Political scientist Vasiliy Kashin a senior researcher at both the Center for Complex European and International Studies at the National Research University Higher School of Economics, and the Russian Academy of Sciences' Institute of the Far East gave a wide-ranging interview to Moskovski Komsomolets' Olga Bozheva (a specialist in her own right on Russia's aviation industry) where he discussed the possibility of military synergy between Russia and China in light of Vladimir Putin's recently concluded visit to China. Russia has helped China's defense capabilities, while Russian defense officials prefer that Russia should maintain its independent capabilities. Kashin believes that there is some room to relax this policy as far as China is concerned.
The two countries will enter a formal alliance only if an actual war with the US is imminent, otherwise an alliance has drawbacks for both sides and in any case is an outmoded form of relationship. The biggest mutual service that Russia and China provide each other is overextending America's military. America fears a dual front war, and for this reason they are willing to talk to Russia about its security concerns where previously they ignored the issue.
The interview with Kashin follows below:[1]
Vasily Kashin (Source: Csn.tv.ru)
Kashin: Concerning joint military contracts, there is one technical matter: the two countries' military-technical issues are discussed at the annual meeting of the Bilateral Commission on Military-technical Cooperation, which is co-chaired by the defense ministers of Russia and China. This time [Russian Defense Minister] Sergey Shoigu didn't come to China with President Putin, as it seems, because he was there last August, when a joint Russo-Chinese exercises were conducted at the Ningxia Hui Autonomous Region training ground. I believe the commission's meeting was held back then. Thus, one shouldn't expect the signing of any military contracts during Putin's visit. Possibly, at the highest political level the presidents outlined some common ground in the military sphere. But altogether, they talked more about the economy, gas, oil and foreign policy.
- Okay, then let's discuss military specifics differently. What do we have that interests China on the military-technical level?
- Everything related to submarine shipbuilding technology and submarine warfare in general is of primary interest to China: submersibles, nuclear-powered submarines (diesel-electric submarines to a lesser extent), torpedo armaments... For China, the gap behind the US in the technical level of nuclear submarines is now the main weakness and the main issue of concern.
- And we [Russia], as far as I understand, have made thorough progress in this area?
- At least with regards to nuclear submarine engineering, we are now far ahead of China. It's hard to say how [our level of development] corresponds with some of the latest achievements of the world leader, the US (It is apparently somewhat comparable, however). Thus, for China, cooperation with us in this area is very important.
In addition, they remain interested in technology associated with the design of tactical missile weapons, as well as a number of other specific technologies. For example, previously the Chinese were interested in nuclear power plants for spacecraft, which can be used in radar reconnaissance satellites. In the early 2010s, a number of statements still mentioned that this topic was being discussed between our countries, but then it all vanished [from the agenda]. Strictly speaking, we do not know whether something came out of it as of today.
Here's the thing: after the CAATSA Act (the U.S. federal law on Countering America's Adversaries Through Sanctions - "MK") was passed, it became more difficult to obtain open information about new Russo-Chinese military-technical cooperation projects. Both sides have become much more secretive about everything pertaining to the field of their military-technical cooperation.
We know that China is still buying our helicopters. And we are still ahead of China in terms of air and missile defense systems.
In addition, there are some standalone areas of cooperation pertaining not to products in their entirety, but to some of their specific parts, for instance, aircraft engines. In part, this applies to engines for land-based equipment, as well as to some forms of radar equipment.
On the whole, we are more advanced than the Chinese in the development of various specialized software. That is, a certain number of such subcontracts for this kind of work are obtained by Russian companies.
- And what, apart from computer chips, could be of interest to us [i.e. Russia] in China from a military aspect?
- Naturally, we are interested in electronic components. The Chinese electronics industry is way ahead of ours. Machine tools and industrial equipment are very important to us too. Our machine tool industry (despite some efforts made towards its restoration) is still a pale shadow of the former grandeur of the Soviet machine tool manufacturing.
Plus, Moscow is interested in UAV components. The Chinese have a lot of them, and they are cheap. Now we strive to establish a sound production of our own low-power piston turboprop engines. However, this task is still at the research and development stage.
Surface shipbuilding is an area where the Chinese far outperform us. They have the largest shipbuilding industry in the world, able to build large ships at an enormous pace.
True, in this sphere, we are running counter to the objectives of our own industrial policy, which involves relying on our own capabilities. I believe that some support vessels could be ordered from China. After all, we do place orders from Turkey. But we won't order warships, even if it is only hulls without weapons.
- Will we build [ships] exclusively by ourselves?
- True. Although the scale [of the two countries' production capabilities] is, of course, incomparable. In the past year, China commissioned 8 large missile destroyers to its fleet. Three of them are cruisers, according to the Western classification. Just imagine: the country has commissioned 3 missile cruisers and 5 large destroyers (which are larger than all of our largest anti-submarine ships) in just one year.
- It wasn't that long ago we were selling them our old warships... How quickly they have come up.
- The last time we sold them modern destroyers was in the very early 2000s. The situation has changed since then. China developed due to commercial shipbuilding. The country is the main producer of container merchant vessels. This facilitated the creation of a huge production base for warship' manufacturing. They mastered modern technology, created new samples of electronic equipment and armament in order to equip the vessels, and started producing these ships at a gigantic rate.
- Faster than the US?
- At no time since the Cold War have the Americans even come close to producing that many ships in a year. China is ahead of their production capabilities. Also China possesses a very advanced radar technology (not everything is so clear-cut regarding the latter issue.)
For instance, radar stations with active phased antenna arrays (APAR) are now more common in China than in Russia. Our aircraft are still predominately equipped with passive phased antenna arrays]. The opinion exists that the future belongs to APAR technology. But a number of engineers believe that our passive antenna arrays still have potential for improvement, as they are more powerful and still have a greater advantage over the active Chinese one. For example, Su-57s are equipped with an active antenna array, while the Su-35 has a passive one.
- So, both parties have advantages and disadvantages material-technical cooperation-wise? It turns out that there is a mutual interest in military-technical cooperation between the countries? Russia won't be the only party sharing its technology?
- We could receive a lot [of technologies] from China. But for now, as I see it, our military has a rather skeptical attitude towards the purchase of foreign products, including Chinese ones.
- There are reasons for this. Do you remember the outcome of the story with the purchase of French-built Mistral helicopter carriers [that France cancelled], which took place under Defense Minister Serdyukov?
- The logic was different back then. Partly in this way Serdyukov was trying to restructure the relationship between the Defense Ministry and [military] industry. His "games" with imports were a method for scaring domestic industry, which at the time behaved badly towards the armed forces. Another point is that this tactic went too far. The industry was forced into too rigid a framework.
- They "forced" and frightened it so much that it almost died of fright.
- Well, today's policy is that everything should be produced in our country. However, in my opinion, each case must be scrutinized separately. In some case we can have our own production, while in some – to cooperate will be a better option.
- Surely, we buy something from the Chinese, including for the military?
- We purchased certain diesel engines from China for certain types of small ships and vessels, and other components for our products as well. True, sometimes the military had complaints about the quality of such supplies. However, I personally don't know of any examples of any final Chinese products purchased for the army, with the exception perhaps being, a purchase of Chinese "Haval" SUVs as a means of transportation for top commanders, who prefer them to our "Patriots" SUVs.
Back in the day a batch China-produced UAVs of the same class as our "Orion" UAVs could've been purchased. We didn't have our own [production] back then. However, even at that time we preferred to do without them, waiting till we could make our own.
Russia's Orion UAV (Source: Ria.ru)
- A serious delay in UAV [technologies] occurred (inter alia) due to the policies pursued by our former military leadership). I won't forget how about 15 years ago, during a press conference, one of the Russian Air Force commanders, commenting on my question about lack of UAV production in Russia, said: "Why would we do so, if we have excellent aircraft and great pilots?"
- Yes, I believe mistakes were made, regarding the leadership's position towards a development of this program. Late, when they sort of realized [such a need] they still, at least for the Syrian campaign, they didn't purchase any Chinese drones. They waited until Orion will be developed. Now I believe, it may be even better than the ones that the Chinese produce. Whereas, we still had a few years of delay.
It was a sort of principled approach to the problem. Actually, provided we are now getting closer with China, we will, probably, have to somehow join forces and begin mutual procurement. If you to recall the Cold War era, the Soviet Union didn't try to produce everything itself. It purchased a lot of arms from the Warsaw Pact member-states: Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Poland... An entire class of weapons was made only there. But so far Russia and China are trying to produce everything themselves as far as possible.
- You're talking about procurement? What about joint production?
- It's already happening. We've designed a number of products specifically for China. Usually it works according to the following model: we develop something for the Chinese, sell a license, and later this product is produced with some of our components. After that the Chinese gradually develop a local production.
This was the case with many models of armaments, starting with the Su-27SK jet, China's main PL-12 air-to-air missile (which was practically developed in Russia and is a development of the Russian "R-77" rocket design). For a while, the homing head for it was supplied from Russia too. Then the same thing happened with the VJ-91 counter-radar missile (which was designed on the basis of our X-31 missile). VJ-91 is too was a licensed version of [our design]. There are many such examples.
However, there was no joint production that would meet the needs of the two states at once. Again, this is explained by a phenomenon that is referred to in the scientific literature as "techno-nationalism," under which a country strives to meet the domestic demand 100% by its own production capabilities, in principle it isn't ready to consider any alternatives, or the prospect of lower prices.
- You must agree that support for the national producer is very important, especially now.
- Yes, everyone is well aware that one must strive for a high level of self-sufficiency. Now it's clear that all this liberal reasoning about free trade has always been a lie. Whereas there are some rational limits. If in one of the areas of production you have no capabilities, or you cannot delay production of some product, then, probably, it won't be a sin to cooperate with someone.
- In these particular circumstances, it would be to our advantage to do so with China?
- Absolutely. I'll tell you the reason. We are tightly linked [to China] by our common political confrontation with the US. This prospect is unlikely to disappear in the foreseeable future.
There is no absolutely doubt that the Chinese are tough negotiators, as they won't let go. They can always set some conditions. And were never known for charity either. If they have a monopoly in some area, they'll exploit it to the maximum. But now we are closely connected and truly need each other. We need to scrutinize areas in which we are weak, in order to somehow join forces in this direction.
- Will the mutual interest, under current conditions, be beneficial to both sides?
- At the very least, we could share the expenses of research and experimental design stage.
- We were discussing the military-technical aspects. Let us touch upon the purely military ones? We are conducting many exercises together with the Chinese army; we are organizing strategic aviation joint air patrols. Under the circumstances created, isn't it high time to move to more substantial forms of military cooperation? I'm talking about the establishment of a joint early-missile-warning system with China, similar to the joint air defense system with Belarus.
- Any such joint system can be classified as a military alliance. And a military alliance is a political step that Russia and China do not seem ready to make.
- Why? Many believe that this is overdue and could happen almost tomorrow, while the Americans, supposedly, are the most afraid of this scenario.
- I believe it won't happen in the short term perspective, as it will lead to a lot of negative consequences for our relations with third countries.
For Russia, for example, a military alliance with China would undermine relations with India, Vietnam and a number of other partners in Asia, who have complicated relations with Beijing.
For China, the alliance with us will lead to a sharp exacerbation of relations with the EU, which is now China's main trading partner. And now, when the US is on a "crusade" against China, the Chinese wouldn't want to lose such an important source of technology as the EU.
Such a formal step as the conclusion of Moscow-Beijing military alliance, in my opinion, is possible, only in the case that war already at the doorstep. And I'm not talking about some conflict in Ukraine, for which they are threatening us only with further sanctions, but about an actual war with the US. Only in the face of such an existential threat could the two countries undertake such a step. Until then, I do not believe, that either Russia or China needs it.
By the way, the unwillingness to create a military alliance is specified in our joint documents. High-ranking representatives of both countries constantly stress this. It's argued that the two countries already have very close relations, and that, possibly we can enter such an alliance, but alliances are perceived as an obsolete form of relations; there's no need for them; we are above that, and so on.
- Be that as it may, in case a military conflict aimed at China begins, will we be ready to help China?
- If it is about the situation surrounding Taiwan, in my opinion, we are guaranteed to provide China with political support.
- Can they do without us militarily?
- China insists that Taiwan issue is an internal matter of the PRC. So, I can't imagine that the Chinese would ask for anyone's military assistance in this regard.
The imaginable prospect, for example (and that is exactly what currently frightens the US, and of which they are constantly talking about) is that an offensive on Taiwan coincides with the beginning of some major exercises, or a sudden test of the combat readiness of our Western Military District, which will involve troops deployed in other parts of the country.
This will pose a tough test for the US and NATO, as they will necessarily have to react on two fronts at once, i.e. to the developments in China and to the Russian exercises (even in a case where that they could be absolutely certain that Russia is not planning any actual military actions). NATO's rules and norms of response demand some sort of response. For instance, [such a response could be] a buildup of some of their forces to prevent a worst-case scenario in Eastern Europe. But this would distract the US from promptly reacting to the situation in Asia, which could lead to their defeat. Despite the fact that this is more of a theoretical scenario, it's one that the Americans seriously fear.
Well, the entire beauty of the current situation is that in order to influence the military situation in Eurasia, we do not need to enter into a military alliance with China. We don't need to go to war with anyone. It's enough to move around some military contingents on our own territory. And all this can be done in the framework of routine military training.
We can hold scheduled exercises somewhere in Kaliningrad or Belarus at the most inopportune moment for the Americans. In terms of military budget spending, it makes no essential difference. But it will force the Americans to withdraw their troops from somewhere and send thousands of service men to some hole in Poland or Romania. It's impossible to do otherwise, as they will lose their authority over the Europeans, and discredit their ability to deter Russia, thereby undermining NATO's capabilities.
This can be practiced year after year. The Americans understand this and therefore they have to respond to our demands regarding security conditions. At least, they state that they are ready to talk to us, which wasn't the case before.
-Meaning, that such a dual simultaneous military "move" on the part of the two countries is difficult for the Americans to withstand?
- Yes, and the further the situation develops, the harder it gets. China is increasing its capabilities very fast. Well, we too continue to advance. We have new technical capabilities; new types of arms are being produced now.
- What a paradox! It turns out that our close military and military-technical cooperation with China, basically leads to world peace, isn't it?
- One could put it this way. It contains the US and creates a heavy military and politico-military cost on global scale for the US. Our cooperation with China increases the price of a hostile policy towards Russia for the US.
Olga Bozheva (Source: Mk.ru)
[1] Mk.ru, February 5, 2022.
