Sociologist Denis Volkov, Director of the independent Levada Center, was interviewed by Oleg Sokolenko of Future magazine regarding trends in Russian' attitudes toward COVID-19, vaccinations, introduction of QR-codes, Alexei Navalny, and relations between Russia and the West. The public opinion studies conducted by Levada show that Russians tend to blame the US and the West for the crisis in Ukraine rather than Ukraine itself. This attitude heightens fear of war, because the public reasons that if Russia initiated the tension, it could bring it to a close, but the West will not stop. The internal crackdown leaves most Russians unmoved, as Covid and economic conditions remain their most serious concerns. The one issue that roused the Russian public was the plan to introduce QR-codes, where the public's fierce indignation at the idea forced the authorities to back down.
The interview with Volkov follows below:[1]
Denis Volkov (Source: Delfi.it)
- Six months ago, you stated that already less than half of the country's population was afraid of contracting COVID-19. Has the emergence of "Omicron" heightened anxiety among Russians?
- According to our data, there are no serious changes. There has been virtually no change over the past year. About 45-47% [of respondents] have a stable fear of getting sick with COVID-19. There have been spikes in the graph [of this indicator] during third and fourth waves, albeit extremely weak. Sentiments are well-established.
- Does the same apply to vaccinations?
The sentiments towards vaccinations began to change at the beginning of the summer. Since then, a growing number of respondents began answering that they had been vaccinated, while decreasingly fewer stated that they didn't want to or weren't yet ready to do so. Apparently, that's when the vaccination campaign genuinely began to work. We possess the latest relevant data as of the end of November. The number of people, who were unready to be vaccinated has dropped to 36% (less almost by a half when compare to last spring, when this indicator exceeded 60%.)
According to respondents, by the end of the year 46% of them were vaccinated. I believe this indicator now should've reached about 50%. Our polls indicate that the proportion of those, who claim that they have been vaccinated more or less matches the data of state statistics. There are more vaccinated among respondents with higher education, who are more likely to be able to make an independent decision in favor of vaccination. The most vaccinated group against coronavirus are those, who in general get regularly vaccinated against influenza. Almost all people in this group, have already been vaccinated against coronavirus. The thing is there are just not that many people in this group, about 20% [of all respondents].
There aren't many staunch anti-vaxxers, about 10-15%. The bulk is simply not ready to make its own decision on vaccination, fearing its consequences. They are waiting for the state to decide for them, for example, by introducing compulsory vaccination.
We also record quite a large group of people, who are afraid of contracting the coronavirus, but who don't vaccinate against it because they are afraid of receiving a shot too. These are basically people from the older generation and people who believe they are not in best of health. They believe that the vaccine, especially the new one, can harm them, by imposing an additional strain on their body.
Naturally such people are deeply stressed. They stay at home because they are afraid of getting infected. The only solution for them is to limit their contacts as much as possible, and simply try not to go anywhere. I would argue that Vladimir Putin, who has been sitting in self-isolation for a long time, is sort of a role model for them.
- But he sort of claimed to have been vaccinated...
- "Sort of," but people didn't believe him for a long time. It was only when he started talking about it more confidently that it really may have worked. Because at first, when the were no information on whether he got vaccinated, people didn't really believe it. We didn't specifically ask this question, but it came up in focus groups. Most of the participants stated that it was unclear whether he was vaccinated or not, and if so, with what vaccine? By the end of last year, such questions disappeared.
- And what do people think about the idea of introduction of QR-codes for the vaccinated and those who recovered from COVID?
- 75% of respondents reported a completely or rather negative attitude towards the imitative. The idea of imposing them [QR-codes] on public transport received the worst acceptance rate. The idea of introducing QR-codes for visiting public places received a bit more calmly, however 67% of respondents regard it negatively. On the one hand, it is not quite clear to people how it will work. There are many doubts that it can generally work in Russian circumstances. "They will let you in through one door with a QR code, and without through the next one," as people say. It is often claimed, (with regard to this measure as well) that in Russia the harshness of the laws is offset by the non-requirement of implementing them.
On the other hand, quite a few people in focus groups voiced their opinion that the introduction of QR-codes is a violation of their freedom of movement, of consumer rights (for example, one cannot go to the store, to an exhibition, etc.). Such people often claim that this will once again hit businessmen. There are often small entrepreneurs among focus group participants, or respondents, who have entrepreneurs among their relatives or acquaintances.
This notion that private entrepreneurs, small businesses that have closed down and lost customers who were affected the most [by COVID-related restrictions] has been a recurring theme in every focus group over the past 2 years.
- But there are people who have a positive attitude towards the idea of QR-codes, aren't there?
- There are, but they are few, constituting about 20%. They believe that if we are already fighting the pandemic, then we have to fight it hard. But this point of view, I stress, is not very popular.
- Meaning, that when the [State] Duma on Monday withdrew from deliberation a bill on QR-codes, it was a concession to public opinion?
- It seems that way. After all, 43% considered protests against the introduction of QR-codes possible, while 25% stated that they were ready to participate in them. Generally, in terms of public outcry, the anti-QR-codes protests were comparable to the protests in support of Navalny at the beginning of last year. The very fact that such protests started to happen in different regions excited people no less [than Navalny's arrest]. That's, probably, why they decided not to make people angry again, despite another rise in infections.
- How important is COVID to Russians now, in the context of other "hot" topics, i.e. the escalation of conflict with the West, price rises, industrial accidents, etc.?
- Coronavirus-related events in general top the list of events every month. If they don't occupy the first place, then they appear in second place. The first place is taken by elections, accidents, emergencies of some sort. And COVID steadily occupies the top positions for two years now. Half of Russians named the coronavirus epidemic the main event of the year. But economic problems are much more important, because they have a greater impact on people's daily lives. Rising prices, low wages, the risk of losing one's job...
While the number of complaints about the health care system, for example, has grown, there were complaints about it before. Now criticism has been added. The majority claims that doctors don't have enough time for regular patients, because they have to deal with COVID-infected patients.
Meanwhile, the number of those believing that the epidemic will continue has increased drastically. However, one cannot argue anymore that the epidemic works as a fear factor. In the beginning, when the first lockdown happened, many people were in shock. They said that they were scared, that they didn't know what was going to happen next. But then people started saying, "Now we know what it's about. So it's not that scary anymore."
- You talked about economic problems. What are the dynamics of the economy-related sentiments of Russians in recent months?
- It's also fairly stable, no major spikes [in indicators] were recorded. The situation is perceived as a certain given fact: prices will rise; life will become more expensive. Over the past year, there has been an increase in concern about rising prices, but it was not significant. It was much more significant in late 2014 and early 2015, when inflation was higher. Later people calmed down somewhat, but such concerns began to grow last year. Still this is problem number one.
As for the forecasts, they are not very bright. If you to take a look at our economic indicators, they have been declining for almost half a year. Starting about from the middle of spring, Russians began assessing their economic prospects increasingly pessimistically. Towards the end of the year, there seems to be a slight trend in the other direction, but it is unclear how stable it may be. Most indicators still look worrisome. Almost 65% [of respondents] believe that an economic crisis is possible in the near future, about 2 years ago 50% thought that way.
So, [people's] expectations are not very good, but there is also a resource for adaptation. There is no panic, people have time to adapt. The thing is that the crisis didn't struck immediately, it happened over the extended period in time. People have time to economize, to save a bit of money, to earn something someplace.
- Are people concerned about internal politics, for example, about the growing number of foreign agents?
- The population at large is not particularly interested in these topics. Only about a quarter to a one third of respondents follow it (or, at least, they are somehow aware of what is going on). The vast majority of them are young people who get their information from the Internet. Telegram channel readers are especially critical, accounting for about 10% of them.
- What about foreign policy? Do Russians care about Russia's ultimatum to NATO, talks of some military means to settle the disputes?
- We have several questions regarding these topics. Needless to say, in everyday life people don't think about this constantly. But the fear of armed conflict is rather high. The highest mark was recorded in spring of last year, when 62% said they were afraid of a major war. By the end of the year this fear had decreased, as in December there were 56% such people. That's also a lot, but still a bit lower. It can be attributed at least somewhat to the launch of negotiations (first at the Biden - Putin level, then at the level of the Foreign and Defense Ministries).
Now, about a quarter of the respondents claim that conflict with the US and NATO is possible. Regarding [a conflict with] Ukraine, various surveys demonstrate that from 35 to 40% [believe in possibility of such a conflict]. Whereas, responsibility [the aggravation] is sort of shifted to the other side, not even to Ukraine, but to the West, the US. "They started it," say people, which makes it all the more frightening. They say that if we were the ones who started it, then we could've at least stopped it. But now it's them, and they won't stop at anything.
It seems that despite the fact that society is afraid of war, inwardly it's already ready for it. In focus groups people say something like the following, "We are being dragged into war against our will."
- Monday marked the one-year anniversary of Alexei Navalny's incarceration. Meanwhile, HBO and CNN have made and are preparing to release a documentary on the oppositionist. How have attitudes towards him changed over this year?
- We haven't asked questions specifically about Navalny since the summer. Back then, about 15% said that they approve his activities (which represents a decrease in that indicator from the beginning of the year, when [approval] stood at 20%). I believe it's unlikely for this indicator to fall further, because when we ask open questions about which politicians people trust, he is steadily included in the top 10.
During the Duma elections, the story around Smart Voting maintained interest in him and his supporters. Although in the last year his popularity began to be squeezed by a young Communist from Saratov, Nikolai Bondarenko. After all the latter is free and has the opportunity to address people.
Meanwhile, it must be said that in the past year young people, of whom Navalny's target audience mainly consists, have become warier of talking about him in focus groups. When we asked such questions, we saw fear. Not necessarily fear that they [the security officials] would get to you, but that something bad could happen, i.e. problems at work, or somewhere else... This is a reaction to the violent dispersal of protests, to the labeling of Navalny's supporters as extremists, and so on.
- What do you think will be the main trends in 2022 for the people of Russia?
- It's hard to predict. Judging by public opinion, we haven't gotten that close to an international military conflict [scenario] for a long time. There is a strong fear [within society] and, simultaneously, a sense of some sort of inevitability. This, naturally, is a very dangerous situation. If the worst occurs anyway, it will undoubtedly alter public sentiments.
But if this won't be the case, one can likely argue that the aforementioned trends will persevere, or even stagnate. In my opinion, a drop in the authorities' ratings is possible, but it is unlikely to be severe. There is a lack of good news that would move the situation assessments and ratings upwards. Supplementary payments could play this role, as the effect of the previous ones has already passed. What's needed is economic growth, a better life, or at least hope for improvement, and a detente in relations with the West.
As I've said, at the very end of the year, Russians' economic expectations slightly improved. But to claim that this will turn into a long-term trend, that an increasing number of people will think that life is improving and will behave accordingly, driving the economy forward, is yet impossible.
It's a very unclear situation. Now it looks like everything will be about the same, i.e. maybe a little worse, maybe a little better. It's sort of a deadlock, when nothing moves upwards or downwards.
[1] Levada.ru, January 27, 2022.
