Against the backdrop of the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, the fate of Russian military bases and equipment remains unclear. Russian experts are actively discussing the possibility of redeploying the Syrian contingent to Libya. Since the beginning of 2024, Russia has been transferring to Libya the mercenaries from the "African direction" of the former "Wagner" PMC.
The Russian media outlet Topwar.ru shared its analysis about Russia's relations with Khalifa Haftar, the leader in the eastern part of Libya, which is defined as a "fellow traveller." "Khalifa Haftar is the leader in the eastern part of Libya. The latter is not an ally for Russia, like former Syrian President Bashar Assad but a fellow traveller (however, as it turns out [Assad was not an ally either] but a something else). From a certain point of view, one can find here even a hypothetical advantage, since relations between political fellow travellers are always more formalized (albeit not publicly)," Topwar.ru stated.
Commenting on Russia's stance, "which could in fact make a good use of bases in Libya," Topwar.ru warned that it is important to take into consideration that Turkey is an important player in Libya, as it is in Syria. "Turkey can 'do us a favor,' as has been the case more than once... But if one looks closely, [Turkey] bills for all its favors," Topwar.ru wrote.
Khalifa Haftar (Source: X)
The following is the translation of his article:[1]
"For several days, the Internet and the media have been actively discussing new satellite images of Libyan bases at which the activity of Russian transport aircraft and some kind of loading and unloading operations were detected. Can one now say: 'Well, here we go, Libya, hello again'? – Apparently, yes. But to the question: 'What comes next?', I can quote one of the characters from the late Perestroika movie 'The Fountain': 'Is it good? – I don't know. Is it bad? – I'm not sure.'
"Be that as it may, it is impossible under the current conditions to quickly relocate large-scale military and civilian equipment from Syria to Russia. Libyan [military] bases are really not a bad option in terms of transferring some of the equipment by air, although it cannot be said that this is a short route. The distance from Hmeimim to the Libyan bases is 1,800-2,000 kilometers. Khalifa Haftar is the leader in the eastern part of Libya. The latter is not an ally for Russia, like former Syrian President Bashar Assad but a fellow traveller (however, as it turns out [Assad was not an ally either] but a something else).
"From a certain point of view, one can find here even a hypothetical advantage, since relations between political-fellow travellers are always more formalized (albeit not publicly). For a while there was not much news from Libya in the mass media segment, it is high time to look at the state of affairs in this difficult part of the world. Our fellow traveller in Libya is very peculiar (provided events will develop in this vein), and for Russia it will be much more difficult to operate there than in Syria.
"West, East And Oil Infrastructure
"Libya is still de facto divided into two parts: the western (Tripolitania, with capital in Tripoli) and the eastern (Cyrenaica, with de facto capital in Benghazi), or rather, the second part should be more correctly (though not very normally) called 'Southeastern Libya.'
"Formally recognized by the 'world community,' the Libyan government has a seat in the capital Tripoli, but in fact the country has already become a traditional dual power, which is only partially retouched through functioning elected bodies, like the House of Representatives (although it practically represents Benghazi). There is a fierce and constant political struggle for the prime minister's chair and finances, which turns into armed clashes. However, curiously enough, the 'west' and the 'east' cannot be called irreconcilable [parties], neither ideologically, nor even in terms of the positions of external sponsor-partners. [The situation in Libya is] now in a sort of dynamic balance.
"Somehow this structure is functioning, and oil comes forward as a staple [of this balance], albeit a completely spiritless one.[2] Libya, in contrast to Iraq, did not suffer serious damage to its infrastructure during the active phases of the war, but it was divided between the parties in a rather specific way.
"Since 2022, the average production of Libyan 'black gold' was around 1.1-1.2 million barrels-per-day (BPD) mark. The 'collective Tripoli' controls the 'El Sharara,' 'El Feel,' and offshore 'Bouri' fields, which yield about 400 thousand BPD or 35 percent of the total volume. The 'collective Benghazi' under a leadership of Haftar controls the fields of the 'Sirte Crescent,' with the main being 'Sarir,' 'Waha' and 'Zelten.' The latter three alone yield 590,000 BPD or 51 percent of the total volume. Considering the [output of the] whole cluster, Benghazi enjoys almost 60 percent of Libyan [oil] production. Formally speaking, the 'national team of Cyrenaica' wins.
"It is not enough to extract oil, it must also be transported and shipped. Strange as it may seem, the state of Libyan pipelines is more or less acceptable, but there is an issue with loading terminals. The ports of 'Ras Lanuf,' 'Es Sidr,' 'Marsa Brega,' 'Hariga,' and 'Zueitina' account for 70 percent of the current shipment capacity of Libya (750,000 BPD), and again they are located in the Benghazi zone of influence. Tripoli with its two ports (like 'Mellitah') located in the west, has 2.5 times weaker storage and shipping capacity. It is unrealistic to commission new terminals under current conditions. The infrastructure was inherited from the 'terrible dictator and tyrant' Muammar Gaddafi and, naturally, was not designed for such a military scenario. It turns out that here, too, the 'Cyrenaica team' has an advantage.
"It would seem that they have their own oil (and its reserves are larger than that in the west), their own pipes and pumps, storage, ports... So, what is lacking for prosperity and simple separation of the eastern part of Libya from the western one? One little thing missing for prosperity is money, since oil can only be traded officially by the National Oil Corporation (NOC), Libya's national oil operator, which gives the proceeds to the central bank.
"There were two central banks in Libya (just as [there are two] authorities) and there are two NOCs, but the Benghazi NOC cannot officially sell oil – [it can be sold] only through the Tripoli NOC, wherein only the official Central Bank can receive foreign currency. In the end, the NOC and the Central Bank had to be merged. Over the past few years, Benghazi made attempts to somehow ship [oil] on its own and acquire money. The EU and the U.S. have threatened the UAE in this regard (the latter were providing help, and quite actively at one time). This turned out to be very inconvenient in practice, under the threat of sanctions. Thus, neither Benghazi nor their sponsors dared to take any risks. However, Tripoli did not possess any special means of coercion.
"In Libya, French 'TotalEnergies,' and to some extent 'Conoco' (USA) and Italian 'ENI' hold the rights on exploration, extraction, and infrastructure operation, as well as concessions for the sale of the oil. On paper, Tripoli offers participation to all: Russia, China, and India, but the main operators and investors are still France and Italy. It is clear that they do not cooperate directly with Benghazi but operate through official structures in Tripoli and the recognized NOC with its subsidiaries. In the end, one party has the ability to ensure market settlements and status (in order not to be subject to sanction), the ability to attract mining companies for concessions, while the other party – volumes and terminals.
"This, in fact, is the staple that holds Libya's west and east in common space. In financial terms, this staple is not so light: Libya enjoys $13.3-13.5 billion a year from concessions (data for 2022-2024) or 33-34 percent of oil revenues. After deducting operating costs and necessary depreciation, this sum quite fairly accounts for exactly half of the market price of Libyan oil (the latter has high-quality characteristics). One cannot argue that the greedy European 'capitalist' does not share [his revenues] with Libya. He does, but it is not enough to divide $13 billion 'fairly' between the west and the east; it is also necessary to evaluate and authorize the shares of authoritative and irreplaceable players within the west and the east. And each party has its own [players], and there are also foreign interests there, not only that of Libya.
"Military And Political Division And Balance Of Powers
"The personalities who represented (represent) the Libyan west and east are generally well known in Russia thanks to the press: In the former case it is the ex-prime minister of the Government of National Unity (GNU) in Tripoli, Fayez Sarraj, in the latter – the head of the Libyan National Army (LNA), Marshal Khalifa Haftar. Sarraj has already been dethroned, while Haftar continues to play the role of the patriarch of the Libyan east.
"The forces that are subordinate to Tripoli and Benghazi do not represent something unified and cohesive along the tribal or any other principles. In each case these forces represent a mishmash of different military brigades. In addition, there are religious and ideological differences between them, however [such brigades] are connected on the ground.
"The division of forces took place in four phases; two of these phases were represented by the clashes for the central coast – Sirte and Misrata. The first phase is the period after the overthrow of Gaddafi, while the second was the struggle for Sirte against ISIS (back then the city and its surroundings remained in the hands of the Government of National Unity (GNU). The third phase was Haftar's struggle for Tripoli (Misrata opens the path to Tripoli, in turn Sirte was the key to oil reserves and shipping ports). Haftar's forces managed to take Sirte, and to clear the surrounding areas and another center of oil transit (Ajdabiya). The forces of the Russian group 'W' [Wagner] participated on Haftar's side playing one of the major roles. Misrata and Tripoli did not succumb to the marshal due to Turkey's direct intervention, which sided with the GNU. Units disloyal to Haftar moved to the western half, in turn ISIS, which settled there following its tactic of seizing trade hubs, was pushed into the desert and dissolved for the time being. The fourth phase is happening today and is more political [in nature].
"In the end, Haftar (in addition to the detachments from Tobruk and Benghazi) was left with the 'combat guard,' which consists of the remnants of the special forces recruited under Gaddafi, detachments from Sirte itself (which are quite loyal), and 'combat Salafists' composed of the forces of the supporters of the preacher Rabee Al-Madkhali ('Madkhalites'). By and large, the Sirte forces and the 'Madkhalites' are comparable in terms of the number of brigades. The backbone of this army accounts for 9,000 'bayonets' [servicemen], with the possibility of recruiting another 8-9,000 'units' from the militias of the controlled territories.
"The tribal and territorial militias that control the oases of Al-Kufra and the borders with Chad, southern Egypt, and northwestern Sudan come forward as important fellow travellers on Haftar's difficult military and political path. These are too Salafi radicals, [politically] focused, like the 'Madkhalites,' on Saudi Arabia. They are located in a very profitable spot in terms of caravan trade. Wherein, the militias managed to curb in the bud the local version of Islam – the Senussis (also, by today's standards, of Salafi teaching). The first and only king of Libya (Idris I), who was overthrown by the Jamahiriya, was a descendant of the founder of this religious order. The Senussis are active and numerous in western Libya; the Al-Senussi family has been formally rehabilitated and is involved in Libyan politics.
"On the western side [of the country], one can observe a similar conglomeration of Tripoli and Misrata units, where brigades connected to such territories as Zintan (the Zintan Brigades), Gadamis, and Zawiya, as well as the huge southwestern region of Fezzan with the towns of Sabha and Marzuk, have [the most] influence. In general, the GNU and Tripoli are supported by forces associated with the Muslim Brotherhood movement.
"Turkey has Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party, in its turn Libya has the Justice and Construction Party. The GNU (the collective Tripoli) several times engaged in confrontation with the Zintan Brigades. The latter sometimes leaned towards Haftar and sometimes turned their back on him. Similarly, the Fezzan tribal brigades (a conglomerate of Toubou tribes) at times supported either Tripoli or Benghazi, but eventually, against the background of the persecution against heretics in El Kufra, they supported Tripoli. The powers of the two sides are roughly equal manpower-wise, but Haftar's forces are somewhat more resistant to problems.
"Kaleidoscope For 2024
"Eventually Fayez Al-Sarraj failed to cope with the hardships and deprivations of politics, handing over his office to the openly pro-Turkish politician Abdul Dbeibeh. But Haftar's protege, Fathi Bashagha, did not last long in the seat of the prime minister [of the Government of National Stability]. Over three years the prime minister's office was contested twice and as a result of the struggle, it was quite logically divided (as everything else [in the country]) between Haftar represented by the former finance minister Osama Hammad and Abdul Dbeibeh.
"This entire kaleidoscope still depends on who and how will be distributing the oil money. Starting from 2022, the struggle is being waged rather in the political field [than in military one], precisely because the oil pumps are working. The fact of them operating [and not being decommissioned] makes the situation balanced albeit dynamically. Especially since Libya now is part of the oil market with its [accounted] volumes: Libyan exports are taken into account in price calculations and OPEC+ plans.
"In the end of the day, there is the GNU with Prime Minister Abdul Dbeibeh, the House of Representatives sitting in Tobruk with a separate Prime Minister Osama Hammad. The former has Turkey and Qatar as military and ideological-religious assets, Italy and France as facilitators of oil deals, and borders with Algeria and Niger, which are somewhat under control. Tripoli's forces are very heterogeneous and sensitive to monetary fluctuations. The second party has oil, pipelines, and ports with an eastern border, more homogeneous [military] forces, which are slightly less sensitive to monetary fluctuations [the income of the state], and the support of Saudi Arabia, the UAE and, partly, of Egypt.
"This entire desert political-military 'vaudeville' is much more complicated than what was going on in Syria. On the one hand, Libya has almost irreconcilable supporters of the Qatari-Turkish Muslim Brotherhood and Saudi Salafists. On the other, we see that there are local Salafists fighting on both sides, that brigades change their allegiance back and forth, as well as militias of the south, the southeast and the southwest of the country, can also switch their sympathies from the west to the east and vice versa.
"Both the west and the east of Libya have to somehow negotiate on oil money [revenues], and if before 2020-2021 it was still possible for them to play tug-of-war, then later when the oil industry started operating, it became dangerous for each side. Each party can 'shut off the valve': one in terms of money, the other in terms of actual raw materials supply. Wherein in Tripoli, the disgruntled tribes – the Toubou and the Tuareg – can also do this. This situation represents a sort of dynamic balance, which neither side wants to disturb seriously.
"Turkey quite logically seized the port of Khoms and turned it into a military base. Thus, it covers both the Misrata and Tripoli [directions] at the same time. It is also clear now that Turkey needs not only Libyan resources, but also control over the border with Niger, Chad and Sudan (the future 'noose' is being tightened around Egypt), and for this purpose Ankara is building a military base in Sudan, while [the country's] military-technical cooperation with Niger and Chad is growing.
"Naturally, the unfolding events are only a pale shadow of the 'mighty French plan' to defeat Gaddafi, according to which France and Qatar should have been, in theory, the full beneficiaries in North Africa (after all, back then the Arab Spring was beginning in Tunisia, and the Mohamed Morsi government had come to power in Egypt). Now Turkey and France are in conflict, the EU in general and Italy in particular do not support Turkey's strengthening in Libya. Saudi Arabia and the UAE, which support Haftar, are also against it. This is a balance that was established over several years.
"[What It Means] For Russia
"Now let us take a look at Russia's stance, which could in fact make a good use of bases in Libya, for instance of the Al-Jufra airbase (near Hun) and one of the [country's] ports. When 'W' group [Wagner Group] was fighting in Libya, it was a big commercial project that was generally, though not universally, in synergy with government policy. The logic of the functioning of the state and that of the military corporation are different. For example, in Sudan, the group rather supported the forces of Mohamed Dagalo (RSF), while Moscow being a foreign policy player of a different magnitude was restricted in such steps. Also, the group could 'work' with Haftar in a variety of ways, while Moscow as an official player was limited in its methods.
"In Libya, Russia enters into the existing balance of power, and it will be necessary to integrate into it as part of that official balance. This means working with both Tripoli and Benghazi. But who controls the financial 'valve' in Libya? – France and Italy. Haftar badly needs good arms, air defense and specialists to counter the threat of Turkey, and Moscow can sell them directly or indirectly. But if Russia comes to the region as part of official policy (establishes military bases), then this aid in arms will already violate the balance. France and Italy via the U.S. can simply cause a financial crisis in Libya for a half a year. What can Moscow do to curb it? Perhaps [it is possible to stop it] together with Saudi Arabia and the UAE, but they had not sought before that to create a parallel [oil] market.
"There is one more player we have not mentioned – the U.S. And they have not even launched their policy in Libya. For several years they have been observing, giving way to France and the Arabians [the inhabitants of the Arabian Peninsula]. This year they are busy with other things. But will the U.S. miss the opportunity to influence such an important region, knowing that they can make life difficult for Russia?
"Actually, that is why I used the following movie quote in the preamble to this thorough article: 'Is it good? I don't know. Is it bad? I'm not sure.' The very fact that we [Moscow] have an opportunity to withdraw some equipment and troops from Syria is clearly a good thing, but there is also a cost to the issue that cannot be solved by the method available to a military corporation. Tripoli Prime Minister Abdul Dbeibeh has already made statements that the strengthening of Russia's presence [in the region] will mean an infringement on Libya's sovereignty and generally has dark prospects. This is understandable; we did not expect otherwise.
"But there is another player – Turkey, which can ask for something important and politically useful for itself [in return for support]. Turkey can 'do us a favor,' as has been the case more than once. After all, Ankara is our partner and neighbor (and sort of a kind neighbor). In Syria they are doing us a noble favor. But if one looks closely, [Turkey] bills for all its favors. There was a big war in Syria, but it was a simpler situation for the [Russian] state – our bases were part of official policy and the balance of power, which was secured in the official framework. In Libya, to create such conditions, both Tripoli and Turkey will have to be paid off, while the U.S. and 'friendly' France are not far away either."
[1] Topwar.ru/256284-vozmozhnyj-placdarm-v-livii-cennyj-resurs-no-skolko-budet-napisano-v-cennike.html, December 24, 2024. The article was written by Russian expert Mikhail Nikolaevsky.
[2] The author hints at a famous meme, "spiritual staple," introduced by Russian President Vladimir Putin in his address to the Federal Assembly on December 12, 2012. He meant spiritual and moral values that foster feelings of brotherhood and national unity.