The Released Russian Prisoners' Arrival In The Established Russian Emigrant Community In The West

On August 1, 2024, President Putin finalized what he had dreamt about for a rather long time: He brought back to Russia Vadim Krasikov, one of Russia's most brutal and least professional killers,[1] who was arrested in Berlin in 2019 and later sentenced to life in prison for the murder of a former Chechen rebel commander.[2] In Putin's mind, the release of this officer, whom he supposedly has known since the early 1990s,[3] should be seen as clear proof that the Kremlin can rescue its agents in very difficult situations and can do this faster than it took to bring home, for example, the famous illegal arms trader Viktor Bout, who served 10 years of his 25-year term in a U.S. prison.[4]

The killer returned to Russia as part of the largest exchange of prisoners between Russia and the West since the end of the Cold War, and several Western citizens, as well as 12 Russians, who were sentenced to prison terms of between of four and 25 years for criticizing Russia's war in Ukraine and participating in political actions initiated by late Russian opposition leader Alexei Navalny,[5] were either returned or expelled to Western countries. Among the latter group there were at least three political activists who seem to be well-known abroad: Vladimir Kara-Murza, a Russia-UK dual national famous for promoting the Magnitsky Acts in several democratic countries;[6] Ilya Yashin, the former chairman of the regional legislative assembly in Moscow; and Andrey Pivovarov, the Chief Executive of the "Open Russia" movement set up by Mikhail Khodorkovsky. All three have been accused of either discrediting the Russian army or government or of participating in "undesirable organizations" or one of those formally outlawed by the Russian authorities.

Released Russian prisoners Vladimir Kara-Murza, Andrei Pivovarov and Ilya Yashin speaking at a press conference in Bonn, Germany, on August 2, 2024. (Source: X)

The Prisoner Exchange Should Not Be Called "Historic"

The exchange as such, to my mind, should not be called "historic" and will hardly become the start of a new détente between Russia and the West. It is also far from obvious that, as Mr. Krasikov has safely returned to Moscow, many other killers and terrorists who were trained in Russia and later infiltrated Europe and/or the United States will surface and engage in a wave of violence as they have become sure they will be rescued even in the case of their capture and sentencing – one should at least wait and see whether that will happen. What looks more interesting, at least in the coming months, is the effect this exchange immediately produced in the Russian "opposition," or, more precisely, in different emigrant dissident groupings.

Most of them, I would say, rejoiced in the news that their comrades and friends had been released from Putin's Reich. Nevertheless, almost immediately, members of the Russian emigrant community expressed a lot of complaints and doubts. First, they questioned why the list of those exchanged did not include others – like, for example, Alexei Gorinov, a municipal council member, who was the first person convicted of "disseminating fake news about the Russian army" and became famous because of his outstanding final speech during his trial,[7] or Daniel Kholodny, a prominent member of Alexei Navalny's team – the number of such people mentioned was much longer.

Second, many analysts suggested that the exchange itself was a success for Putin since he managed to trade prisoners of conscience for professional killers, spies, and hackers while during the Cold War years the exchanges were more "proportional," and that this was the first attempt to expel Russian citizens, many of whom did not want to leave the country. This position was voiced at least by freed Russian opposition activists and human rights defenders Ilya Yashin and Ksenia Fadeeva.[8]

Third, many dissidents argued that all this clears the way for Putin to intensify terrorist activities in Western countries while simultaneously strengthening the pressure on domestic dissenters sending them to jail and therefore increasing the "exchange pool" of those people who might become subjects for further exchanges. In several days after the exchange was completed, most Russian observers arrived at the conclusion that the move was more beneficial for Putin than for the Western governments,[9] especially citing the massive outcry it has caused in Germany,[10] where Chancellor Olaf Scholz agreed to liberate the Russian killer, opposing both the popular sentiments and the consolidated position of the Prosecutor General's office and of the Justice Ministry,[11] as well as in Poland, whose government released the most prominent Russian spies it had captured in years.[12]

Released Prisoners Address Unpopular Issues Among Russian Emigrees

However, the most intriguing developments came after the released activists began both to comment on their liberation and to share their views on the latest developments in Russia and abroad. During their first press conference in Germany, all of them assured the public they will continue their fight against Putin's regime, although Andrei Pivovarov and Ilya Yashin said they have no experience – and even no idea – concerning how this can be effectively done outside Russia.[13]

But at the same time, they addressed several issues that have become deeply unpopular among Russian emigrees in recent years. According to Mr. Pivovarov, the sanctions should be aimed at "the criminals and the Putin regime," and not at Russian citizens based on their citizenship. Mr. Yashin noted that one of the most important demands will be a termination of the aggressive war in Ukraine, without specifying how it should end. Mr. Kara-Murza said that since many Russians do not support Putin's war in Ukraine, the West should better distinguish between the Russian people and Putin's Russia.[14] The next day, in an interview with Novaya Gazeta, Mr. Pivovarov mentioned that he cannot support anyone who is fighting Russia on the frontlines – because, as he argued, many of those mobilized to the Russian army had no intentions of going to war and had been fooled or simply attracted by the huge amounts money offered by the authorities. This became the last drop that unleashed a wave of critique from all sides.[15]

Russian dissidents, many of whom have been not only designated as "foreign agents" since the start of the war but also convicted in absentia and sentenced to prison terms, blamed the "newcomers," that is, the released Russian prisoners who are now in the West, for their implicit support of Putin.[16] They argued that the sanctions that hurt the most Russians were introduced by the Kremlin itself, and not by Western powers.[17] They further insisted that the Russian people are equally responsible for the war since there were no sizeable protests inside Russia in response to Putin's aggression, and condemned the critique of the direct military fight against the regime which was, as many argued, the one and only means of securing victory over Putin's Russia.[18] To soften their accusations, the critics reiterated that all these statements were made by people who had just appeared from Putin's prisons, possess little knowledge of the recent developments and, hopefully, will change their minds after they get accustomed to the newest trends in military policy – but many straightforwardly argued that the released dissidents were Putin's propagandists. As the latter hardened their approach, suggesting that a ceasefire in Ukraine might me a good solution for the conflict (as Mr. Yashin did in his interview with Dozhd TV),[19] their opponents had labeled their views disgusting and detrimental.[20]

Disagreements Between The "Newcomers" And The Established Emigrant Opposition Was Expected

The mounting disagreements between the "newcomers" and the established emigrant opposition, to my mind, was almost imminent. On a personal level it came from the very fact that the released prisoners – some of whom even they had not asked for a pardon[21] and exchange – are full of optimism and hope, being less dissatisfied with the world they are now in than many of those who, though they have been enjoying freedom and affluence while the former had suffered in jails, have nonetheless been living in exile for years. But what is more important is that the freed prisoners coming from Russia believe they still remain Russian politicians (and I would argue they have much more grounds for claiming this than those emigrants who left the country a decade ago or even earlier) and are still hoping they will return to Russia and transform it in some distant future (which, I believe, may be true – at least for some of them who are much younger than the most prominent emigrant opposition leaders, who are near or have already trespassed on retirement age).

They are a bit naïve in believing that the Russian people does not support the war or that Russian soldiers are fighting in Ukraine against their own will – but they are right in insisting that the West should not take Putin for Russia and that the pro-Ukraine volunteers have not a single chance in changing the course of the war or igniting a civil conflict inside the Russian Federation.[22] What they are saying is that the Russian opposition should focus on Russia and educate Western policymakers about Russian developments and that they should do so without hatred and prejudice, which most of the emigrants have accumulated over the years; they should refrain from bashing the entire Russian people for what is dependent predominantly on Putin and his team; they should be moderate about the sanctions levied on Russia since they seem to be not very effective, and the support to these sanctions undermines the Russian opposition abroad in the eyes of the Russian people; and, last but not least, they should not wish for foreign (including Ukrainian) forces to destroy Russia to topple Putin's regime.

originates from the fact that the latter has little hope of returning to Russia, and it wants more to anathematize their former motherland than to change it. One may understand such an approach simply because there is a very small chance for Russia to change and return to "normalcy" in an evolutionary and peaceful way even if Ukraine succeeds in its military efforts and reinstates its 1991 borders.[23] Because of this nihilistic approach, many of those emigrant Russians who are politically active are now as anti-Russian as they are anti-Putin, calling for its defeat and demise, thus resembling most of the Ukrainians who naturally hate Russia because of its aggressive war against Ukraine. On the other hand, Mr. Yashin, Mr. Pivovarov, and some others still believe their mission is to address the Russians inside Russia, to galvanize them, and to participate in building "a better Russia,"[24] so they realize quite well one cannot ignite people if she or he has expressed hatred against them, called for their destruction, or proposed sanctions against them, at any time in the past.

Conclusion

Putting all this in a more straightforward way, I would say that the release of the Russian prisoners points to an inevitable conflict between those who fled Russia to secure their normal life (which, one should realize this perfectly: those people value their normal life more than the heroic fight against Putin's system – otherwise they would be in Putin's jails or in Russian regiments on the Ukrainian side of the frontline), and those who decided to stay in the country and openly voice their disagreements even facing a prison term, and later have no intention of being released and expelled.

The latter, I would insist, possess much more positive energy than the first. If Russia changes, they – as well as thousands of those remaining in the country and silently opposing Putin's policies – will become the leaders of the coming transformation, as did hundreds of Soviet dissidents in the 1980s while almost none of the Soviet emigrants has returned to the new Russia (and some who did, like Alexander Solzhenitsyn, quickly turned into Russian imperialists). It should be mentioned also that several respected Soviet Russian dissidents who still reside in Russia and have no intention of leaving – e.g., Alexander Podrabinek – supported both Mr. Yashin and Mr. Pivovarov, citing their sufferings in Russia and mentioning the doubtful achievements of the Russian emigrant opposition.[25] I would side with these voices and suggest that Western policymakers should instead turn to these "newcomers" for a better understanding of Russia and its perspectives and celebrate the chance for some "renewal" and "reconstitution" inside the Russian emigrant opposition.[26]

To summarize, I wound argue that the arrival of new Russian anti-Putin activists – and it looks like the latest exchange will not be the last one – into the established Russian emigrant community may have a long-lasting effect, since it reflects many weaknesses of the latter, which had become a company of publicists and YouTube bloggers continuously losing their connection with Russia. I hope the "newcomers" will embody an opposite trend as they seem aimed at revitalizing the fight against Putin's terrorist regime inside Russia itself, prioritizing it ahead of hailing and supporting Ukraine and petitioning Western leaders on sanctioning Russia.

*Dr. Vladislav Inozemtsev is the MEMRI Russian Media Studies Project Special Advisor, and Founder and Director of the Moscow-based Center for Post-Industrial Studies.