In Wake of Arab Spring, Deadlock in Peace Process, Jordan Thaws Relations with Hamas

Introduction

Contacts between Jordan and Hamas in the recent months are expected to lead to a renewal of the official relations between them, which were severed 12 years ago. In 1999, less than one year after the death of King Hussein and the crowning of his son Abdallah II, the Jordanian regime decided to end some eight years of Hamas activity in Jordan and expelled the Hamas officials, headed by Khaled Mash'al, from the country. The officials first moved to Qatar and later settled in Damascus, from which they direct the movement's political activity today.[1]

The Hamas-Jordan rapprochement is the result of the upheavals in the Middle East: Hamas is seeking an alternative to Syria, where its political bureau is currently located, due to the unrest in that country; in addition, it hopes that relations with Jordan will strengthen it in the regional and inter-Palestinian arenas. Jordan, for its part, hopes to quell the wave of protests that is threatening its stability by appeasing the Islamic opposition in the country and by cooperating with the Islamic movement that is gaining strength throughout the region. At the same time, it too is seeking to improve its regional standing, through involvement in the Palestinian issue.

The thaw between Jordan and Hamas is expected to have far-reaching ramifications for the Palestinian, Jordanian and regional arenas. In the Palestinian arena, it could strengthen the Islamic movement, including among Israeli Arabs, at the expense of the secular forces; so too in Jordan. In the regional arena, this development could create a strategic territorial continuum of regimes sympathetic to the Islamic movement in general and to the Muslim Brotherhood in particular: from Turkey though Syria (where the regime is gradually buckling), to Jordan, the West Bank, Gaza and also Israel, and finally to Egypt.

This report will review the background of the Hamas-Jordan contacts and their development, the forces mediating between the sides, and Jordan's and Hamas' respective expectations from the thaw in relations.

Hamas-Jordan Contacts in Advance of Renewing Official Ties

Since April 2011, media outlets within and outside Jordan have been reporting on contacts between Jordanian and Hamas officials in advance of a possible revival of relations between the two sides. The contacts have increased in intensity since September, in light of the violent events in Syria – where Hamas's political bureau is located – and in light of the political instability in Jordan, which includes protests by the opposition led by the Islamic movement, as well as a rapid turnover of Jordanian governments.

The Arab media has reported extensively on Qatar-mediated contacts between the sides; for example, it was reported that Hamas political bureau head Khaled Mash'al had met with Prince 'Ali bin Hussein, the brother of Jordan's King 'Abdallah,[2] and with the head of Jordanian intelligence.[3] The Jordanian government spokesman announced that Mash'al is to conduct an official visit to Jordan, together with the Qatari crown prince, during which he will meet with the king and hold talks with the government.[4] There have been conflicting reports regarding a possible transfer of Hamas' political bureau from Damascus to Amman, or the opening of a Hamas headquarters in Jordan.[5]

Columnists in Jordan deal extensively with the issue of relations with Hamas: the reasons for renewing them, the limits that must be placed on them, and problems they could cause. Hamas officials, for their part, continue to speak favorably of Jordan, as they have done in past years, and express their desire for good relations with it. It should be mentioned that Jordan's warming of relations with Hamas is concurrent with increased criticism and threats against Israel, especially after recent calls in Israel to make Jordan an alternative homeland for the Palestinians.[6]

King 'Abdallah II of Jordan

Qatari Mediation – A Key Element in the Jordan-Hamas Rapprochement

The thaw in relations has taken place with the mediation of Qatar, which is known for having good relations with Hamas, and has recently agreed to host 15 prisoners who were released as part of the Shalit deal and deported. As mentioned, Qatari Crown Price Tamim bin Hamad is expected to join Khaled Mash'al on a trip to Jordan. Assessments that the Hamas-Jordan thaw is linked to a Jordan-Qatar rapprochement emerged as early as April 2011.[7] At that time Jordan, along with Morocco, began angling for admission into the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC), a move that GCC member Qatar apparently opposed.[8] Jordan wants Qatar to change its position, and therefore welcomes Qatari mediation in its relations with Hamas. Qatar, for its part, wants to strengthen its position as a leader and crisis resolver in the Arab and Islamic world. The daily Al-Quds Al-Arabi assessed that by encouraging a Hamas-Jordan rapprochement, Qatar is trying to prevent Hamas from growing close to Iran.[9]

Discussing Jordan-Qatar-Hamas relations, the Jordanian website Akhbar Baladna stated that the expulsion of Hamas officials from Jordan in 1999 had caused considerable tension between Qatar and Jordan, to the point of a complete severing of the relations between them (though it should be noted that this was only one of the reasons for the tension between the two countries). According to the website, there is a plan to transfer the Hamas leadership from Damascus to Jordan, with Qatari funding, a move that will strengthen relations between the two countries.[10] This claim is very likely exaggerated, but it does indicate Qatar's status as a mediator between Jordan and Hamas.

Hamas political bureau head Khaled Mash'al

Qatari Crown Price Tamim bin Hamad Aal Thani

Hamas' Motives to Renew Relations

Strengthening the Movement's Standing in the Domestic and Regional Arenas

Despite the expulsion of its leaders from Jordan and the official severing of ties, Hamas officials never lost sight of the importance of relations with this country. An improvement in relations will be regarded as recognition of the movement's legitimacy, and will help strengthen it both inside Palestine vis-à-vis the PA and in the regional and international arenas.

During a mid-September 2011 visit to Jordan – the first official visit by a Hamas official to the kingdom – Hamas Health Minister Bassem Na'im said that "the natural state of affairs is that there would be no problem for Gaza officials to visit Jordan, since [Hamas] is an elected and legitimate [Palestinian] government. Even if [in the past] there were political circumstances that clouded the relations between the sides, time has proven that Hamas' stance on Jordan, its security and stability is principled and well-established."[11]

Hamas Health Minister Bassem Na'im (center) during his visit to Jordan

Finding an Alternative to Syria and to the Resistance Axis in Light of the Collapse of the Syrian Regime

Hamas's central motivation in renewing relations with Jordan is to find an alternative to Syria in light of the violence and the regime's instability there (it should be mentioned that the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria is participating in the anti-regime protests, and this places Hamas, which is sponsored by the regime, in an awkward situation). The possibility of losing the Syrian haven is not acknowledged in statements by Hamas officials, who in fact reject it, stressing that the movement has no intention of leaving Damascus. It seems that for the time being, Hamas prefers to remain silent on the Syrian issue so as to not harm its relations with the Syrian regime and with Iran.

However, Jordanian analysts, not constrained by such considerations, claim that Hamas seeks to leave the Iran-Syria-Hizbullah axis and to reshape its regional relations. For example, the editor of the official Jordanian daily Al-Rai, Samih Al-Ma'aita, claimed that the political freeze between Jordan and Hamas had been caused, inter alia, by Hamas' affiliation with the Iranian alliance in the region. According to him, several factors – the rise of Turkey and its rapprochement with Hamas, the crisis in Syria, the breakdown of the Iranian axis, and the decline in Hizbullah's popularity due to its support of the Syrian regime – all motivate Hamas to abandon this axis and seek out new alliances.[12]

In his column in the London daily Al-Sharq Al-Awsat, former Jordanian information minister Saleh Al-Qallab, known for his criticism of Iran and Hamas, wrote that Hamas wants to stay in Syria until the last possible moment, but is preparing an alternative base in Jordan in case of need: "It is clear that Khaled Mash'al wants to maintain a foothold... in Damascus until the last possible moment, so that the roads between him and Tehran remain open and safe, and so that Hamas remains one of the angles in what Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei called 'the strategic triangle,' along with Bashar Al-Assad's Syria and the Lebanese Hizbullah, headed by Hassan Nasrallah. [But] at the same time, [he] is seeking an alternative base that will be ready in case the escalating tension in Syria produces [unpleasant] surprises, and in case [Syria] suffers the same fate as Libya...

"Therefore, it is safe to assume that Khaled Mash'al's eye... is turned towards Jordan, and that he is not merely dreaming, but [actually] working to return Hamas to the Jordanian arena, both organizationally and politically. He believes that a presence there is like a presence in the West Bank, [since Jordan is] attached to the West Bank both geographically and demographically. [In fact, he believes that a presence in Jordan] is [even] more important than a presence in Gaza, for he thinks that returning [to Gaza] will cause the conflicts between [Hamas'] interior and exterior leadership to explode - [conflicts] that have become open and known."[13]

Jordan's Motives to Renew the Relations

Dealing with the Islamic Opposition and With the Rise of Islamic Forces in the Region

Jordan's main aim in changing its policy vis-à-vis Hamas is to appease the Islamic movement – which comprises the Islamic Action Front party and the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, and which is a central part of the Jordanian opposition – and to deal with the upsurge of Islamism in the changing Middle East. In fact, according to reports, the renewal of relations with Hamas is part of a deal between the Jordanian government and the Islamic movement, which includes this and several other gestures towards the movement, in return for a significant decrease of its participation in the protests against the government and the regime. It is not clear who initiated the deal, and the Islamic movement has denied its existence.[14]

Jordanian journalist Maher Abu Tir speculated that an official visit by Mash'al would help to appease the more extreme stream within the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, which has a deep emotional bond with Hamas, and whose satisfaction is crucial to the appeasement of the Islamic movement as a whole. He added that this was the motivation behind the deal between the Islamic movement and the regime. [15]

The Jordanian online newspaper Al-Mustaqbal Al-Arabi noted: "The Muslim Brotherhood movement played a crucial role in pressuring the Jordanian government to open direct channels of communication with Hamas. This is evident from the statements of Jordanian Prime Minister Awn Al-Khasawneh, who said that the expelling of the Hamas H HamaHamasHamaofficials from Amman in 1999 had been 'a constitutional and political mistake.' The rapprochement of Al-Khasawneh's new government with the Muslim Brotherhood and Hamas may be the result of a new vision adopted by this government, through which it is attempting to institute a series of reforms in order to contain the demands of the Muslim Brotherhood."[16]

In contrast, Nabil Ghishan, a columnist for the independent Jordanian daily Al-Arab Al-Yawm, wrote: "The government must not think that restoring the relationship with Hamas is the key to a good relationship with the Jordanian Islamic movement... It's not so simple. If it were, the relationship with Hamas would have helped the Syrian regime to diminish the enmity of the [Syrian] Muslim Brotherhood towards it."[17]

'Oraib Al-Rantawi, the director of Al-Quds Center for Political Studies in Amman, wrote in an article in the Palestinian daily Al-Quds that the wave of Islamism which has come in the wake of the Arab revolutions leaves no choice but to form close ties with the Islamic forces: "Who can live in the 'changing Middle East,' which is almost surrendering to the Muslim Brotherhood regime and to its increasing influence... without maintaining strong ties with [the Muslim Brotherhood] in all the lands of its '[Arab] spring?' Moreover, who can... disregard the popular activity and the results of future fair elections, in Jordan and elsewhere, and maintain his distance from and hostility towards the Muslim Brotherhood?... We must establish channels of dialogue [with the Muslim Brotherhood's branches] in Jordan and Palestine... before we find our people welcoming [Rashed Al-]Ganoushi [chairman of the Islamist Al-Nahda party that won the Tunisian elections] and [former Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood general guide Muhammad Mahdi] 'Akef, and others."[18]

Muslim Brotherhood protesters at a July 2011 pro-reform demonstration

Restoring Jordan's Role in the Palestinian Cause

Another motive in renewing relations with Hamas is Jordan's desire to consolidate its role in the Palestinian cause, by becoming involved in the Fatah-Hamas reconciliation[19] and in the political process vis-à-vis Israel. Back in April 2011, before Fatah and Hamas signed the Egypt-brokered reconciliation agreement in Cairo, there were reports that Jordan may join Egypt, or even replace it, as a mediator, in light of Egypt's preoccupation with its domestic affairs.[20] It appears that now, in light of Egypt's instability, the impasse in the peace process with Israel, and the progress in the inter-Palestinian reconciliation, Jordan is renewing its efforts to increase its involvement – hence, King Abdallah's November 21 visit to Ramallah, for the first time in 11 years, and his meeting with 'Abbas prior to the latter's meeting with Mash'al in Cairo.[21]

Jordanian journalist Rana Al-Sabbagh wrote: "The launching of relations between Hamas and Amman will help the latter to revive its declining role in the Palestinian cause, particularly in advancing the Hamas-Fatah reconciliation, after [a long period in which] the political and security issues were monopolized by the regime of former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak. In addition, Jordan may have a chance to rehabilitate Hamas as a party in the negotiations [with Israel], by compelling it [to accept] the conditions of the international quartet. Jordan may also play a role in defusing the situation in Gaza, which is on the verge of explosion."[22]

King 'Abdallah and PA President Mahmoud 'Abbas meet in Ramallah

Rapprochement with Hamas as a Means of Thwarting the 'Alternative Homeland' Plan

Another factor is Jordan's fear of the Israel's alleged 'alternative homeland' plan. Hamas is perceived as an ally in repelling such a plan, thanks to its firm opposition to it, unlike the Palestinian Authority, whom Jordan fears might make concessions to Israel. [23] Hamas, too, mentions the need for a joint stand against "Israel's alternative homeland plan."[24]

Rana Al-Sabbagh wrote in Al-Hayat: "The Israeli campaign to eliminate the Palestinian cause at Jordan's expense requires an alliance with a faction that represents a major Palestinian sector both inside [Palestine] and in the diaspora, and which takes a firm stand regarding the alternative homeland [plan] and the right of return. This will strengthen Jordan's position... Considering Jordan's geography, demography, and history, [we] can no longer accept the notion that its government cannot maintain open ties with a strong and influential Palestinian force."[25]

A columnist in the government daily Al-Rai, Hassan Al-Barari, warned that Israel, which rejects the two-state solution, might demand to resolve the Palestinian problem at Jordan's expense, and that the PA might cooperate with this plan. Therefore, he said, Jordan must "reassess its relations with Hamas" instead: "[Jordan's] challenge is not limited to the issue of Israel [itself]. There is also the weakness of the PA and its inability to achieve anything that assures the Arab public... The [Palestinian] Authority's plight [might] cause it to sacrifice Jordan's interests as part of a settlement with Israel, as revealed by documents that were leaked a year ago from the office of Palestinian chief negotiator Saeb 'Ereqat [i.e., the protocols from the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations exposed by Al-Jazeera]. [Therefore,] perhaps Jordan should reassess its relations with Hamas, which is apparently willing to reach understandings that will serve [the interests of] both peoples, the Jordanians and the Palestinians."[26]

Al-Arab Al-Yawm columnist Nabil Ghishan wrote in a similar vein: "The renewal of warm [relations] with Hamas comes at a very important juncture, when the Zionists are increasing their attacks on the Palestinian cause in an attempt to eliminate it, and when pressures are growing to force Jordan [to accept] the status quo [i.e., the permanent presence of the Palestinian refugees on its soil]. Good relations with a Palestinian force that has a firm stance on the 'alternative homeland' [idea] and on the right of return will strengthen Jordan's position. [But] renewing the relations [with Hamas] is not the [most] important issue. The more important issue is reassessing the Jordanian conduct vis-à-vis Israel and the U.S. and escalating [its opposition] to their positions..."[27]

Advancing Jordan's Admittance into the GCC

A renewal of relations with Hamas, with Qatari mediation, and increased involvement in the Palestinian issue, may also help Jordan's efforts to join the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) – a move the Jordanians regard as an economic life-saver for the country. Jordanian journalist Rana Al-Sabbagh wrote in Al-Hayat: "Improving relations with Hamas – with clear Qatari mediation – will lead to strengthening relations with Doha, thus removing another obstacle from Jordan's path to joining the GCC. It will also open the door to finding employment [in the GCC countries] for the host of unemployed [Jordanians]. Until today, Saudi Arabia and the UAE seemed to be the only ones among the six [GCC members] to support Jordan's joining the GCC, according to a decision that was announced [several] months ago... Oman and Kuwait objected to the plan, and Qatar remained undecided, possibly because it was waiting for the results of the Council's yearly summit [in December 2011]."[28]

Palestinian columnist Hisham Munawwar, who writes on the liberal website Elaph, as well as on the Palestine daily, which is close to Hamas, stated: "… Jordan wants to increase its chances to gain [the status of] member or partner in the GCC. To this end, it must play a larger role in regional crises and affairs, among other means by improving its relations with the Palestinians, who form two thirds of its population..."[29]

Shield of the GCC

Jordanian Apprehensions regarding the Rapprochement

The rapprochement with Hamas has not been accepted in Jordan without reservations, and reports indicate that elements in the kingdom are trying to delay Mash'al's visit. The opponents of the move express concerns that rapprochement with Hamas might invite the movement's intervention in Jordanian affairs, strengthen the Islamic movement in the country, and affect relations with the PA, Israel, and the U.S.[30] Columnists called to limit relations with Hamas in order to protect Jordan's interests and security and optimize its response to the rise of Islamism in the region and the shifting balance of power. Furthermore, they warned against Jordan becoming another theatre of the intra-Palestinian struggle.

Jordanian Journalist: Ties with Hamas – Only as Part of a Strategy Beneficial to Jordan

In an article in the daily Al-Hayat, Rana Al-Sabbagh called to renew relations with Hamas as part of a political-security strategy serving Jordan's interests, and especially in light of the changes in the region: the rise of the Islamic movement in Jordan and its increasing demands for internal reform and for reassessing the peace agreement with Israel, Mahmoud 'Abbas' threats to dismantle the PA, Iran's growing power, and Israeli pressures.

Al-Sabbagh wrote: "If the Assad regime falls, the demands of the Islamic [forces] in Jordan will increase, and might even exceed the slogan of 'reforming the regime.' [It must be remembered that] any relations between Jordan and Hamas will strengthen the Islamic [forces], which threaten the regime, security, and stability.

"A permanent Hamas presence in Jordan also means that the Islamic Palestinian [leaders] in [both] Palestine and Jordan may join the Jordanian [forces]... in a demand for firmer [Jordanian] positions regarding the peace [process] and political reforms.

"Jordan should formulate a political-security strategy that will redefine the foundations of the relations on the day after [Mash'al's] visit. After the interests are redefined, it will be necessary to launch a strategic dialogue between the sides, especially in light of open-ended scenarios regarding the future of the peace process and 'Abbas' threat to dismantle the PA, which requires the Jordanian political leadership to use many diverse cards."[31]

Editor of Jordanian Daily: Renewal of Ties with Hamas – Only With Clear Boundaries

Samih Al-Ma'aita, editor of the official Jordanian daily Al-Rai, stressed that Jordan would not go back to the pre-1999 situation: "Since 1999, twelve years have passed, which have seen major developments in the Palestinian issue. Hamas is currently a strategic partner in managing the Palestinian Authority, while Fatah's presence is weak and the peace process led by the Zionist governments is flagging. Jordan has a consistent position, which it maintained throughout those years: it refuses to go back to the situation that prevailed before 1999, that is, [to a situation whereby] Hamas uses the Jordanian arena mainly as a theater for its activity as a Palestinian organization... This consistency of position proves that what happened here in 1999 was not a whim of the [Jordanian] government at the time, or [the result of] a passing security climate."

Al-Ma'aita enumerated the principles that should underlie the renewed relations with Hamas: the movement must be kept from using Jordan as its main theater of operations and as an arena for its conflict with Fatah; the relations with Hamas, which is part of the Palestinian leadership, must be regarded as part of Jordan's foreign policy; clear boundaries must be established for Hamas' ties with the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood.[32]

Jordanian Columnist: Political Activity by Hamas Officials – Only within Jordanian Parties

Jihad Al-Momani, a columnist for the government Jordanian daily Al-Rai, called to allow the return of Hamas officials to Jordan, on the condition that they join Jordanian political parties and work for Jordan: "[In 1999] there was no decision to [simply] expel the Hamas officials. They were given a choice of three options: forgo membership of a non-Jordanian party; stand trial for belonging to a non-Jordanian organization, or leave the country to [prevent] a severe crisis that would have emerged in Jordan's relations with the West. Hamas officials chose not to forgo their membership in a non-Jordanian party... and they did not accept the option of a trial... Then came the Qatari initiative, which they happily accepted. They boarded the special plane that was sent for them and left with Allah's blessing and protection for our sister [state] Qatar, whose relations with Jordan at the time were bad...

"Hamas is a respectable faction and we have repeatedly demanded [to maintain] good relations with it. But these relations cannot be successful so long as we agree with the whole world – Arab and non-Arab – that the PA is the legitimate Palestinian authority. That said, Jordan did not go along with the plots [made] against Hamas, but rather maintained [an impartial position] toward the organization, which is currently governing Gaza and declaring itself the legitimate government, contrary to the opinions of Arabs and the West.

"We will support the move by Prime Minister 'Awn Al-Khasawneh to turn over a new leaf [in the relations with] Hamas, and to succeed where others have failed, [namely] in returning the Hamas officials to Jordan as Jordanians with equal rights and obligations, who engage in politics via Jordanian parties, with their eye on Palestine, and work with us for the future, sovereignty, and welfare of Jordan."[33]

Jordanian Measures to Limit the Relations and Alleviate Concerns

To assuage these fears, Jordanian officials stressed that Jordan's relations with Hamas would be similar to its relations with any other Palestinian organization, and would not replace its official ties with the PA and PLO. Furthermore, Hamas would not be allowed to establish headquarters in Jordan or conduct political activity there, and would also officially sever its ties with the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood.

Jordanian Officials: We Must Maintain Impartial Relations with All Palestinian Forces; Hamas Will Not Establish a Headquarters in Jordan

Though Prime Minister 'Awn Al-Khasawneh said that expelling the Hamas officials from Jordan had been "a constitutional and political mistake" – a statement that sparked an uproar in Jordan – he stressed that Hamas would not be allowed to establish a headquarters in Amman, and that the proposed plan was for Jordan to maintain ties with all the Arab and Palestinian forces, in order to broaden the range of diplomatic options at its disposal.[34]

Jordanian Minister of Media Affairs and Communications Rakan Al-Majali clarified: "The proposal is for [holding] consultations and mutual meetings [with Hamas], just as we do with all other organizations. The only difference is that Hamas is a major organization. I hope [this move] will not be construed as coming at the expense of our relations with the PA, for the official ties between Jordan and the PA are steadfast, because the PA represents the Palestinian state to be, and they will continue, just like the relations between any two countries... The meaning of these natural relations is that Hamas officials will visit Jordan and meet with Jordanian officials. But the notion of [establishing] a [Hamas] office or headquarters in Jordan is not being proposed at the moment, not even by [Hamas]. The relations between Hamas and Jordan were never severed. Some Hamas officials were allowed to visit Jordan and then leave [again], or to leave Jordan and [later] return [to it]."[35]

Former Jordanian communications minister Saleh Al-Qallab stressed in his Al-Sharq Al-Awsat column that Jordan must limit its contacts with Hamas, for the sake of its security and regional ties: "Jordan may allow Khaled Mash'al and other members of his political bureau to visit [the country] occasionally, but it will certainly not allow Hamas to reenter the Jordanian arena and [restore] the state of affairs that existed before 1999... especially considering the instability in the region and the fact that Hamas maintains its relations with Iran, and [also considering Iran's] tense relations with Saudi Arabia following the assassination attempt against the Saudi ambassador in Washington [which Iran was suspected of planning]. Furthermore, the state of Jordan does not maintain relations with any Palestinian force other than the PLO and the PA, including Fatah – because [the PLO] is the sole legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and the PA [represents] the Palestinian state, and has an embassy in Amman like all other Arab countries.

"The Jordanian [Muslim] Brotherhood, which has organizational ties with Hamas... will continue to pressure this government, and every subsequent government, to restore Hamas' [status] in Jordan to what it was before ... 1999. But the [pressure] will not change a thing, because this is a matter of state security and of Jordan's relations with Arab and Muslim states and with the PA and PLO."[36]

Limiting the Power of the Islamic Forces by Severing the Ties between Hamas and the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood

Against the backdrop of concern regarding the increasing power of the Islamic forces in Jordan, several Jordanian media outlets reported that the authorities were making the renewal of the relations conditional upon Hamas' severing of its organizational ties with the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, and that the "office of the General Guide of the global Muslim Brotherhood" (based in Cairo) would accept this demand.[37] In fact, according to reports, the global movement already instructed, two years ago, to sever the organizational ties between Hamas and the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, in response to a request by Hamas, and to establish a Muslim Brotherhood movement in Palestine.[38] The Jordanian daily Al-Majd reported that a decision to this effect would be taken the global Muslim Brotherhood at a January 2012 convention in Istanbul, and that the Palestinian Muslim Brotherhood would cooperate with Hamas but remain organizationally independent of it.[39]

Al-Rai columnist Sami Al-Zubaidi wrote: "The [issue] that raises questions is the distinction between Hamas as a political and military resistance movement in Palestine and the [Muslim] Brotherhood as a Jordanian Islamic movement with a Jordanian agenda. It is the mixing of these two aspects that is troubling, not the agenda of each group [in itself]. Therefore, the leaders of the Islamic movement [in Jordan] must assure the Jordanian public that the [their] movement does not intend to treat Hamas as part of the domestic [arena], and [must] take a clear stance on certain issues, especially the severing of [organizational] ties [with Hamas]."[40] Saleh Al-Qallab wrote that the Hamas officials would be permitted "to stay in Jordan for a while, [but] without [maintaining] offices, headquarters or militias [there], and providing they do not intervene in Jordan's internal affairs, especially in the affairs of the [Jordanian] Muslim Brotherhood and the Islamic Action Front."[41]

* L. Barkan is a research fellow at MEMRI.