Viktor Biryukov, who heads a sports academy in Lugansk (in Donbas region, occupied and annexed by Russia) wrote an article for "Military Review" ("Voennoe Obosrenie") titled "A Duma Deputy Has Admitted the Unworkable Nature of the Special Military Operation's Goals. Who is to Blame and What to Do?" The article discussed the recent criticism of the conduct of the special operation by Konstantin Zatulin, the Deputy Chair of the Duma Committee on Relations with the Commonwealth of Independent States.
Zatulin, speaking at a forum discussing Ukraine's future, claimed that none of the Special Military Operation's objectives have been achieved and generally delivered a broadside critique of the conduct of the war and particularly the information policy in terms of Ukraine, the Russian public, and the West. Zatulin's criticism drew threats to expel him from the ruling United Russia faction in the Duma.[1]
In the 'Mlitary Review' article, Biryukov concurs with most of Zatulin's remarks and takes issue with some points. He admires the deputy's courage in challenging the excessive optimism prevalent in official circles, and risking the wrath of the authorities for speaking the plain truth.
There should be no mistake. Zatulin does not want an independent Ukraine, and like Putin, he believes that Russians and Ukrainians are one people. He seeks to win over the Ukrainian people by confiscating the property of Ukrainian oligarchs and distributing it amongst the general population. However, Russia, by its policies and messaging, has managed to unite the Ukrainians against Russia.
Biryukov's article, with extensive citations from Zatulin's presentation follows below:[2]
Konstantin Zatulin (Source: Radiokp.ru)
"The French philosopher Voltaire wrote in one of his works that optimism is the passion of claiming that all is well when in reality things are horrible. If we look at what is being said about the Special Military Operation [SVO] on TV, what some of the "Gung ho -patriotic channels' write, and project the meaning of this quote onto the current situation, i.e., the military conflict in Ukraine, we can say that this represents a fairly accurate characterization of those bloggers and experts, who claim that the SVO is going according to plan and according to schedules.
"In the author's opinion, the media clearly lacks sensible assessments of the current situation in the SVO zone, especially when it comes to the official media, since there are plenty of such assessments in the 'blogosphere' [Internet] (Igor Strelkov provided pessimistic forecasts, many of which proved accurate), although quite often they are considered "marginal." Officials and deputies often either speak very cautiously about the topic of the military conflict in Ukraine, following opportunistic considerations, or fall into excessive optimism and gung-ho-patriotism, speaking of the inevitability of victory over Ukraine, the success of the SVO and the collapse of the Ukrainian leadership.
"The recent speech by Konstantin Zatulin, a State Duma deputy and First Deputy Chairman of the Committee on CIS Affairs, Eurasian Integration and Relations with Compatriots, made at the foresight forum "What Kind of Ukraine Do We Need?" represents an exception to this rule. Zatulin honestly and frankly stated that the original plan for the SVO was 'unfeasible" and that some of the announced objectives of the SVO had lost their meaning and are no longer relevant. At this very forum he also raised a number of other topical issues concerning the SVO, as well as its information support, which merit attention. We will analyze Konstantin Zatulin's speech in this article.
Foresight forum panel discussion on the "Crisis of World Order and Ukraine" (Source: Business-gazeta.ru)
"The SVO Plan Was Fundamentally Unrealistic
"Speaking at the foresight forum "What Kind of Ukraine Do We Need?" Konstantin Zatulin said that what is called the SVO should be more accurately called a war, which has been underway for quite a long time. And, in his opinion, Russia has not demonstrated such victorious results that we ourselves would like to take credit for.
"'We have included Zaporizhzhya and Kherson Oblasts as new constituent entities of the Russian Federation. Meanwhile, we never included the city of Zaporizhzhya, but we abandoned the city of Kherson.
"'We continue to struggle to reach the borders of the Donetsk Oblast, that is, to fully incorporate the DPR [Donetsk Peoples Republics] as a constituent entity of the Russian Federation. Meanwhile, you will notice that for several months we have been simultaneously watching and worrying about what is happening at the city of Artemivsk (Bakhmut), while endlessly discussing the topic of when this Ukrainian counter-offensive will take place, where it will happen and how we will vanquish it. Is it within the logic of victory to expect someone else's counteroffensive? It is not the logic of victory. This is a forced logic,' said Zatulin.
"In his view, the logic behind the SVO was that following the coercive action, the Ukrainian state would collapse quite quickly, and without much sacrifice it [the operation] would be able to achieve what had been failed to attain during the 8 years that they attempted to implement the Minsk agreements. This plan, according to Konstantin Zatulin, was fundamentally unrealistic.
"'What were our officially proclaimed goals at the start of the SVO? Sure, you all remember: denazification, demilitarization, the neutrality of Ukraine and the protection of the DPR and LPR residents, who have been suffering all this time. On which of these points have we attained results to date? None. What's more, some of them no longer make any sense. For instance, the "neutrality of Ukraine." What is the sense behind this demand? None at the moment. It will no longer be neutral if it remains existing [as a state],' stated the deputy Chairman of the Committee on CIS Affairs.
"'And now the question: will it be Ukraine under the Zelenskyy's leadership (or his successors), or will it exist in the end at all? It will, I can tell you that. It will.... Because there is not enough strength to overcome it, considering the support that is being provided to them. And by the way, in my opinion, the leadership of our country, (which hasn't spoken on this subject (and absolutely correctly so), is in fact making it clear that it understands this," states the Deputy Chairman of the Committee on CIS Affairs.'
"One can agree with almost everything Konstantin Fyodorovich has stated. It takes courage to say such things, because in our troubled times it's very dangerous and fraught with consequences to speak unpopular truth. It's worth recalling the recent example of Igor Grinev, the deputy from Krasnoyarsk, who was fined "for discrediting the army" because of his statement that Kherson residents were abandoned after they put their hope in Russia. Absurd? Yes, absurd. Because, following the law against discrediting of the Russian Armed Forces, one can be punished for the slightest criticism, even if you have stated a truthful fact.
Igor Grinev (Source: Krasrab.ru)
"Naturally, there are some points with which one can argue. For instance, Konstantin Zatulin makes somewhat contradictory statements, on the one hand arguing that it's necessary to create a General Command Headquarters (and one can agree with this), and to shift 'not only industry but also life to a military footing' [towards fulfillment of military goals]" (it's not entirely clear what he is referring to), in order to win. On the other hand, he admits that it's impossible to achieve a complete victory over Ukraine, and by the SVO's results, it will remain as an independent state, in any case.
"Here again we are confronted with a question that the author has been asking for a long time, what will be perceived as a victory, what are its parameters? What are the goals of the military operation after it has become clear that it's impossible to take control of all Ukraine? These objectives are not disclosed publicly, but it's clear that for the moment, the aim is to preserve the status quo and the new Russian territories. Bigger goals are out of the question in the current situation.
"Konstantin Zatulin believes that the goals [of the SVO] should be more ambitious: to reach boundary lines that would prevent shelling of Donetsk, Luhansk (although now the protection of the Belgorod Oblast seems no less relevant, in light of recent events in Shebekino, which suffers from shelling no less than the very same Donetsk) by the enemy, and to sever Ukraine from its corridor to the sea (in order to secure Crimea). However, even these plans, which sound quite sensible and logical, [in reality] look unfeasible (especially following the withdrawal from Kherson Oblast and Snake Island).
"As for industry's conversion to a war footing and general mobilization (which some patriotic bloggers are calling for) the author believes that first, only a partial transfer of the economy to a war footing is possible, because a full transfer, provided attempted, would quickly lead to economic collapse. However, even a partial conversion to a war footing will not be easy, because the question the arises: where to obtain the staff and production capacity? Machines will not appear out of thin air. In other words, militarizing the economy without external assistance will be problematic.
"Second, it's dangerous to carry out a general mobilization in a situation where the SVO goals are not clearly defined, Russia's strategy in the global confrontation with the West is not apparent, and the image of the future hasn't been formed, not only because deployment of poorly trained and unmotivated people to the front is unwise and may lead to unpredictable consequences. The fact is that large numbers of men need to be put in uniform, armed, provided with ammunition, combat equipment, UAVs, etc. Is the current military-industrial complex capable of supplying another, say, half a million or even a million people?
"As the experience of the first wave of mobilization demonstrated, there were problems not only with uniforms, but also with organization: when hundreds of armed people assigned to no one found themselves abandoned at some railway station. In case of a larger mobilization, the scale of the problems would be much larger.
"Therefore, before conducting mobilization (not a general mobilization, which in the author's view is unnecessary), it's first necessary to establish required material and technical basis for it, to prepare an ideological platform, as soldiers must understand what goals they are fighting for and what Russia's strategy is. To say nothing of the fact that the soldiers must trust the command, which, considering that no general has been held accountable for mistakes, is very problematic. And so far, it's hard to believe that Moscow is ready to take all these steps.
"So far, it seems quite likely that the new waves of mobilizations we may yet see will occur in a very limited format, in order to patch up the emerging [personnel] holes at the front lines.
"But let's get back to Konstantin Zatulin's statements. The next important topic he touched on was information support for the SVO.
"Regarding Information Support For The SVO
"The information support for the SVO aroused questions from the outset, as the presentation of the material was rather chaotic. This was the natural result caused by the absence of a clear strategy and image of the future, which became particularly evident after the initial plan for a quick takeover of Kyiv had failed. While the original plan was to liberate Ukraine, later only protection of the new Russian territories was voiced. And now they have already started talking about the 'old' Russian territories.
"However, if we talk about the initial information campaign, when there was a plan to take Ukraine quickly and bloodlessly, then the question arises: what exactly did Russia offer Ukraine? (well apart from replacing some Zelensky with some Medvedchuk)? Why in fact, should Russia have been supported in Ukraine, given that for many years no one was engaged in 'battle for minds' of Ukrainians? Unless, naturally, you count creating a network of Telegram channels mimicking Ukrainian ones, such as 'Legitimnyi,' as a 'battle for minds.'
"When Ukrainian propaganda offering Ukrainians a future in the EU and NATO, was working quite well and promising quite concrete 'biscuits' (such as visa-free travel). The military conflict further strengthened the myth of the Ukrainian nation.
"Be that as it may, some politicians and experts, despite the difficult situation in the SVO zone, continue to deny reality and tell us that "Ukraine no longer exists." Konstantin Zatulin drew attention to this as well. Talking about the information support of the SVO, he notes,
"'We have two paths. One path is the way the Ministry of Defense reports. "We killed 520 Nazis, we killed 600 Nazis, we killed 400 enemy soldiers..." I'm not a fan of those reports. Well, you want to emphasize your work, report on the equipment, how much equipment we destroyed... Oh, well... But don't emphasize how many you've killed. We are killing ourselves too, you understand that right? Since we argue that Ukrainians constitute one people with Russians. So, we need to suggest another way.
"'When Henry IV [of England] laid siege to Paris in order to become the king, he fed Parisians who were starving with bread, because he knew that he would have to enter Paris tomorrow anyway, and that he can only be crowned as the king of France in Paris.
"'If we want Ukraine to be on our side, or Ukrainians to be on our side, we have to emphasize this line. If we keep saying that Ukraine does not exist, that Ukrainians do not exist...
"'I would be happy, if there were no Ukraine, I would be happy. But tell me, does it help us to increase resistance [by the Ukrainians] on the battlefield when we talk about it? In my opinion, it increases it, because it is about the soil. This is an argument for those who explain: you see, they want to wipe us off the face of the earth, we all have to fight them as one.'
"Konstantin Fedorovich's words have, no doubt, a rational core. However, it should be understood that the 'battle for the minds' [of Ukrainians] has already been lost, as the Russian leadership cannot even explain to the Russian population the logic and strategic goals behind the SVO, let alone explain it to the population of Ukraine.
"However, this doesn't mean that an information strategy is unnecessary. It is necessary because all those issues that Zatulin voiced should be tackled. But an information strategy is only possible if there is an overall SVO strategy present, an idea that is not just words, but represents a concrete plan.
"Zatulin also mentioned another issue, which it is somehow not customary to voice publicly in Russia. In his words, the Ukrainian army is highly motivated by the belief that it was Russia that attacked Ukraine and started an armed conflict.
"'The high motivation of the Ukrainian army didn't appear from scratch. It stems from the belief that we [Russia] are the aggressor. That we started it. That we have come to their home, that we are destroying them. They don't tell each other that it's their own fault for electing such presidents, that they don't care about shooting at Donetsk and Luhansk, these arguments pass them by.
"'But the fact that you [Russian soldiers] came and shot at us - that's enough. And [masterminds] over the ocean are rubbing their hands, because the more we kill them [Ukrainians], the more they will hate us [Russians]. It is obvious. Let's get out of it somehow. How you ask? Not by giving up our intentions, but by clever propaganda, proper conduct and a better attitude to those who have found themselves at our territory,' argued Zatulin.
"Then, the First Deputy Chairman of the Committee on CIS Affairs said words with which the author, as a resident of Donbass, cannot agree. He points out that he did not vote for recognition of the LPR and DPR without any conditions, but proposed recognizing the republics in case Ukraine attacked them according to the 'Georgian scenario' [meaning the war in Georgia in 2008 over the breakaway republics].
"'The point is that we would not have fallen into the trap that we have found ourselves in as a result, when we started acting and immediately gave everyone a reason to demonize us and create this block [of Western states] against us. Exactly that happened. This was a mistake, and we are all bearing now the burden of this mistake, and it is pointless to say who was right and who was wrong, because we have, as they say, a one-way ticket... But the fact that it was a mistake is obvious,' argued Konstantin Zatulin.
"On the one hand, it's obvious that Russia is, in fact, got trapped as a result of these decisions. On the other hand, it is not about the republics' [the Donetsk and Lugansk Peoples Republics] recognition - that should've been done back in 2014, in that case there would not have been a military conflict such as the one we are observing now, because then a motivated Ukrainian army (a mistake that Vladimir Putin also acknowledged) wouldn't have existed.
"If we are talking about the situation in February of 2022, it would be more logical, after the recognition of the Donbas republics, to deploy troops there and to present an ultimatum to Ukraine: either it stops shelling, or Russia will be forced to create security zones and strike military facilities located deep within Ukraine. In other words, Russia should've acted gradually, including through a relevant information campaign. The situation would then look very different from an international point of view.
"But the fact is that those, who made the plans for the SVO proceeded from completely different calculations, and therefore the wrong decisions were made, which Zatulin is talking about.
"It's difficult to say, why such decisions were made and how much they were influenced by global players (who waited for some time: how the assault on Kyiv would end, and only then, by the hands of different countries, began mass deliveries of arms to Kyiv, while increasing them gradually). Now all these arguments are meaningless. The past cannot be restored. We need to talk about what can be done here and now.
"Which does not mean that those who made the wrong decisions should not be punished, because if no one is responsible for anything, the same mistakes will be repeated over and over again. And Zatulin correctly points out that no one was punished for anything, which is wrong.
"At the moment, it's necessary to change the approach to SVO, to develop a clear strategy, an idea and conduct an information campaign corresponding to it, punish those responsible for failures and mishaps, and introduce a Counter Terrorist Operation regime at the border territories. But so far, we have not seen any of this."
