In Preparation For Post-'Abbas Era, Calls In Jordan For Increased Involvement In Palestinian Politics, Openness To Hamas

Introduction

The Kingdom of Jordan has lately increased the level of its involvement in the Palestinian Authority (PA). There seem to be two main reasons for this. One is the security escalation that has occurred in the absence of any progress towards a resolution to the Palestinian problem, and the other is Jordan's fear that chaos may erupt in the West Bank after the departure of 87-year-old PA President Mahmoud 'Abbas, especially given the poor performance of the PA and the absence of a clear mechanism for the transfer of power, as well as the deep intra-Palestinian schism. [1]

Jordan is concerned that security and/or political chaos in the PA may threaten its security, stability and future identity. Two concerns often expressed in Jordan are that a severe crisis in the West Bank could cause mass migration of Palestinians to Jordan and also threaten the Hashemite custodianship of the holy sites in Jerusalem.[2] This is in addition to Jordan's permanent concern that, in the absence of peace negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians, the solution of the Palestinian problem may ultimately be at Jordan's expense, namely by turning Jordan into the Palestinian homeland. This is the so-called "Jordanian option," which the kingdom regards as an existential threat.[3]   

Therefore, following a long period in which it limited its involvement and influence in the Palestinian arena – especially after the signing of the Abraham Accords in 2020 – Jordan is seeking to play a more significant role in this arena, in particular on the political-diplomatic level. In contrast to its traditional policy of supporting the Palestinians and the PA without intervening in their internal political affairs, it is now acting to broaden and deepen its influence in the West Bank, in order to prevent the collapse of the PA – a possibility that seems likely due to the decline in the PA's popularity, the erosion of its authority and the internal schism within the Palestinian arena.[4]   

In light of the above, Jordanian intellectuals and journalists have called for the kingdom to be involved in shaping the Palestinian political map and in selecting Abbas' successor, and for drafting a clear plan for the day after the president's departure. One unprecedented article did not even rule out reviving the Jordanian-Palestinian discussion about the option of annexing the West Bank to Jordan.    

Jordan's concerns about the instability in the West Bank and about the murky future of the PA and the Palestinian cause also gave rise to unprecedented criticism of the PA's performance and policies. In addition, there were calls for Jordan to show openness to other Palestinian political players, such as Hamas, in light of the latter's growing power in the Palestinian arena and due to the changing power-balance in the region following the agreement recently signed by Saudi Arabia and Iran to renew the relations between them.

This report reviews the public discourse on these issues.

Conference In Jordan Discusses Scenario Of PA Collapse, Proposes Ways To Prepare For This

On  February 10-12, 2023, the Al-Quds Center for Political Studies in Amman and the German Konrad Adenauer Foundation held a conference in Amman titled "Jordan's Options in Handling Scenarios Connected to the Palestinian Future." The conference was attended by Jordanian and Palestinian politicians, former ministers and journalists, including Al-Quds Center Director and journalist 'Oraib Al-Rantawi and Jordanian former interior minister Samir Al-Habashneh. It addressed various scenarios for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and their implications for Jordan's national interests, as well as Jordan's apprehensions regarding the future of the PA. 

A page devoted to the conference on the Al-Quds Center's website stated: "In light of the growing chances of escalation and the growing tension between the Palestinians and the occupation authorities, as well as the growing threats [stemming from] the political impasse and the declining chances of establishing an independent and viable Palestinian state,  Jordan is concerned about possible effects on its security, stability and the future of its national identity and existence. It is also concerned, of course, for the future of the Palestinian national enterprise and the fate of the PA. This requires us to prepare in advance for every possibility and scenario, in the near, medium and distant future."[5]

According to the London-based daily Al-Quds Al-Arabi, the conference participants advised Jordan to strengthen its influence in the West Bank, its role in the PLO and its involvement in the Palestinian arena in general, and to be open to all the Palestinian forces, not only to Fatah and the PA, with which it has ongoing ties.[6]

Jordanian journalist 'Omar Kallab, who attended the conference, devoted three of his columns  in the state daily Al-Rai to the debates and the climate at the conference. In the first column he revealed that the majority of participants assessed that the most likely scenario, given the present situation, is that of "the great explosion – namely a direct confrontation between the Palestinians and the Fascist government occupying Palestine [i.e., the Israeli government], a third intifada that will necessarily be armed, or the eruption of chaos in the West Bank if the PA collapses or if the Fascist government starts a direct confrontation with the Palestinians… This situation," Kallab added, "will be accompanied by migration, or [at least] a trickle of migrants into Jordan, and by damage to the Hashemite custodianship over the sites sacred to Islam and Christianity [in Jerusalem]."  

According to Kallab, the worsening security situation, and the absence of a political horizon and of any chance of establishing a Palestinian state, "require us to prepare in advance for confronting the accelerated and severe developments that may [also] occur on the other side of the Jordan river [i.e., in Jordan]." He noted that the conference participants had agreed on the need to prepare for every scenario and that Joran must "expand its options and diversify its means of dealing" with the situation.[7]

In another column Al-Kallab wrote that, in order to promote a reconciliation among the Palestinians, Jordan "must be open to all the Palestinians, namely all the factions, civil elements and professional unions, instead of confining itself to the narrow corner of the PA. This can be done through unofficial popular and political [elements], if the official political [echelon] cannot do it." [8]

It should be noted that a conference held by Jordan's Politics and Society Institute in October 2022, on "the Death of the Two-State Solution", likewise called for Jordan to "become more deeply involved in the Palestinian issue, which directly touches on Jordan's national security." Here too the participants urged Jordan "to develop ties with the many diverse Palestinian forces, and to enhance the Palestinian arena's ability to deal with 'a no-state scenario,' i.e., the disintegration of the PA."[9]

Jordan Frustrated With The PA: It Is Preoccupied With Maintaining Its Status, Not Establishing A Palestinian State

The Jordanian apprehensions about the unstable situation in the West Bank and the unclear future of the Palestinian cause are also evident in Jordanian press articles from the recent months. These articles express concern that, since the Palestinian issue is not advancing toward its ultimate goal – the establishment of an independent Palestinian state – the resolution of the Palestinian problem will ultimately be at the Jordan's expense. The articles do not blame only Israel for this situation but also the PA and its senior officials. They criticize the PA, which they say has become a tool in Israel's hands, for its poor performance and its failure to realize the Palestinian dream of establishing an independent state. In fact, they accuse the PA of striving only to preserve its status while deliberately preventing the transition to a Palestinian state.

In an article he published in Jordan's Al-Ghad daily, former Jordanian minister of information Samih Al-Ma'aita claimed that the Oslo Accords served Israel by creating a Palestinian Authority that does nothing but "provide [Israel] with security services, keep the West Bank in check, and manage most of the West Bank affairs in the areas of livelihood and administration." Israel, he says, wants a Palestinian Authority that is "not quite dead" but is nevertheless "on the verge of death, political disintegration and economic collapse" and therefore "not likely to become a state." He adds that "the Oslo Accords established a [Palestinian] Authority according to those parameters, and everyone understood this. The PA exists [to achieve] goals which do not include its transformation into an independent Palestinian state. Those who signed the Oslo [Accords], negotiated [them] and agreed to [their] terms know the truth…" Al-Ma'aita claimed further that "keeping the PA alive [as an authority and not as a state] is a strategic choice made by the Fatah movement and the other PLO factions, because its survival in its current format is the only option available today, and the PA will [therefore] defend this option."[10]

In his column in the state daily Al-Rai, journalist Raja Talab wrote, in a similar vein,  that, since the death of Yasser Arafat in 2005, the PA has transformed "from a [mechanism for] building a state based on the two-state solution into a [mere] tool for administrating the civil affairs of the West Bank." The Israelis, he added, "have focused on two aspects of the PA: first, the security coordination and the development of Palestinian security apparatuses to serve this purpose, and second, blackmailing the PA over the topic of the financial support which it receives from the U.S. and the European Union and making it conditional on compliance with Israel's wishes. Throughout the years the PA supplied what was demanded of it and actively curbed any activity [likely] to obstruct this agenda…"[11]

Jordanian journalist Maher Abu Tir also accused the PA of serving Israel's goals and of focusing on marginal issues instead of the main goal – the establishment of the Palestinian state. Following the PA demand to restore PA Foreign Minister Riyad Al-Maliki's VIP travel pass, which Israel had revoked, he wrote in Al-Ghad: "This is the greatest farce we have ever experienced. Instead of demanding to liberate Palestine – all of Palestine – today the [Palestinians'] demand is to return the Palestinian foreign minister's VIP pass… This is the bitter reality, whereby the larger issues are dwarfed and become marginal details, which reflect mainly the mistake [of signing] the Oslo [Accords] and the failure of its plan, after the [Palestinians] recognized three-quarters of [the territory of] Palestine as the state of Israel in exchange for Gaza and Jericho first, and a promise, that hasn't been kept, to establish a Palestinian state…"

Like the other journalists, Abu Tir also holds that the function of the PA, as far as Israel is concerned, is to "refrain from any activity on the international level, oppress the Palestinians in its stead, and continue [fulfilling] this evil role – in other words, perpetuate the current situation in the West Bank with no attempt whatsoever to take a stand against Israel…" He states further that, for 20 years, the PA has "supplied services to the occupation… while Israel keeps it from overstepping its authorized [role]… It is inconceivable [that the Palestinians should] pay the price of the flawed administration of their affairs on the pretext [that the PA] is pressured by Arab and international elements. The Palestinian people wouldn't have reached this situation if it hadn't been for the [PA's] pathetic gamble on the establishment of a Palestinian state and if it weren't for the [PA's] silence in the face of the Israeli plan, which has expanded over the past 20 years since [the signing of the] Oslo [Accords]…"[12]

Jordanian Writers: Jordan Must Be Involved In Selecting 'Abbas' Successor

In light of this Jordanian frustration with the PA's conduct, and the growing concerns about possible chaos in the PA after the end of the Mahmoud 'Abbas era, recent articles in the Jordanian press urged the kingdom to be involved in the selection of the president's successor. Such involvement, they argued, is necessary and even vital considering Jordan's proximity to the Palestinian territories and the potential impact on Jordan's national security.  

Former Jordanian Minister: The Situation In West Bank Affects Jordan's National Security, So We Must Be Directly Involved In The Selection Of The Next PA President

In a January 22, 2023 column headlined "Jordan and the West Bank – A Fateful Connection" in the London-based Qatari daily Al-Arabi Al-Jadid, Jordan's former minister of culture, Muhammad Abu Rumman, urged Jordan to be more involved in the affairs of the PA and to expand its influence in the West Bank, which he maintained is "an integral part of Jordan's national security." He wrote: "…It would a mistake to limit the Jordanian role in the West Bank to a choice between two stark options: [either] annexation and unity or complete non-intervention… as though any Jordanian thought or opinion about what occurs in the West Bank constitutes a revival of the scenario of uniting the two banks [of the Jordan river]. There are many pending issues that are fatefully connected [to Jordan]. This makes the issue of the West Bank an integral part of Jordan's national security, whereby every development has numerous implications for Jordanian politics. The reasons for this have to do with the historic and religious legitimacy of the Jordanian regime, with Jordanian geopolitics, and with [Jordan's] internal [demographic] composition.

"The [old] Jordanian approach, based on the principle that we support the PA and the Palestinians and do not interfere in their internal affairs, is no longer a valid way to tackle many large questions and considerations that are currently [on the agenda]. It is impossible to ignore the magnitude of the West Bank's significance and the tremendous shadow it casts over Jordan. This [significance] has grown recently, due to [a series of factors]: the Netanyahu government and the Deal of the Century; the attempts to eliminate the Palestinian cause, to Judaize Jerusalem and to change the reality in Al-Aqsa; the decline of the two-state [solution]; the growing discourse in Palestinian and international circles about the day after [the departure of] Mahmoud 'Abbas and about who will succeed him, amid public opinion polls which indicate a sharp drop in Abbas' popularity, and, [finally], the structural crises from which the [Palestinian] Authority suffers [in the West Bank].

"[In the past,] the Hashemite custodianship of the Muslim and Christian holy sites in Jerusalem was seen as a [merely] symbolic or moral issue. But now, in light of the serious threat to the holy city of Jerusalem, the equation has been turned on its head, and it is the role of the PA that has become secondary, while the Jordanian role has become central and important. The issue of Jerusalem tops Jordan's diplomatic interests and has [headed] its priorities for years, and this year [its importance] is likely to increase even more…

"It is no longer possible to accept the change that has taken place in the regional balance of power, especially in the matter of Jordan's 'Arab depth' in [its] diplomatic confrontation with Israel, and the new phenomenon which has begun to increase, [namely] the clear aggression on the part of Israeli writers and politicians and the threats expressed in their articles, which reflect the Israeli concern about the Jordanian position. On the other hand, it is vital that these strategic developments prompt Jordan to revisit its approach to the Palestinian arena, expand its assessment of the situation in the West Bank and its political options, and strengthen its ties with the powerful elements and Palestinian officials there. This means expanding and deepening  Jordan's influence in the West Bank and aligning the jointly-held cards in advance of the next round.

"I've heard that many Palestinian politicians harbor beliefs, perhaps mistaken ones, about Jordan's position on [who] the successor of President Mahmoud 'Abbas [should be]. Others believe that Jordan is distancing itself from this issue because it is an internal Palestinian affair. This position [of non-intervention] is misguided, because many elements – Western and Arab – are [already] concerned with this topic. It is only fitting that Jordan should play the most senior role, given its connections to the West Bank and its considerable involvement there, and because of the significant impact of this issue on the future of the PA and consequently on the West Bank and also on Jordan's own national security."[13]

In another article, from April 9, Abu Rumman addressed the Politics and Society Institute's October 2022 conference, which dealt with "the Death of the Two-State Solution" and the impact of regional developments on Jordan. Supporting the idea expressed at the conference, that Jordan should show openness to all the political players in the PA, as Egypt is doing, Abu Rumman wrote: "Dangerous changes are taking place to the west of the [Jordan] river, on more than one level. One of the main recommendations in the report [of the Politics and Society Institute in Amman] was to enhance Jordan's involvement in the Palestinian territories, so as to strengthen the positive role it could play, in a way that serves the tactics of confronting the occupation and at the same time supporting the Palestinians. But this necessarily requires Jordan to refrain from limiting its ties only to the PA and its leaders. It must expand and strengthen [its ties] with other major Palestinian players as well.

The approach of dealing with the PA alone, and leaving [the rest of] the Palestinian arena to our Egyptian brothers, is completely obsolete. Only conservative figures in [our] establishment, who are unable to understand the changes [in the region] – the Abraham Accords, the Iranian-Saudi agreement and the [other] shifts taking place in the region – still espouse [this approach]. In fact, today there is need for openness to [other Palestinian] elements and forces and for a broad and deep rethinking of all the options and scenarios, so as to serve the new definition of Jordan's national security and vital interests."[14] 

Jordanian Journalist: Jordan Needs A Clear Vision For The Day After The Death Of 'Abbas

Similarly, in his January 19 column in the daily Al-Ghad, journalist Malik Al-Athamneh contended that Jordan must have a clear plan for the day after the death of 'Abbas, and wondered whether Hussein Al-Sheikh, secretary-general of the PLO Executive Committee and head of the General Authority of Civil Affairs, who is apparently the leading candidate to replace 'Abbas, is acceptable to Jordan. He wrote: "Who will inherit the red carpet, the presidential title and the offices in the Mukata'a in Ramallah after the death of Mahmoud 'Abbas? It is important to formulate the question  this way in order to understand the scope of the [role] he will inherit, which defines the scope of the disaster everyone will have to contend with on the day after the official burial ceremonies…

"Hussein Al-Sheikh is the leading candidate to succeed Abu Mazen [Mahmoud 'Abbas] as president… Al-Sheikh is the secretary-general [of the PLO]. No one knows what this position entails or what it encompasses, but it is a position which qualifies its incumbent to be the leading candidate for chairman of the PLO… Hussein Al-Sheikh has [thus] become the ideal candidate to be the sole legal successor to Mahmoud 'Abbas… [although] he has no more than three percent of the popular [support], according to data published in the New York Times. According to those figures, 75% of Palestinians oppose his being promoted to the position of PLO secretary-general… Put simply, the Palestinian people… is basically absent from the selection of the 'sole' legitimate president who will lead it…

"The question is, does Jordan have a clear assessment of the situation and a clearer vision for the day after the death of Mahmoud 'Abbas? It is natural and legitimate for countries to study [the situation of] their neighbors in the region. Jordan has done more than that in every election in Iraq, for example! And we give [even greater] priority to the situation on the western [bank] of the [Jordan] river, which was under Jordanian rule for dozens of years and constituted part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan… Are Hussein Al-Sheikh's 'security' qualifications sufficient to make him acceptable to Jordan? Or are there other options, which can support and grant expression to the absent will of the Palestinian people, [and can be promoted] in the almost negligible period of time [left before 'Abbas' death, whose duration] depends on Allah's will and decree?"[15]

Article In Al-Ghad Daily Calls For Dismantling The PA, Uniting The Two Banks Of The Jordan River

In a recent article in the daily Al-Ghad, Jordanian media figure Malik Al-'Athanmeh called to seriously consider the option of reuniting Jordan and the West Bank. He noted that the West Bank was part of the kingdom of Jordan from 1950 until 1967, and criticized the Arab states for refusing to recognize Jordan's annexation of the West Bank at the time. He also called the PA an "artificial" entity that should cease to exist, and contended that the Jordanians should start talks with a "real and active" Palestinian partner about the option of reuniting the two banks of the Jordan river, which would benefit both sides. 

Al-'Athanmeh wrote: "In practice, the West Bank of the Jordan river used to constitute one half of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, and all the debates about how to describe what happened at the Jericho Congress,[16] whether it was 'annexation' or 'unification,' will not change the geographical and historical [facts that prevailed] after April 24, 1950 [Jordan's official annexation of the West Bank]. On that [day], two years after the establishment of the state of Israel in 1948, the West Bank and its inhabitants became part of Jordan. In December 1949 the inhabitants of the West Bank had already been granted the right to apply for Jordanian citizenship…

"[Over the years], these historical and geographical facts, backed by UN resolutions and more than that, were despicably undermined. The first step [in this process] was the naïve Arab willingness, during the period of the spread of false pan-Arabism,  to recognize the PLO as the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people.

"The scenario of [re]uniting the two banks must begin with a clear understanding of what this annexation means. King 'Abdullah was right when he asked in 2018: 'Confederation with whom?'[17] I believe that this question denies, once and for all, the possibility of the [continued] existence of the lie [known as] the 'Palestinian National Authority,' instead of giving it oxygen to prolong its artificial existence.

"The important thing now is that there be a real and active Palestinian partner for talks about any scenario of [re]uniting the banks. This can only be done through real dialogue, not by trading accusations of betrayal on the two sides of the Jordan. [The goal is] to realize the Jordanian and Palestinian interests equally, not to promote a new Israeli scenario full of traps and minefields, the most loathsome of which is [the desire to] expel the [Palestinian] population from the West Bank to the East Bank. This must be fought by every means and with serious, balanced and objective ideas, not with extremist fanaticism."[18]    

Calls In Jordan To Renew Ties With Hamas

Alongside the calls for Jordan to show openness to all the political players in the Palestinian arena, there were also explicit calls to renew the relations with Hamas. According to the Al-Quds Al-Arabi daily, the surprising visit made by a Hamas delegation in Saudi Arabia on April 17, 2023, which was the first of this kind in several years, sparked a debate among the Jordanian elites on renewing the relations with Hamas. MP Khalil 'Atiyya urged to warm the relations, whereas  other MPs close to the decision-making circles took the opposite view, claiming that Jordan, which receives over $1.5 bn annually in aid from the U.S., cannot afford to establish direct and open ties with Hamas, which the U.S. has designated as a terror organization.[19]

Muhammad Hassan Al-Tal, formerly the board chairman of the state daily Al-Rai and the editor of the daily Al-Dustour, was among those who advocated rapprochement with Hamas. In an April 11 article on the website Amonnews.net, he called to renew the relations with this movement in light of its growing strength and the developments in the region.

He wrote: "Hamas has become the most dominant element in Palestine, both in terms of national decision-making and in confronting the Israeli entity, and its relations with Arab, Islamic and international elements are constantly developing… [Moreover,] the parameters of the Palestinian issue have changed. Jordan deals with this issue on a daily and hourly basis. It upholds and defends the rights of the Palestinian people more than anyone else in the Arab and Islamic region… However, it has confined its ties with the Palestinian side to the [Palestinian] Authority in Ramallah, which it regards as the official representative of the Palestinians, [even though] Israel has acted to divest this authority of any power, rendering it impotent and powerless…

"What prevents a reexamination of Jordan's relations with Hamas, which, in essence, have never been severed and have never become hostile, God forbid?... Hamas has never harmed Jordan. On the contrary, over the past years its leaders have consistently acted to rebuild the relations with Amman…"

Addressing Egypt's and Syria's warming relations with Hamas, despite their disagreements with it, Al-Tal wrote that they are not doing this "out of love for Hamas, but rather because they have realized that this movement has considerable influence in the Palestinian arena and has become an important and significant element in Palestinian decision-making. [They] renewed the relations with it for the sake of the Palestinian people. And, as part of the openness that currently characterizes the region, it cannot be ruled out that other Arab capitals will [also] open their doors to Hamas, which were closed in the past," he said.

Al-Tal concluded: "It would not be a mistake for Amman to rethink its relations with Hamas… Nobody is calling for Hamas to fully renew its activity and [reopen] its offices in Amman. The call is [only] for Jordan to include it in its ties with the Palestinians, for it has become the most significant element with the greatest impact on the [Palestinian] issue. Hamas, [for its part], has faith in the Jordanian leadership and in its [genuine] concern for the rights of the Palestinian people, and is surely yearning to renew its relations with it…"[20]  

* Z. Harel is a research fellow at MEMRI.