Peace For The Taiwan Strait Depends On U.S.-China Relations

In the discussion of cross-Strait relations, there is a saying: "The closest distance between Beijing and Taipei is through Washington." This well-known phrase means that the U.S. plays a decisive role in the fate of Taiwan, and that Beijing cannot bypass the huge influence of Washington in resolving its Taiwan question and achieving reunification. The Taiwan question is the core of the game between China and the U.S.

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China Is Preparing To Confront The U.S.

The main goal of the Third Plenary Session of the 20th Central Committee of the CCP, concluded in Beijing on July 18, was to further open the Chinese market, in hopes of making up for the huge shocks and damage to the Chinese economy caused by President Xi's serious miscalculation in the past few years. At the same time, in terms of politics and regime security, Xi has further tightened the reins and become more conservative and dictatorial.[1]

It should be noted that, in reference to national security and defense, the plenum stated that the party should "improve the national security mechanism concerning foreign affairs." It added, "We should improve the leadership and management systems of the people's armed forces and deepen the reform of the joint operations system." These statements are all related to the Taiwan issue.

The message from this plenum suggests, though not explicitly, that Beijing's ambition to resolve the Taiwan issue, that is, to take over Taiwan, has not weakened, but strengthened. The regime in Beijing is quietly making economic, military, and political preparations to substantively confront Taiwan's protector, the U.S.

The Chinese military and coast guard's recent routine threats against Taiwan show no sign of letting up. After President Lai Ching-te took office on May 20, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) conducted another military exercise to blockade Taiwan from May 23 to 24, and, on July 2, a Taiwanese fishing boat was detained by the Chinese mainland coast guard, which was the first time in 17 years.[2] These incidents are an inevitable way for Beijing to exert pressure and provocation on the ruling authorities of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) of Taiwan in an all-round way to create conflict hotspots and reasons for attacking Taiwan.

Can Taiwan Develop A National Defense Strategy To Deal With China's Threat?

Given China's aggressiveness, Taiwan's ruling authorities have few options but to respond largely passively. The reason is simple: Taiwan is small and lacks strategic depth. In terms of national security, Taiwan's rulers and people have for a long time been highly dependent on the security protection of the U.S., have unrealistically high expectations, always seem to doubt China's ambition and strength to annex Taiwan, and lack sufficient attention and countermeasures.

In addition, Taiwan's military resources are also a big problem. Since 1987, Taiwan has gradually reduced the length of mandatory military service. As of January 2008, Taiwanese will be required to serve for just one year. From February 2013, those born on or after January 1, 1994, will only have to undergo four months of military training to complete their mandatory military service. The implementation of "mandatory conscription and voluntary recruitment in parallel" was launched in 2019.

To cope with the possible turbulence in the Taiwan Strait brought about by the deterioration of Sino-U.S. relations and the outbreak of the Russia-Ukraine war, Taiwan adjusted its military service system beginning in January 2024. Under the adjustment, those born on or after January 1, 2005 resume one year of compulsory military service, while those born between 1994 and 2004 still only need to receive four months of military training.

Obviously, this military service system can hardly ensure that Taiwan has enough soldiers in wartime.

The Ukrainian experience is difficult to replicate in Taiwan, where most Taiwanese today are content with a life of small affluence and lack martial spirit.

Therefore, given the growing gap between Taiwan and China's comprehensive national strength and military capabilities, Taiwan cannot independently develop a national defense strategy to deal with China's threat of force.

The Chinese Military Has Several Options For Attacking Taiwan

The 2023 ROC (Republic of China, Taiwan) National Defense Report's section on military strategy for dealing with China's threat of force states: "Based on 'resolute defense and multi-domain deterrence' strategic guidance, the ROC Armed Forces has completed asymmetric capability planning and acquisition by taking into account of future enemy threats, technological advances, pattern of war and operation environment,  and weaknesses of likely enemy courses action. It has improved defense operational resilience with decentralized command & control. By integrating all-out defense capacity and taking long-range denial and multi-domain defense approaches, it will impose unacceptable risk and cost on any enemy invasion against Taiwan as a means to deter enemy ruthless aggression and safeguard our territory and sovereignty, national security, and regional peace and stability."[3]

The section goes on to say that "Taiwan is a linchpin at the First Island Chain. It plays a key strategic role in integrated deterrence and Indo-Pacific defense formed by the U.S. and its allies. The ROC will improve its operational interoperability and participate in regional joint defense through military  exchanges to cooperate with like-minded partners and collectively meet People's Republic of China (PRC)’s threats and challenges."

It is obvious that the Taiwanese military believes that as long as its troops can delay the progress of the Chinese military's armed attack on Taiwan, it can be considered successful, and subsequent military confrontation can only count on the intervention of the U.S. and its allies.

However, the Chinese military has more options for attacking Taiwan.

Beijing could resort to:

• Blockading Taiwan, encircling it rather than attacking it;

• Depleting and crippling Taiwan's economy;

• First seizing Taiwan's outlying islands such as Kinmen, Matsu and Penghu, and then attacking Taiwan island;

• Directly attacking the island of Taiwan, using low-tech long-range rocket launchers, combined with short-range and medium-range surface-to-surface, air-to-surface, ship-to-surface missiles and drones and other unmanned military equipment firepower to first carry out multiple waves, high-intensity, high-density attacks on the island, combined with precise targeted decapitation means to attack Taiwan's ruling leadership.

China is now a global producer of military equipment such as drones, and a war of attrition would certainly be bad for Taiwan.

When the Communist army crossed the Yangtze River in 1949 and continued to attack the Kuomintang army, it adopted the method of first covering the Kuomintang army with intensive fire, attacking the effective strength of the Kuomintang army, and then crossing the Yangtze River by force. The only difference is that, at the time, there were no drones and other smart weapons available today.

Stability In The Taiwan Strait Has Little To Do With Taiwan's Own Efforts

Since Taiwan's security can only rely on the protection of the U.S., should the U.S. send troops to directly participate in the war in the event of the PLA's invasion of Taiwan, or just provide advanced weapons and equipment as the United States did in assisting Ukraine to resist Russia?

On the Taiwan issue, both Democratic and Republican parties seem to have partially abandoned years of "strategic ambiguity."

The stability of the situation in the Taiwan Strait has little to do with Taiwan's own efforts. Taiwan is too small, China is too close to Taiwan, and its overall strength far exceeds Taiwan's. Whether the situation in the Taiwan Strait is war or peace fundamentally depends on Sino-U.S. relations. It also depends on the ebb and flow of the two countries' strengths, that is, on whether the development of China's economy, military strength, and overall national strength can continue to narrow the gap with the U.S. To a certain extent, it also depends on whether Russia will help and support China in the war against Taiwan.

Meanwhile, Taiwan should continue to increase defense spending and modernize its military, but without the full support of the U.S., it is unlikely that Taiwan will be able to defend itself against China's invasion.

*Chris King is Senior Research Fellow for the MEMRI Chinese Media Studies Project.