Ahead of the Baghdad Nuclear Talks Between Iran And The 5+1 – An Assessment

A. The demands of the sides

Iranian demands

1. Iran demands the cessation of all Western activity aimed at promoting a democratic change of regime in Iran.[1]^, [2]

The West has not responded to this demand or addressed it in any way.

2. Iran demands the immediate lifting of existing oil and financial sanctions, and the cancellation of the sanctions meant to come into effect in July.

The Western response: According to reports, Britain has proposed to delay some of the July sanctions by six months.[3] The New York Times referred to a possible Western willingness to ease the sanctions, and warned: "If Iran makes credible gestures, sanctions should be eased, but not significantly until it takes irreversible steps to roll back its nuclear activities."[4]

3. Iran demands that the negotiations be based on a Western recognition of its inalienable right to nuclear technology.

The West has partly accepted this (in consenting to continued activity of 5 percent enrichment).

Western demands

The West demands the removal from Iran of all 20 percent enriched uranium, and access to all nuclear sites in the country, including military ones.

Iran has not agreed to this, so far.

B. The sides' range of flexibility

Iran's range of flexibility

According to Western assessments, Iranian concessions to the West might include the following:

1. Access to the Parchin military site, where, according to reports, extensive clean-up activities have recently taken place;

2. The removal of some of the 20 percent enriched uranium from the country. We assess that, if Iran consents to this at all, it will agree to the removal of a small amount of material, such as the amount necessary for operating the research reactor in Tehran, while retaining most of the material in its possession and continuing the enrichment activities.

The West's range of flexibility

According to Western assessments, Western concessions to Iran might include:

1. The removal of the ban on supplying spare parts for Iranian civilian aircraft.

2. Assistance for Iran's energy sector (oil refineries and construction of civilian nuclear plants).

3. A postponement of the decision to remove the anti-regime Iranian group Mujahideen Khalq from the U.S. list of terrorist organizations.

4. The lifting of some of the sanctions.

Conclusions

An examination of the two sides' demands and flexibility range suggests that the gaps are too wide to bridge.

However, since both sides have a considerable interest in preventing the failure of the Baghdad talks (a failure that could strengthen the forces pushing for a military attack on Iran), they are likely to make a substantial effort to present the talks as a success, even if only a limited one. This, in order to enable the continuation of the dialogue, which would benefit both sides (Iran, because it would delay a Western military attack, and the West, because it would prevent an economic crisis stemming from a rise in oil prices, which could affect the upcoming elections in the U.S.).[5]

As part of the mutual effort to create an impression of progress, Iran and the West may present Khamenei's non-existent fatwa against nuclear weapons as evidence of a shift in Iran's nuclear position which justifies the continuation of the talks,[6] and even limited Western concessions.

In order to achieve its immediate goal – an extension of the talks[7] – Iran might concede to make small concessions as a basis for interim agreements. This will allow it to pursue its strategic objective, which is to obtain recognition by the 5+1 of Iran as a "nuclear threshold state"[8] (in fact, Iran is already close to attaining this status, but has not been internationally recognized as such). As a recognized nuclear threshold state, it could not be subjected to the political and economic sanctions and limitations that are currently imposed upon it.

Even if recognized as a threshold state, Iran – unlike other threshold states, such as Germany and Japan – will likely refuse to maintain full transparency of its nuclear facilities.

* A. Savyon is director of MEMRI's Iranian Media Project; Y. Carmon is President of MEMRI.