment of a state this September? And if the [PA] cannot prevail [in the event] that the aid and flow of taxes are cut off, how can it declare, citing international [reports], that it is ready to establish a state, that the Palestinian economy is flourishing, and that its growth rate is on the rise?"[18]

In an article on the website of the Palestinian news agency Maan, Suleiman Al-Wa'ri, director-general of the PLO's Department of International Relations, wrote that after Israel froze the transfer of taxes to the PA in early May 2011, following the signing of the Fatah-Hamas reconciliation document, the Palestinians "began to wonder – are we in fact prepared for the declaration of statehood, as announced by Dr. Salam Fayyad a week ago? Have we finished building the [necessary] institutions, and do we have the basic foundations for a state, most important of which is a national economy and sufficient financial resources? It later became clear that we are not prepared [for this], when Dr. Fayyad announced that the Palestinian economy is suffering a severe crisis, that salaries [in the civil sector] would not be paid until Israel transfers the tax payments, and that [Israel's] oppressive decision was harming a large sector of Palestinian society and not just the civil servants.

"It is economic stability that establishes and contributes to political stability, and the basic foundations of any country must rely on stable financial resources, in order [to ensure] the continuing function of its institutions. If no constant resources exist, it is difficult to continue the project of state[-building], as building the administrative and security structures of the [PA] on scientific and professional foundations is not sufficient, without clear and profitable financial resources drawing on investment and production enterprises that benefit every Palestinian and provide numerous job opportunities. It is not enough for donations and aid to go to infrastructures alone, as economic reform is a basic condition for and the cornerstone of [any] state-building program."[19]

Palestinian economist 'Omar Sha'ban, head of the Gaza strategic research center Palthink, said, "The figures [presented by Salam Fayyad regarding the PA's budgetary deficit] run counter to the ongoing talk of the [PA's] readiness to declare statehood. Fayyad has the figures at his fingertips and can present them in various contexts. The credibility of information and figures has [much] to do with timing, and the publication of this information now [of all times] raises an important question: Why now? How can Fayyad, along with international institutions, publish optimistic reports, and then say, all of a sudden, that they cannot pay [their workers] salaries?" Sha'ban also cast doubt on Fayyad's declaration that by 2013, the PA would no longer be in need of foreign aid: "On April 13, [2011, Fayyad] asked the donor countries for the sum of $5 billion until 2013, and now he is saying that he will not need this aid."[20]

*L. Barkan is a research fellow at MEMRI.