Some Reflections For Western Policymakers On Post-Soviet Politics

In the two weeks preceding the historic vote in the U.S., observers of post-Soviet affairs were following some other elections: those in Moldova and Georgia. In Moldova a presidential election was linked to a referendum in proclaiming EU integration as a constitutional goal whereas in Georgia, all the parliament seats were at stake.

Both elections were considered crucial, as in Georgia the government has been enacting laws on the freedom of the press and LGBTQ+ rights similar to those already adopted in Russia,[1] and in Moldova the Socialists opposing the current president have gained ground as a result of the people's growing Euroscepticism.

The results were not too optimistic: the Georgian ruling party got around 53 percent of the vote,[2] and both the pro-EU amendment and the current leader in Moldova was outvoted by the local citizens but emerged victorious due to the support of the Moldovan European and North American diaspora. The result, I would argue, is still far from being final since Moldova will elect its new parliament in 2025.[3]

Looking at the Moldova and Georgia elections, I should argue that they were assessed by most observers in a very straightforward and quite natural manner. Both nations have been divided since the first years of their independence, both were at different time invaded by the Russians, and Russian troops are still stationed on their internationally recognized sovereign territories,[4] supporting secessionist puppet regimes in Transdniestria, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia. Therefore, it was not a surprise that Western analysts and policymakers treated the political showdowns there almost exclusively in terms of geopolitical balancing.[5]

President of Moldova Maia Sandu, who was reelected last Sunday, was considered pro-European, and her adversary, the former prosecutor general, who has been a promoter of Moldova's westward drive for many years, pro-Russian.

Bidzina Ivanishvili, Georgia's shadow ruler, was seen as the Kremlin's proxy, while the alliance of opposition parties that have lost the recent parliamentary polls was labelled pro-Western.

As Samuel Charap, a well-known U.S. expert on Russian and Eurasian affairs, wrote in his book on Ukraine, many states that border both the Russian and the Western spheres of interest, might be called "in-betweens."[6] Hence, such a confrontational approach possesses its internal logic, enabling researchers and policymakers to associate local politicians either with Europe and the West or with Russia.

Nevertheless, I would argue that such a dichotomy is completely misleading, and there are at least two points that should be considered for better understanding recent events and developing the appropriate political decisions for the upcoming Republican administration in the U.S.

(Source: X)

Moldovan Or Georgian Politicians Cannot Be Understood Properly If Called Either Pro-Russian Or Pro-Western

First, I would like to argue that any prospective moves of either Moldovan or Georgian politicians cannot be understood properly if they are called either pro-Russian or pro-Western. Not one of these women and men have any ideas that may lead to a subjugation or a sell-off of their countries either to Russia or the European Union. The people who have risen to the top political scene in both nations are driven, if not by their understanding of what is good for their nations, than by their notion of what is beneficial to themselves.

Yes, one of the most controversial Moldovan politicians, Mr. Ilan Shor, being accused of a gigantic fraud in his country,[7] has fled and resides now in Moscow.[8] He might even be behind a formidable attempt of electoral fraud, as it was reported that hundreds of Moldovans were sent by planes from Russia to Minsk and even to Baku for arranging their voting,[9] since the Moldovan Embassy in Moscow appeared to be unable to serve all those who wished to vote – but even if this is true, he did it in his own interests, and not on Russian President Vladimir Putin's behalf, as he wishes to return to his homeland and to continue his smuggling and money laundering schemes.

Yes, Mr. Bidzina Ivanishvili (who served as Prime Minister of Georgia from October 2012 to November 2013) once was a billionaire entrepreneur,[10] who amassed a large fortune in banking and industrial business in Russia, but these days he wants to consolidate his grip on Georgia for advancing and securing his personal businesses and revenues, and not for pleasing the Kremlin that might be interested in "pro-Russian" Georgia.

I would add that, even while the Georgian authorities have deported some anti-Putin activists,[11] they cannot be called pro-Russian actors, as they were doing so, first of all, to secure the continuous arrival of Russians that might be cut off if the Kremlin decides, for example, to close the border crossings, while the Georgian economy benefits significantly from the inflow of Russian money.

As I have argued many times already, all over the post-Soviet space, public service appears to be the most profitable type of business,[12] and few politicians in this part of the world are unselfish and benevolent. It might not be very encouraging news for those who believe in good governance, but it seems to be much better than if the leaders of post-Soviet countries were nothing more than Russia's proxies – and I would advise observers to look deeper into their well-known and diversified business interests than into their dubious and unproven connections with the Kremlin. Every politician in any of the post-Soviet nations realizes perfectly that she or he derives power and authority from the mere fact that their countries are not part of Russia, and therefore no one would wish to cede their sovereignty.

Disenchantment With The European Perspective

Second, and this point looks even more important, I would argue that the disenchantment with the European perspective is quite visible in both countries. In Moldova, only 50.46 percent of voters supported mentioning European integration as their state's constitutional goal.[13] This can also be explained without focusing on the Kremlin's propaganda and influence.

There is a profound difference between the countries that were allowed to join the EU quite soon after the demise of Communism, and those whose acceptance was conditioned for years.[14] In the latter, a massive emigration has for years been going on, which I would call an individual realization of people's European dream. In the Moldovan case, around 16 percent of voters cast their votes abroad,[15] in Georgia's election, up to eight percent of adult citizens are living in Western countries.[16] While in the 1990s and 2000s, these guestworkers were sending hundreds of millions of Euros back home, nowadays most are not dreaming of returning to their homelands, and, as their elderly relatives die, they are less and less connected to either Moldova or Georgia. Since 2006, the decrease in the remittances as a percentage share of Moldova's GDP more than doubled.[17] As a result, those living in these countries consider many of the emigrants to be traitors and question a collective choice in favor of Europe, since the individual choices of the same kind have not made them happier.

Both Moldovans and the Georgians now enjoy a visa-free travel to Europe,[18] and many of them simply need nothing more as they become irritated by Europeans, who invent many new reasons for postponing the long-awaited accession.

Some observers have already mentioned that the result of the Georgian opposition forces would be even less impressive, and in Moldova both the current president and the EU referendum would be lost without emigrants participating in the vote.[19] It means that the more pro-European citizens leave the post-Soviet states, the less Westernized they are becoming. Therefore, I would argue, a new moment is now emerging in the former Soviet Union: The nations that have not been integrated into Europe so far may well become more selfish – not necessarily pro-Russian, but wishing to opt out of the geopolitical game that has been waged in this realm for decades and of which they do not want to become a part.

The "Georgian Dream" posters used during the recent campaign – depicting both destroyed Ukrainian churches and renovated Georgian ones – were quite argumentative: The local people do not want to become "in-betweens," they wish to live and evolve for their own sake, whatever it may mean.[20]

New election banners of the ruling Georgian Dream party have appeared in Georgia. The political force used images of Ukrainian cities destroyed by Russian troops for its election campaign. The banner shows the ruins of Maripol and the second-largest city of Georgia, Batumi (source: Komersant.info)

The Case Of Abkhazia

I could stop here, but the story evolved in a way that completely supports my main hypotheses. A few days ago the same "selfish" trends surfaced in Abkhazia, a tiny unrecognized state that came into being because of the Russian efforts in 2008 when Moscow sided with it and heralded its "independence." In the years that followed, the Kremlin provided not only military security for the fragile republic but supported it financially (since 2008, it channeled at least $3.2 billion into this "black hole," not only subsidizing the republic budget but directly paying pensions to the local elderly and wages for the public servants)[21] and economically (it has been supplying the republic with free electricity during winter months for many years).[22]

Russian tourists have been the major source of revenue for Abkhazian businesses, and Russia has remained almost the only foreign market for its exports (since the country has no tradeable commodities, Russian companies were ordered to use its sand and crushed stone for the construction work in preparation for the Sochi 2014 Olympic Winter Games.[23] Nevertheless, the people of Abkhazia, backed by the business community, revolted against Russia's proposal to sign an "investment agreement" that would grant Russian citizens and companies a – quite natural – right to buy land in Abkhazia and to acquire real estate in the republic if they build it on their own.[24] Moscow already threatened to stop welfare payments to Abkhazia in September 2024, and later the officials signed an investment agreement, but its submission to the parliament for ratification provoked a riot[25] in which a mob stormed into the parliament building and the presidential residence calling for Abkhaz President Aslan Bzhania's resignation. I would predict the public will win as the president has already left the city of Sukhum and fled to his native village, where he believes that he may find firm support.[26]

The evolving Abkhazian story perfectly confirms what might be said about almost all of Russia's post-Soviet neighbors: Even if some of them seem to be totally dependent on Russia, they will try to act on their own in pursuing their potential benefits and not be commanded by either Russia or its adversaries (a statement of the Abkhazian Foreign Ministry insisting that the riots were caused by some "anti-Russian" forces was met with irony).[27]

Conclusion – The Need To Change The Approach To Post-Soviet Countries

To finalize, I would reiterate that for the Western policymakers it looks essential to change their long-established practice of approaching the post-Soviet countries as one would approach an arena for Russia-West confrontation. It might be seen as such, but the stance of the local politicians, the local businesses, and the local people is much more dependent on their own interests than on Moscow's or Washington's will. The sooner this fact is recognized, the better...

*Dr. Vladislav Inozemtsev is the MEMRI Russian Media Studies Project Special Advisor, and Founder and Director of the Moscow-based Center for Post-Industrial Studies.