Russian Emigrant Dissidents Are Not The Means Of Cracking Down On Putin's Regime – Change Will Come Only From Inside Russia

The past few months have been marked by a series of conflicts that shook the Russian emigrant community. First, it was "revealed" that Leonid Nevzlin, who is one of the former owners of Yukos, a Moscow-based oil and gas company that the Russian government bought in the 1990s, supposedly hired criminals who assaulted several active members of Alexei Navalny's Anti-Corruption Foundation (ACF).[1] Later, Maxim Katz, another well-known blogger and anti-Kremlin activist, accused the ACF of accepting millions of dollars in donations from businessmen not only responsible for Russia's "unfair" market reforms[2] but also involved in massive money-laundering schemes.[3] All this has caused a split in the Russian dissident community since most of its members have taken sides in the clash.

So, as Navalny's last book, provocatively titled Patriot, hits bookstores,[4] it is widely considered that his legacy has been completely ruined and cannot be restored despite the many prizes and honors his widow has been collecting all over the globe this year,[5] starting with the Academy Award for best documentary film.[6]

I would argue that the sad story of the Russian opposition deserves to be seriously studied because the people that belong to it are still treated by many Western politicians with admiration and considered a serious anti-Putin force that might have a significant effect on Russia's future. To my mind, these hopes are completely irrelevant, and the demise of the Russian liberals has resulted from a series of trends that has been clearly visible for many years.

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The Failures And Mishaps Of The Russian "Opposition"

First, I will focus on the most important point to consider when one evaluates any political figure in any country: the achievements that may be credited to her or his activity. If one looks at the Russian "opposition" from this angle, it is possible to realize that the story of this group is one of continuous failures and mishaps over at least 20 years.

Even while they were Russia's leading politicians, ministers, and deputies in the late 1990s, they did nothing to prevent former KGB officers from being appointed as Russia's new ruling gang. In the early 2000s, they teamed up with their associates trying to squeeze into the Duma and thus supported Putin's re-election in 2004.[7] Later, they ceded one position after another claiming that Russia is still able to return to democracy but started fighting each other almost immediately after then-President Dmitry Medvedev reopened some channels for legal political activity in 2011.[8]

Former deputy prime ministers fought first for Duma mandates, and later for being elected deputies in the regional legislative assemblies, like Boris Nemtsov did before his assassination.[9]

I will not take more time to depict these sad developments, but I would say that the story of the Russian opposition is the story of a group that has been sidelined in national politics for years, losing both elite and popular support, and now, after it was finally squeezed from its own country, Western policymakers are de facto asked to welcome and hail these people (I would be very impolite) not because of their achievements but rather because of the absence of any; not for the results they had harvested, but for the pain and suffering they encountered. The latter, I believe, should be respected, but there is no reason to believe these former hardships might be converted into any political role in the future since the Russian public has little respect for emigrant dissidents and at least as of now is, on the whole, quite satisfied with the current rulers.[10]

Undermining Chances For Reviving The Liberal Appeal In Russia

Then we come to the second extremely important issue: If Russian dissidents have performed so poorly in the eyes of their compatriots, why has no one ever tried to address the reasons for the dissociation between Russian liberals and the Russian public? I would argue that there are two major reasons for this.

On the one hand, throughout the 2000s and after, the most influential Russian dissidents and emigrants were either prominent policymakers of the 1990s (like Yegor Gaidar, Boris Nemtsov, Mikhail Kasyanov, Vladimir Ryzhkov, Andrey Nechaev, and dozens of others), or people who benefited greatly from the events of the time (Mikhail Khodorkovsky or Leonid Nevzlin seem like the most prominent examples).

Such a strong connection prevented and prevents the anti-Putin group from the harsh criticism of the Yeltsin era that the majority of the Russians consider to be the time of robbery and anarchy.

On the other hand, in recent decades, the opposition and protest activity in Russia has focused on defending people and groups oppressed by the Kremlin – journalists, human rights activists, ethnic minorities, entrepreneurs, non-Orthodox religious believers, feminist activists, and LGBT people – i.e., all those who might be seen as minorities, while Putin, hailing the "Russian world" and praising the former empire, approached those who considered themselves a majority.

Of course, there is no doubt that it is President Putin who inflicted terrible damage on the Russian nation by forcing many educated and talented people to leave, undermining the readiness of people in the country to raise more children, allowing corrupt policemen to become involved in drug trafficking and thus provoking an enormous intoxication of the nation, and, most important, by sending hundreds of thousands of people to their deaths in Ukraine.

Nevertheless, Russian liberals have never tried to address Russians as an endangered group, preferring to criticize their imperial aspirations and thus completely undermining any chance of reviving the liberal appeal in Russia.

The Phenomenon Of "Trans-Ukrainianism"

The third distinctive feature of the Russian dissidents emerged after the start of Putin's aggression against Ukraine, as the vast majority of them sided with the Ukrainians, which was quite understandable, and imagined that Ukraine's victory would provoke a massive disillusionment in President Putin and lead to the collapse of the Russian political regime.[11] This phenomenon is now called "трансукраинство [trans-Ukrainianism]" meaning that a "good Russians" should be even more patriotic for Ukraine than many Ukrainians.[12]

It is not a coincidence that Dmitry Bykov, a well-known and talented Russian writer and poet, wrote the most enthusiastic biography of President Zelensky, and the Free Russia Forum declares as its goal "Victory for Ukraine and freedom for Russia."[13]

I would not even say that Putin's propagandists in Russia widely comment on such an attitude as being the best proof that all emigrant dissidents are in fact traitors, but this approach looks extremely shaky because of the huge chances that Ukraine will lose the war or at least broker some kind of armistice. What will happen to "freedom for Russia" if the "victory for Ukraine" does not materialize?

I would just mention here, that the much more successful Russian opposition emigrant, Vladimir Lenin, and his fellow Social Democrats, never dreamt of Germany's victory over Russia, but advocated only "the defeat of your own government in an imperialistic war."[14] Lenin and his Bolshevik party finally achieved a goal that was the complete opposite of that with which the Russian opposition is obsessed these days: They overthrew the Provisionary Government and took Soviet Russia out of the war, thus contributing to Germany's temporary success. I would insist that it would be the best way for the new Russian dissidents to secure Ukraine's independence and sovereignty, but they still hope if not to arrive in Moscow on Western-made and Ukrainian-manned tanks then to be invited to form "the government of the liberated Russian territories in the occupied regions of the Kursk oblast." To my mind, both aspirations are completely groundless.[15]

Celebrities Rather Than Political Actors

The fourth remarkable point is that the Russian opposition consists of people who have never been politicians, though they still often label themselves as such. I mean that all these people have for years been either acting as functionaries and bureaucrats, at various times appointed by Russia's rulers to certain positions, the self-proclaimed leaders of small groups of admirers, or simply individual activists and bloggers. Most of them believe in a better Russia and are fierce critics of President Putin, but this makes their community one of faith that may be moved by a shared belief but is deeply split because of personal loyalty to one leader or another. In a recent article in Gazeta Wyborcza I argued that the opposition resembles European elites that for centuries were divided by religious schisms, heresies, monastic orders, reformist groups, and endless sectarianism, provoking conflicts that claimed more Christian lives than all the wars Europeans waged against Muslims or pagans.[16]

As medieval Europeans, Russian dissidents cannot understand that politics starts from the point where the role of the Holy Inquisition is diminished and that alliances are built not on irrational faith, but to pursue rational goals of transforming society through uniting dispersed groups into solid parties. From this peculiarity another feature arises – the one that establishes Russian dissidents much more as celebrities rather than political actors; as preachers rather than deliberators. As in the Middle Ages, these people – of course, using not a hand-written Bible, but all available communication techniques – are transmitting their revelations to the amazed flock without attempting to establish a dialogue with the people. They can fiercely debate between themselves what kind of a parliamentary system "the perfect Russia of the future" would possess, but they will never address the simplest slogans that may resonate in thousands of people inhabiting the "terrible Russia of today."[17]

No One Should Expect Russian Emigrant Dissidents To Call For A Maidan

The fifth and last point that should be mentioned here is that Russian dissidents are democrats and so they admire the rule of law, human rights, and all the things that may contribute to the peaceful dismemberment of the regime. What they do repeat again and again is the phrase coined by Vassily Rozanov, who said about the 1917 troubles that "Russia has disappeared in three days."[18] The current emigrants say the same about the Soviet Union and are expecting that this will happen to Putin's Reich. But the Russian revolution was, on the one hand, initiated by the masses indoctrinated by Social Democrats, and started when the elites turned away from the emperor. The Soviet perestroika was fostered by Mikhail Gorbachev, the supreme ruler of the country, and much later became supported by the liberal intelligentsia.

Today, the elites have no motivation to change anything since they realize they are all criminals by international as well as by Russian standards. Therefore, Putin's regime can be overthrown only by a violent revolution, and the democratic liberals simply cannot call for such an "illegitimate" move, bringing them to a kind of a dead-end with which they cannot cope because the only way forward goes through a terrain that is absolutely hostile to them. This can be proved by the fact that no one among these dissidents is talking about finding supporters in Russia or developing underground networks or military regiments. Their fantasy cannot extend further than calling people to gather in their backyards at night and ignite small lights to establish a sense of mutual solidarity or to flock to the polling stations in Russia and abroad at noon on the election day, thus providing propagandists with much-needed pictures of queues claiming that the Russians are spending a lot of time to cast their vote for President Putin.[19] It might be seen as an abnormality, but no one should expect from these people to call for a Maidan. On the one hand, they all fear anarchy and unpredictability, and, on the other, no one will make such a call just because the popular movement may show he is not a "true leader" of the opposition.

Conclusion – Change In Russia Will Not Come From Those Assembling In Nice Hotel Conference Rooms In Berlin Or Washington

All the above brings me to the conclusion that the Russian emigrant dissidents these days resemble more those Russians who fled their country in the early 1920s after their cause was defeated by the Bolsheviks, than the Bolsheviks themselves of the time they lived in Europe and even in the U.S. before the Russian revolution. They are losing their connections with their compatriots, are becoming traitors because of their support of Ukraine, and seem unable to present even a "minimal program" that would motivate ordinary people inside Russia to dream of change.

The governments of the Free World, by supporting the "free Russian press," awarding dozens of prizes to Russian activists, and filming endless high-profile meetings between such activists and Western policymakers, to my mind, celebrate some kind of a martyrdom culture rather than that of achievement.

Change in Russia will come not from those assembling in nice hotel conference rooms in Berlin or Washington, but from Russians who become angered by corrupt officials, police brutality, or economic hardships. These people will organize themselves much better than the emigrant activists can and will have a much sharper vision of the future than the current opposition may possess. And, therefore, if the West is interested in cracking down on Putin's regime – which, after all, does not seem evident – it should look inside Russia for both elite figures who are not happy with current developments, and for local problems that might become signals for the protests.

The West should offer the Russians: the lifting of all the sanctions imposed on Russia; the dropping of the issue of reparations for Ukraine;[20] and a roadmap for reconciliation and incorporation of the Russian Federation into the Free World in exchange for a plane stuffed with war criminals on a direct flight to the Hague.[21] Should this offer be made, the wanted outcome may follow – but nothing like this would result from another decade of pleasing and gratifying the decent and brave people, who, I am sorry to say,[22] can now do absolutely nothing except ruin the reputations of themselves and their fellow dissidents...

*Dr. Vladislav Inozemtsev is the MEMRI Russian Media Studies Project Special Advisor, and Founder and Director of the Moscow-based Center for Post-Industrial Studies.