A Russian View Of Prominent Chinese Scholar Yan Xuentong's Moral Realism Theory For China's Rise

Recently, Chinese international relations (IR) scholars have been debating the need to create their own original theory of international relations, which is traditionally dominated by Western scholars. One of the key contributors to the ongoing debate is Yan Xuetong, distinguished professor and Dean of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University. In 2005, he started a research project, which aim was to enrich international relations with non-Western thought and historical experience. He analyzed Chinese classical texts from the Pre-Qin era and evaluated their applicability to the analysis of modern international relations. In 2014, he formulated the theory of moral realism, which combined main assumptions of realism with new concepts derived from the ancient Chinese thought. The main goal of the theory and related research questions is to provide an alternative explanation of China's rise and the future of the world order.

In this article, the authors, Russian researchers Svetlana V. Krivokhizh and Elena D. Soboleva,[1] analyze the key concepts of the theory presented in different publications of Yan Xuetong: morality, political strength, power, types of leadership and types of major power. The key concept of the theory is morality, which is borrowed from the ancient Chinese philosophy. Moral behavior in domestic and international politics increases strength and comprehensive power of a state on the international arena, while moral qualities of the major power shape the world order and determine international stability. The authors examine practical recommendations built upon the moral realism theory that Yan Xuetong gives to the Chinese leadership. From a scientific point of view, the theory is criticized for the lack of clear definitions, for contradictions and biases, but it is valuable because it reflects the thinking of major Chinese intellectuals. It is worth noting that the paper was written in 2017, but the paper remains valuable for his in-depth analysis of Yan Xuetong's moral realism theory.

Below is a full translation from Russian into English of the essay on Yan Xuetong's political thought:[2]

Yan Xuetong with Henry Kissinger (Source: Tsinghua.edu.cn)

Introduction

"One of the important characteristics of the current situation in the field of international relations (IR) in China is an ongoing discussion since late 1980s about the advisability of creating a China-specific IR theory. Proponents of 'Sinicization' claim that contemporary IR theory is based on Western values and, consequently, is incapable of adequately explaining the distinctive nature of the involvement of non-Western countries in global processes.[3][4][5] And vice versa, researchers who think that IR theory must be universal see the task of enriching the theory with new ideas as top priority for Chinese scholars.[6][7]

"These debates in the Chinese academic community immediately became the object of very intense study by Western researchers. The subject has been addressed by Barry Buzan,[8] William Callahan,[9] Linsay Cunningham-Cross,[10] David Shambaugh,[11] A. Korolev,[12] A.D. Voskresenskii,[13] E.N. Grachikov.[14] But most of the papers by these scholars discuss whether the creation of a Chinese school of IR theory is necessary and study the process of the establishment of this discipline in China, whereas the theoretical insights of Chinese scholars are only touched upon in passing. Still, several theoretical ideas put forward by Chinese scholars deserve a more detailed analysis. Among them, one of the most outstanding is the work of the leading Chinese IR expert, Dean of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University, Professor Yan Xuetong.

"Yan Xuetong is an influential figure in the scholarly circles of China; he is the editor-in-chief of The Chinese Journal of International Politics (joint project of the Oxford University and the Institute of Contemporary International Relations at Tsinghua University). In 2008, the Foreign Policy journal named him as one of the world's top-100 public intellectuals. Before Tsinghua University, Yan worked in the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations under the auspices of the Ministry of State Security, where he, together with his colleagues, developed a new approach to issues of security. In particular, he proposed the idea that military alliances of the future will be formed not against hostile states but against specific threats. These ideas form the basis of the 'New Security Concept,'[15] which has become one of the most important elements of Chinese foreign policy strategy. A new idea developed within the framework of this concept, which later became the key point of all Yan's theoretical works: the idea of moral superiority of China's foreign policy (oriented towards joint resolution of problems and building a harmonious world) over that of the current hegemon – the United States (which is still determined by the 'bloc mentality' of the Cold War era and characterised by a tendency to fight ideological enemies rather than common threats).

"While opposing the idea of creating a 'Chinese school' of international relations, Yan Xuetong began work on developing his own theory within the framework of the existing school of realism. The result of the scholar's intellectual effort is the theory of moral realism (道义现实主义, dao yi xian shi zhu yi), whose key ideas are presented in his 2014 article 'Theory of International Relations from the Viewpoint of Moral Realism.'[16] His book The Transition of World Power: Political Leadership and Strategic Competition, published in Chinese in 2015,[17] gives a detailed account of the principles of his theory. In his later works, the scholar further develops some of its aspects and attempts to apply this theory to the analysis of modern international relations.

"Despite scholarly interest towards works by Chinese authors, it is for the first time that Yan Xuetong's theory of moral realism becomes subject to a detailed analysis. We believe that studying Chinese works on IR theory has not only theoretical, but practical importance. These research studies can give us an answer to the question of how China's intellectual elite sees the future of the international system and China's place within it.

Pre-Qin Philosophy And The Development Of Moral Realism Theory

"In order to update existing theories of international relations and develop foreign policy recommendations for China and some other countries in the context of the changing world, a group of scholars from Tsinghua University led by Yan Xuetong began studying works by pre-Qin philosophers in 2005. The university scholars are certain that the study of these works may help deepen the understanding of the nature of international relations and develop new concepts for the analysis of global politics.[18]

"The pre-Qin era is the period from 770 BC until the foundation of the Qin Empire in 221 BC. This period is further divided by historians into the Spring and Autumn Period (Chunqiu) and the Warring States Period (Zhanguo). This era is characterized by the existence on the territory of modern China of a large number of relatively independent states, wars of conquest, destruction of some states and growth in power of others, – all of which, in the opinion of Chinese scholars, strongly resembles modern international relations.[19] During this historical period, considerable changes took place in the political, economic, and social life of China; this era saw the flourishing of philosophy known as 'the Hundred Schools of Chinese Thought.' Thus, the resort to pre-Qin classical texts can be explained by the existence of a large number of outstanding philosophical works, whose study and critical re-evaluation have allowed scholars to look beyond the boundaries of the Anglo-Saxon discourse in analysing the issue of China's rise, and to offer an alternative explanation of this process on the basis of the country's historical experience.

"As part of the 'pre-Qin project,' the scholars conducted a detailed study of works by seven Chinese thinkers – Guan Zhong, Confucius, Laozi, Mozi, Zhuangzi, Han Fei, and Xunzi – as well as other Chinese classic texts, such as The Commentary of Zuo (Zuo Zhuan), The Strategies of the Warring States (Zhan Guo Ce), Master Lü's Spring and Autumn Annals (Lüshi Chunqiu), and The Book of Etiquette and Rites (Liji). As a result, they identified a number of concepts and philosophical ideas that later formed the basis of the moral realism theory.

"The results of the research were published not only in Chinese, but also in English and immediately attracted the attention of the global academic community.[20] The idea of using pre-Qin texts to create a theory of modern international relations came under strong criticism from some researchers. For instance, it was pointed out that the originality of the texts, their real date of composition, as well as their connection to real historical events were doubtful, and that modern states and international relations are very different from the states and the kind of interstate relations that existed in pre-Qin China.[21] Responding to criticism, Yan Xuetong states that the aim of his project is not studying the past but creating a new theory to explain the present. The scholar emphasizes that the difference between pre-Qin kingdoms and modern states stems from the temporal gap between different eras, not from the opposition of East and West, and therefore, cannot have a negative effect on the universal nature of concepts proposed by pre-Qin thinkers.[22]

"Developing the theory of moral realism, Yan Xuetong has combined pre-Qin ideas with the main theoretical concepts of the school of realism. Thus, moral realism proceeds from the idea that the chief goal of a state's foreign policy is implementation of its national interests. Rivalry between states is a zero-sum game, and therefore, a structural conflict between the existing superpower and a rising state is inevitable. Yan Xuetong has often stated that he is an adherent of realism,[23] but in his opinion, currently no single theory in the school of realism can provide full explanation of how China's rise will occur and how this process will influence the world order. Authors of most works concerning China's rise consider predominantly two variants: either China will sooner or later challenge the existing superpower and the world order, which will provoke a crisis in the world system, or China will continue the policy of maintaining the status quo and thus will save the system from upheavals. Evidently, both variants are unacceptable to Yan, because all his works exhibit interest towards and search for a new theoretical insight into China's rise.[24]

"Major research questions of the theory of moral realism come down to the following: under what conditions can a rising state become a new superpower, and how will the process of redistribution of power from the existing superpower to the rising state occur? In this connection, it is important to emphasize that most of the theoretical constructs by moral realists are oriented towards the analysis of the two-way relationship within the pair 'rising state (崛起国 jue qu guo) – superpower (主导国 zhu dao guo)' and hardly touch upon relations between medium-sized, let alone small, states. It is primarily for the explanation of this interaction that proponents of the moral realism theory offer an original interpretation of such notions as morality, authority, power, etc.

"Questions to which the Chinese scholars are trying to find answers with the aid of the theory of moral realism stem from the current condition of international relations and from the need to give an alternative assessment of the role China is playing now and will play in the future. Yan notes that the case of China is unique, because it is the first time in history that a rising state can take the place of the existing superpower, while ceding ground to it on many parameters (ideology, technologies, economy, political system). To explain this process and its consequences for the international system, a new theory is required. This rather narrow focus and bias have come under criticism. Researchers point out, for instance, Yan Xuetong's selective approach to concepts in pre-Qin political philosophy. Trying to find answers to rather specific questions, he brushes aside the ideas and concepts that do not suit him at the outset, and, in developing a theory of international relations, is guided by the interests of a specific state.

"However, despite the criticism of Yan Xuetong's theoretical works, they are not without value: firstly, they are among the first serious Chinese works in the field of IR theory which have attracted the attention of the global academic community; secondly, they have made an impact on the scholarly circles in China itself, setting the tone of further discussions not only about the country's place in international relations but also about possible ways of transforming the entire world system.

Political Power And Morality

"One of the central concepts in the theory of moral realism is political power (政治实力, zhengzhi shili). Together with cultural and material (economic and military) powers, it forms the comprehensive state power (综合实力, zonghe shili). Yan Xuetong gives the following formula: CP = (M + E + C) × P, where CP stands for comprehensive state power, M for military power, E for economic power, C for cultural power, and P for political power.[25] Political and cultural powers are part of the 'soft power,' while military and economic powers represent the 'hard power.' The balance between powers of different type has impact on the international status of the state and on its rise, but it is the political power that makes all the other components of the comprehensive state power more effective.

"Regretfully, Yan Xuetong does not give a clear definition of political power, only drawing parallels with such concepts from pre-Qin texts as virtue, benevolence, the way (or dao), justice, worthy men, and sages. He proposes an idea that political power depends on a ruler's moral qualities.[26] The source of this power is on the level of the state's domestic policy, but it manifests itself on the level of international relations as well. Thus, a highly moral head of state hires competent officials and rules the state under the guidance of a moral code. Compliance of the foreign and domestic policies with norms of morality does not only strengthen the legitimacy of the authority (while non-compliance weakens it), but even augments its political power. One of the markers of the latter on the state level are such factors as willingness and ability to conduct reforms, and creation of an attractive image of the country for external migration, or influx of 'talents.' Political power is relative, i.e. its growth in one country leads to a decrease in another country's political power. For example, in Yan Xuetong's view, as a result of the fact that the US presidential election in 2008 was won by Barak Obama (who surpassed his predecessor in moral qualities), the political power of the US increased, while that of China was reduced correspondingly.[27] One should point out that Yan gives this example in an article that was published in 2011, at the peak of Obama's popularity, after he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2009.

"The questions of whether morality can be viewed as the central element within the paradigm of realism, and whether the concept of morality is compatible with the fundamentals of this theory, have aroused debates. Critics point out that, on the one hand, Yan Xuetong identifies himself as a positivist, but on the other, he introduces into the discourse a subjective concept like morality.[28] Responding to criticism, Yan Xuetong clarifies that the idea that morality and realistic paradigm are incompatible is a myth which has become widespread not only among proponents of alternative theories (liberalism, constructivism, etc.), but also among some scholars who identify themselves as realists. Yan is certain that the misconceptions have arisen because of an erroneous interpretation of some postulates by the classical authors of realism, as well as due to mixing the concepts of 'universal morality' and 'morality of a particular state.'

"Among the six classical principles of realism proposed by Hans Morgenthau, Yan Xuetong emphasizes two, directly connected to the role of morality in international relations.[29] Thus, the fourth principle states: a man can be guided by the principle 'let the world perish but justice be done, 'but a state must take into account the way in which its actions will impact those it is responsible for. The fifth principle states that realism does not identify the moral stance of a particular state with the universal moral values or the moral laws that govern the universe. In Yan's opinion, despite the pre-eminence of the task of ensuring security, realists do not downplay the role of morality, but neither do they identify it with the morality of a specific state. Yan Xuetong concludes that Morgenthau was against the dissemination of moral values of a particular country as universal. The Chinese scholar points out that a state must be guided in its policy by universal principles of morality rather than by Chinese or American ones. In his work 'New Values for New International Norms,' he outlines values characteristic of the Western civilization – equality, democracy, freedom, etc. – and proposes to add to this list such Confucian values as 'benevolence' and 'rite.'[30]

"Thus, in contrast to supporters of the idea of a clear-cut opposition between Confucian and Western values, Yan Xuetong insists on a universal moral standard, which, in his opinion, changes together with history. For example, it was considered the norm in the past that authority should be transferred by inheritance, but from the viewpoint of modern morality a head of state should be elected. Therefore, according to Yan Xuetong, the electoral system and democracy have become the universal moral norms in the course of time.[31] Even though the Communist Party (CPC) is dominant in China, there are eight other political parties in the country, which means that China is trying to abide by the modern universal moral norms, at least nominally. Yan emphasizes that his country must be instrumental in spreading the universal moral principles, which will be different from the principles of the US, the current superpower, but not exclusively 'Chinese.'[32] In other words, the principles of morality depend not on their belonging to a superpower, but on a particular historical period and the configuration of powers on the global stage. Some principles, however, stay unchanged under any circumstances; in particular, adherence to treaties of alliance, payment of debts, or courtesy to state leaders.[33] Regretfully, it remains unclear who or what determines the moral values of a particular period.

"Thus, in the framework of the moral realism theory, morality ('morality of actions') is an independent variable, which lies at the heart of a state's political power. In its turn, political power makes the other components of the comprehensive state power more effective. Norms of morality depend not on a particular state, but on a specific historical period, and are universal for all nations within this period. The task of a rising state is to help spread the universal moral principles, which are different from the principles of the current superpower.

National Interests And Foreign Policy Strategy

"Yan Xuetong considers the factors that determine a state's foreign policy strategy – power and type of leadership. If a rising state can formulate its interests in the right way and choose an appropriate foreign policy strategy, it can take the place of a superpower.

"Authority (权力, quanli) is one of the primary national interests and the goal of the state's entire foreign policy, while power (实力, shili), on the one hand, determines the country's national interests, and on the other hand, serves as a tool for their achievement. Depending on their power, states try to implement different national interests, achieve various levels of authority. The comprehensive power of a superpower, which is superior to any other state in the system, determines its principal national interest as maintaining its dominant position in the world. The growing power of a rising state brings to the forefront the goal of increasing its international influence; the goal of a regional power is maintaining its influence in the region, not global leadership. For instance, after the end of the Cold War, the US began to strive for increasing its global reach, whereas Russia, being a much weaker successor of the disintegrated USSR, did not set the same goal, since it no longer had the capabilities to augment its global reach.[34] Determining a state's national interests on the basis of its power gives one opportunity to set a number of restrictions and helps one understand whether the foreign-policy aspirations of a state are justified.

"Without denying the importance of security, which appears as the top priority of national interests in classical realism, moral realists regard this category as only one of many elements of state interests. A superpower and a rising state are rarely under threat of destruction by other states; the problem of distribution of international influence (authority) is much more pressing for them. A superpower aims to maintain its influence, a rising state – to increase it. According to moral realists, it is respect for the international principles of morality (moral behavior) that plays a direct role in increasing international influence, since it helps increase the credibility of the state, which, in its turn, plays an important role in the process of obtaining, maintaining and increasing its influence.

"Moral realists propose yet another factor that influences the foreign policy of a state: the type of leadership. Yan identifies four types of leadership: inactive, conservative, proactive, and aggressive, which differ in their foreign policy goals (aspiration to maintain or to change the existing status quo) and in tools they use to achieve these goals.

"An inactive leader (无为型领导 wu wei xing ling dao) does not have any ambitions in foreign policy. Under this type of leadership, a rising state avoids any conflict situations even to the detriment of its strategic goals. A conservative leader (守成型领导 shou cheng xing ling dao) is characterized by his determination to maintain the status quo, develop trade and economic cooperation, and ease tensions by strengthening economic interdependence. A proactive leader (进取型领导 jin qu xing ling dao)[35] pursues policies that enhance the country's world status by political measures. Leaders of this type, for example, create alliances to ensure international support for the foreign policy pursued by the state. An aggressive leader (争斗型领导 zheng dou xing ling dao) usually uses military means to achieve his goals and often pursues arbitrary policies. Hence, states that occupy similar places in the structure of international relations can behave differently depending on their leadership type.

"It follows from this classification that maintaining the status quo or seizing power by aggressive means are not the only, and not even the most preferable, ways of behavior for a rising power. The best variant is proactive leadership, the type moral practices are most compatible with, according to Yan Xuetong. One of the indicators of the moral character of foreign policy is strategic reliability (战略信誉 zhan lüe xin yu), which is manifested primarily in fulfilling the state's obligations towards its allies. That is why Yan Xuetong so actively advocates the idea of China abandoning its policy of non-alliance and urges the country's leaders to undertake allied commitments and to fulfil them. In the scholar's opinion, this will automatically raise the level of trust towards his country, will allow the rising state to change the nature of the international system.

"Thus, Yan Xuetong is convinced that the foreign policy strategy of a state is determined by its power, national interests, and leadership type. He comes to the conclusion that proactive leadership in combination with high level of strategic reliability make it possible for a rising state to establish, peacefully and without upheavals, its dominance over the entire international system and to create new norms and a new world order based on these norms.

Types Of States And Types Of World Order

"Lastly, the principal theoretical construct in the framework of moral realism, proposed by Yan Xuetong, is the typology of superpowers and world order. In Yan's opinion, the entire world order depends on the type of state that the superpower belongs to, and the history of international relations is a succession of superpowers. As has been noted before, a leader's moral qualities and convictions have a bearing on the method of state governance and ultimately on the type of state itself.

"Yan proposes the following classification of superpowers and the corresponding world order: tyrant and tyranny (强权, qiangquan); hegemon and hegemony (霸权, baquan); wang, or humane authority, humane dominance (王权, wangquan).[36] Tyranny is the worst world order, whereby a tyrant state attempts to gain leadership exclusively by military force; it is an all-out war. This world order is characterized by instability and wars of conquest. Under hegemony, a superpower relies mostly on its military and economic might, but does not rule out political power either, joining alliances.[37] All European superpowers before World War II were 'tyrants' (according to Yan's typology), whereas the US and the USSR after World War II were 'hegemons.' Since superpower types were different in these time periods, international relations were characterized by different trends. The defining characteristic of wang is prioritizing the development of political power rather than military or economic might. Wang ensures global leadership by means of morality,[38] and therefore, world order with a wang-superpower is the most stable.

"Superpower types also differ in their attitude to international norms, which play an important part in the theory of moral realism. A wang-state adheres to existing international norms, thereby playing a leading role in their dissemination, which cannot be said of a hegemon and especially of a tyrant. Yan proceeds from the fact that what can be observed in international relations on a practical level is not anarchy (as most theories claim) but loose hierarchy, and he proposes a new understanding of the international norms in connection with this fact. In his opinion, modern nation states should be divided into two categories: states with full sovereignty (完整主权国, wan zheng zhu quan guo) and half-sovereign states (半主权国, ban zhu quan guo), whose status in international relations is profoundly different. For example, different states have different influence in such international organisations as the UN, the IMF, and the World Bank.[39] It must be noted that anarchy in IR theory means first and foremost the absence of a global government, and the idea about different capabilities of various states is not new. But the conclusion that Yan draws later deserves further consideration. He states that international relations must be based on two principles – equality and hierarchy,[40] and the combination of the universal and hierarchical norms that pre-Qin thinkers wrote about can maintain world order without leading to chaos or tyranny. More powerful countries should undertake more responsibility, while weaker countries should accept the international norms that discriminate against them. An example of the first is the Kyoto Protocol and the international regulation of hydrocarbon emissions, and of the second – permanent membership of the victorious powers in the UN Security Council.[41]

"Thus, the international order and its stability depend on the type of state a superpower belongs to – tyrant, hegemon, or wang. Wang ensures the superiority of its comprehensive power and world leadership by force of morality and helps in spreading the international norms based on hierarchy and equality. In contrast to tyranny and hegemony, the world order led by a wang-superpower is more stable and therefore preferable.

China's Rise: Forecasts And Recommendations

"Yan Xuetong's theoretical developments, like most works by Chines IR scholars, are aimed at solving problems relevant for contemporary China: providing an alternative interpretation to processes in the modern system of international relations, determining China's place in it, making forecasts for the future. A distinctive feature of Yan's theory is that he does not only build theoretical constructs but proposes practical tools that China can use to achieve its foreign policy goals. On the basis of the analysis of pre-Qin philosophy, Yan Xuetong comes to the conclusion that China's rise may have two different strategic goals and two different results: the creation of a hegemony similar to the current hegemony of the US and, as a consequence, maintaining the corresponding system of international relations, or the transition to a new, more harmonious, system of humane authority.

"Yan formulates the following recommendations regarding China's foreign policy strategy, which should be different from that of the US in three areas. Firstly, China should help establish a system of international relations where there is a balance between the states' rights and responsibilities. Calling all countries equal is hypocritical; it is necessary to admit that they have different powers, and, consequently, different rights and obligations. Secondly, developed states must be more consistent in observing the international norms than developing states, and not vice versa. China should reject the US practice of imposing on others a single standard of political system, since it provokes conflicts and results in negative consequences for the stability of the world order. And thirdly and finally, China should contribute to creating a more open and united world, appealing to the concept of tianxia (union of all under heaven), be open to the international community, promote the principles of freedom of travel and labor migration, and not make its border control stricter, as the US is doing.[42] In addition, moral realists criticize the policy of non-alliance that China adheres to, since participation in various coalitions is what allows one to prove one's reliability to partners and to raise one's credibility.

"The gradual revitalization of China in international affairs, which can be observed with the coming to power of the fifth generation of rulers, can be interpreted as transition to proactive leadership, which, according to moral realism, will be able to ensure the country's peaceful rise to the status of superpower. Thus, in one of his latest works, 'From Keeping a Low Profile to Striving for Achievement,'[43][44] Yan evaluates the consequences of China's transition to more active foreign policy with the help of the moral realism theory. The scholar arrives to the following conclusion: even though many analysts gave a negative evaluation to China's assertiveness on the global stage, in fact, it has led to an increase in its political power and authority. The fact that China started to undertake more responsibilities has had a positive effect on China-US relations and on relations with the EU and developing countries. Given the inevitable escalation of fear of a rising state, the only rational way is entering alliances and, consequently, receiving international support.

The theory of moral realism, which, according to the author himself, is still in the early stages of its development, is of great interest to a researcher; it is with the aid of this theory that Yan Xuetong proposes an alternative interpretation of the future of international relations, a Chinese vision of the process of transformation of the world system, and China's place in it. The alternative interpretation is also an attempt to generate new ideas and a new type of discourse in the field of world politics, which, from the viewpoint of social constructivism, determine international relations. Despite the fact that the theory is not yet developed enough, contains contradictions, and does not have clear definitions of a number of key concepts, it has not only attracted attention of the world academic community, but already has influence on the study of China's foreign policy both within the country and outside it.