In an article in the daily Al-Sharq, the former head of the law faculty at Qatar University, Hassan 'Abd Al-Rahim Al-Sayyed, harshly criticized the Qatari authorities for failing to establish an elected Shura Council[1] and a supreme constitutional court, even though the Qatari constitution and law require the establishment of both. He said that the government's endless delays are motivated by its desire to control the country exclusively, without sharing power with the legislative and judicial branches or submitting to their supervision.
The following are excerpts from the article:[2]
"It has been over two and a half years since the passing of Law 12 (2008), which mandates the establishment of a constitutional court, and since a president was nominated for this court – yet the implementation of this law has not begun. The court [itself] has not been nominated and has not [begun to] perform its duty, which is to ensure that laws and regulations comply with the constitution. We know there is such a thing as a 'minister without a portfolio.' But a court president without a court – that's an bewildering new invention!...
"[As a matter of fact,] Qatari history has seen two laws pertaining to constitutional supervision that were issued [but never implemented]: Law 6 (2007), on the settlement of constitutional disputes, which was abolished overnight before any of its clauses could be implemented, and the present law, which was [meant to] replace it, whose clauses likewise remained [nothing but] words on paper. So the delay in operating the supreme constitutional court is not a matter of completing the legislation. Before explaining what the real reason is, in my opinion, let me beseech Allah that the [court, when it is finally established,] will not be hostile to the elected Shura Council, which they have been promising us since the approval of the Provisional Basic Law in 1970, that is, for over 40 years. Just like the constitutional court, the Shura Council has never materialized, despite all the promises of senior officials who assured us it would definitely be established.
"In my opinion, the reason for the delay in operating the constitutional court is the following: When the state discharges its authority, it is supposed to comply with the legal code and the constitution... Laws are judiciary mechanisms, and the Shura Council should be involved in proposing them, discussing them and voting on them before they are approved by the Emir and published. The same is true for agreements signed by the state, pertaining to peace [with other countries], to the state's territory and sovereign rights, to the collective and individual rights of its citizens, or to changes in state laws. [All] must be submitted to the Shura Council before being signed into law.
"The Shura Council's role in passing laws and approving agreements is set out in the Permanent Constitution, but the [relevant] constitutional clauses have never been implemented! [This state of affairs] gives the executive branch absolute control over these constitutional mechanisms, free from any real and practical involvement by the Shura Council. But, in order to give the executive branch total control over the constitutional mechanisms, is it enough to delay the [establishment] of a Shura Council? Of course not. There is another problem, namely that these mechanisms are [supposed by be] monitored by the constitutional court. After all, regulations and [legal] clauses must comply with the articles of the constitution, otherwise the court can abolish them at its discretion. Similarly, agreements signed by the state... will not be approved by this court if they are at odds with the constitution. So delaying [the establishment of] a constitutional court likewise serves to give the executive branch complete control, [allowing it to] shape the constitutional mechanisms and approve any agreements it wants to pass, [free from] supervision by any other branch [of government]...
"The decrees that are periodically issued to extend the tenure of the nominated Shura Council, but which fail to provide any reasons for doing so that would convince the citizens, and the lack of transparency regarding the real reasons for the absence of the constitutional court, [all] lead [us] to a single conclusion: namely that the government wants exclusive control over the decision-making [process], and is not interested in a real legislative branch, represented by an [elected] Shura Council, or in supervision by the judiciary branch, represented by a supreme constitutional court...
"The final question to be asked is this: Is it possible to create an institution[-based] state without an elected Shura Council and a constitutional court?..."
