The Iran-Backed Iraqi Militias – Another Component Of The Iranian Threat To Israel From The East And The North

On October 7, 2023, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, an umbrella organization of Iran-backed militias in the country, claimed to have launched a drone at the powerplant in Hadera in Israel. In a message posted on its Telegram channel, the organization described the attack as part of its "ongoing resistance to the occupation and assistance to our people in Gaza, and a response to the acts of massacre perpetrated by the oppressive entity [i.e. Israel] against Palestinian civilians…"[1] This message is one of more than a hundred claims of responsibility issued by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq for drone and rocket attacks against Israel since Hamas' deadly massacre on October 7, 2023. The claimed attacks were on a wide range of targets across Israel, from the Golan Heights in the north to Eilat in the south, and from the Dead Sea in the east to Haifa in the west, including army bases, infrastructure facilities, seaports and airports. In one case, the militias published a video in which Akram  Al-Kaabi, secretary-general of the Al-Nujaba militia, which is a member of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq, is seen taking part in preparing a drone for an attack on Eilat.   

The Islamic Resistance in Iraq is an umbrella organization of several Shi'ite Iraqi militias supported by Iran that appear on the U.S. list of designated terrorist organizations. Formed  a few days after October 7, it includes the Hizbullah Brigades, the Al-Nujaba Movement, the Sayyid Al-Shuhada Brigades, and the Ansar Allah Al-Awfiya Movement. Initially, the militias focused on attacking American targets in Iraq and in Syria, apparently exploiting the Gaza war to renew their activity against the Americans after suspending it for almost a year under pressure from the Iraqi government and from Shi'ite members within it. However, in late January 2024, following U.S. pressure that included attacks on the militias and warnings to Iran, the militias once more suspended their actions against the Americans, and instead increased their attacks on targets in Israel. This second hiatus in the action against the Americans lasted until late July, when the attacks on U.S. bases in Iraq and Syria resumed.[2] Militia spokespersons clarified that the hostilities had been renewed due to the lack of progress in the talks between the U.S. and Iraq about withdrawing the American forces from the country and also because of America's support for Israel. They also threatened that "a renewal of the escalation against the U.S. is imminent."[3]  

It should be noted that the efficacy of the Iraqi militias' attacks on Israel, if they in fact took place, is unclear. With the exception of a few instances in which the IDF spokesperson announced the detection or interception of drones or rockets arriving from "the east," i.e. from Iraq, and from Syria, and several reports in the Arab media about the discovery of drone wreckages of drones in northern Jordan – apparently launched from Syria or the Syria-Iraq border – there are no indications that the alleged drones and rockets reached Israel or hit their targets, as claimed by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq. In most of the cases the rockets and the drones were presumably intercepted by Israel, the U.S. or Jordan before they reached Israeli territory.

However, despite this, the attacks on Israel are a significant development in the activity of the Shi'ite Iraqi militias, which previously operated mainly in Iraq and Syria, against U.S. interests there and also against alleged  "Zionist interests" in the Kurdish region in northern Iraq. The introduction of the Iraqi militias as another aggressive element against Israel is part of Iran's vision and strategy of "the unity of the fronts," which calls for the involvement of all the components of the resistance axis in fighting Israel and the U.S. on it behalf. Hamas' October 7 attack provided Iran with an opportunity to implement that vision, as manifested by the strikes against Israel carried out by the Iran-backed militias on several fronts: in Lebanon, Syria,  and for the first time also Yemen and Iraq. Senior officials in the Iraqi militias assert that their operations since October 7 have been coordinated with the other members of the resistance axis and are conducted from a joint operations room. During this period, the militias have also strengthened their ties with the Palestinian factions, as well as with Yemen's Iran-backed Ansar Allah movement (the Houthis). In fact, the Houthis and the militias have recently announced that they are cooperating on the operative level and carrying out joint attacks against Israel, although the details of this cooperation are still unclear.

This report reviews the attacks against Israel claimed by the Iraqi militias in the recent months.

The Iraqi Militias Obey Iran As Part Of The Resistance Axis And Its Joint Operations Room

For many years now, dozens of Shi'ite militias supported and sponsored by Iran have been operating in Iraq, chief of them the Hizbullah Brigades and Al-Nujaba terror organizations, which view Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei as their religious authority, although they also underscore their loyalty to Ayatollah Ali Al-Sistani, the religious leader of the Shi'ites in Iraq. Most of the militias operate on two levels: as independent organizations, some of which have a political arm that is actively involved in the political system in Iraq, and as active members of Al-Hashd Al-Sha'bi (Popular Mobilization Units, PMU). The PMU was established in 2003 as an umbrella organization of numerous militias, most of them Shi'ite, with the aim of fighting the Sunni jihad organization ISIS, with the support of Iran and in accordance with a religious ruling by Ayatollah Sistani.

The establishment of the PMU as a force to combat ISIS allowed the militias to consolidate their status and their legitimacy as armed organizations. In an attempt to regulate the activity of the PMU, in 2016 Iraq passed a law that subordinated them to the prime minister and made them part of the Iraqi armed forces. However, despite this measure, most of the militias remain loyal to the Iranian regime, which maintains direct and close contact with the PMU and with most of its member militias.[4]

Some of the militias, such as Al-Nujaba, have a headquarters in Tehran, and their leaders visit Iran and meet with government officials there, including members of Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), who in turn visit the offices of the militias when they come to Iraq.

These Shi'ite militias consider themselves inseparable from the resistance axis, led by Iran, and,  since October 7, their leaders have emphasized their commitment to defending their fellow axis members. On October 7 itself they immediately aligned themselves with Hamas and vowed to support the Palestinian factions with all their resources and capabilities.[5] On March 24, Abu Alaa Al-Walai, secretary general of the Sayyid Al-Shuhada Brigades, stressed that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq is a "major" part of the resistance axis and the of the doctrine of the "unity of the fronts."[6] On May 3, Al-Nujaba member Muhammad Al-Mousawi likewise declared that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq is "a key part of the axis of resistance."[7] The militias' role in the resistance axis, and the cooperation among them, are also highlighted by the militias' official media outlets.

The coordination and cooperation among the components of the resistance axis is both bilateral and multilateral.

The Multilateral Level: 

According to reports, since the outbreak of the Gaza war, at least two extensive meetings have been held in Iran, the first in March[8] and the second in May, on the sidelines of the funeral for Iran's president Ebrahim Raisi, who was killed in a helicopter crash. Present at the second meeting were the commander of the IRGC Qods force, Esmail Qaani; Hizbullah's deputy secretary-general Naim Qassem; the head of Hamas' political bureau, Ismail Haniya; the head of the Yemeni negotiation team, Muhammad Abd Al-Salam; the secretary-general of the Iraqi Hizbullah Brigades, Abu Hussein Al-Hamidawi, and Akram Al-Kaabi, secretary-general of Al-Nujaba. At this meeting it was agreed to continue escalating the attacks against Israel.[9] There were also reports on the existence of a joint operations room of the resistance axis which directs and coordinates the militias' operations.[10]

The heads of the resistance axis meet in Iran on the sidelines of Raisi's funeral (Image: Alalam.ir, May 23, 2024)

The Bilateral Level: 

The war also provided an opportunity for the members of the axis to tighten their bilateral cooperation.

Tightening Cooperation With Palestinian Factions: 

According to Jaafar Al-Husseini, spokesman for the Iraqi Hizbullah Brigades, the ties between the Palestinian factions and the Iraqi militias have grown stronger since October 7 and there is "direct and daily" coordination between them on the political and military levels. The faction heads speak to each other by phone, and the heads of the Palestinian factions have visited Iraq.[11] In June it was reported that Hamas had opened a Baghdad bureau and was considering moving the bulk of its operations from Qatar to Iraq, due to the pressures exerted by Qatar on it.[12]

Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) delegation meets with Qais Al-Khaz'ali, secretary-general of the Shi'ite Asaib Ahl Al-Haqq movement (Image: Jehad.ps, April 18, 2024)

PIJ secretary-general Ziad Al-Nakhaleh with PMU commander Abd Al-Aziz Al-Muhammadawi (Image: Jehad.ps, April 18, 2024)

Military And Operational Cooperation With The Houthi Ansar Allah Movement:

In June there were also reports of joint rocket and drone attacks by the Houthis and the Iraqi militias against targets inside Israel. No further information is available about the cooperation between the two sides, but the claims of responsibility imply that this cooperation enables the Houthis to vary their targets and to reach targets further to the north, which may mean that the attacks are carried out by the Iraqi militias from Iraq or Syria, possibly with Houthi weapons. Also in June, Arab news websites reported that the Houthis were training under IRGC oversight at PMU bases in Iraq, including in the operation of drones.[13]

It should be noted that the growing cooperation among these elements constitutes a threat not only to Israel but also to Saudi Arabia and the U.S. The Houthis have recently escalated their threats against Saudi Arabia, warning it not to act against Yemen, militarily or economically.[14] The Shi'ite militias have likewise threatened to take action against Saudi Arabia, on the grounds that it aids Israel and threatens the Houthis in Yemen.[15] In July 2024, it was reported that the Houthis had opened an office in Baghdad.[16] According to Aziz Rashed, "affiliated with the [Houthi] defense ministry," the Houthis have had a representation in Iraq for several years now,[17] but they chose to highlight its existence at the present time as a "message" to Saudi Arabia and the U.S. that the cooperation with the Iraqi militias can also be directed against them. He said that the Houthis intend to expand their attacks in the region to include not only Israel but also its "defenders in the region, first and foremost the American bases," and that the attacks against Saudi Arabia will not be launched from Yemen but from "many other directions and elements." Rashed stated that the recent public visit of Houthi representative Abu Idris Al-Sharafi to the headquarters of the PMU in northern Baghdad was "a clear message that Sanaa intends to increase the joint operations and the unity of the arenas and the fronts," and that the relationship between the PMU and the Houthis is "a unity that cannot be broken."[18]

Abu Idris Al-Sharafi with Nasser Al-Shammari, the deputy secretary-general of Al-Nujaba and commander of the PMU's "Baghdad Belt" operations room (Image: Telegram.me/ansarallah_iraq, July 4, 2024)

Alongside their cooperation and coordination with the other members of the resistance axis, the Iraqi militias claim – perhaps to prevent criticism from within Iraq – that they make their own decisions and take local Iraqi interests into consideration. For example, on March 19 the Hizbullah Brigades announced that its secretary-general, Abu Hussein Al-Hamidawi, had met in Tehran with "resistance axis leaders from inside Iraq and abroad." The meeting took place about six weeks after the organization announced it was suspending its attacks on U.S. targets. Implying that this announcement had met with criticism from elements in the resistance axis, the statement stressed that the Islamic Resistance in Iraq "takes timing into consideration, interacts with the main challenges, and manages its decisions with wisdom and deliberation." At the same time, it clarified that the decision to suspend the attacks against the U.S. was "not the end of the matter" and that "the resistance can rely on its own capabilities to manage a long-term battle."[19]

In several instances, there were clear attempts by members of the resistance axis to distance Iran from responsibility for attacks in order to protect it from an American or Israeli retaliation. These elements claimed that they operate independently and that Iran even attempted to dissuade them from escalating their attacks. A January 30, 2024 statement by the Hizbullah Brigades about the suspension of the attacks against the Americans said that Iran had advised not to increase the attacks.[20] And on June 22, a report in the Hizbullah-affiliated Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar claimed that Iran had tried to dissuade the Iraqi militias from fighting alongside Hizbullah in South Lebanon so as to avoid expanding the war in the region.[21] Despite these attempts, several Iranian officials admitted that Iran leads and directs the resistance axis, including the Iraqi militias. In an interview with the IRGC-affiliated Tasnim news agency, General Mohsen Chizari, the Qods Force deputy operations commander, said that Iran's Supreme Leader Khamenei "is the  commander of the resistance axis" and that "he alone is the guide, the leader, and the commander" of this axis.[22]

Attacks Against Israel: Details, Goals, Targets, Weapons And Effects

As of this writing, the militia's attacks against Israel have primarily involved rockets, missiles and suicide drones. As previously mentioned, at the beginning of the Gaza war, the Shi'ite militias in Iraq used the war to end their year-long suspension of the attacks against American targets, and  resumed these operations, mainly in Syria and Iraq, on the grounds that the U.S. supports Israel.[23] On November 2, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq published its first claim of responsibility for an attack in Israeli territory, claiming to have hit a "vital target" on the shores of the Dead Sea. The statement did not provide any details about the target or about the weapon used against it.[24] On the following day, the group claimed an attack on a target in Eilat,[25] and on November 11 it claimed to have hit another target in Eilat with "the appropriate weapons."[26]

In December 2023, the Islamic Resistance in Iraq issued four additional claims of responsibility for operations against Israel, some of them involving suicide drones, and shared footage of these drones being launched. The purported strikes included a drone attack against Eilat, a strike on "a target in the Mediterranean Sea," an attack against a "key target" south of the Israeli locality of Eliad in the Golan Heights, and an attack on a "military target" in the Golan Heights.[27] A statement by the Israeli authorities confirmed that an attack had indeed taken place in Eliad, causing property damage. None of the other purported attacks were confirmed by Israeli sources.

The claims of responsibility increased in January 2024, with 11 purported attacks. During this month, the militias declared the beginning of the "second phase" of their operations, in which they  intended to besiege Israel by targeting airports, seaports and targets in the Mediterranean Sea.[28] The claimed attacks during January were against Eilat, the Golan Heights, Haifa, the Jordan Valley, the Ashdod port, and the "Zevulun naval facility."[29]

February 2024 saw a decrease in the militias' attacks against Israel, as well as against American targets in Iraq and Syria, and in total the militias claimed to have carried out only four attacks against the port of Haifa, Eilat, the shores of the Dead Sea and the Golan Heights.[30]

March 2024 marked the beginning of another significant increase in the attacks against Israel claimed by the militias, after the latter announced a ceasefire in their attacks against American targets on the backdrop of a series of repeated American airstrikes against militia targets and American threats to expand the scope of the airstrikes. The militias' claimed attacks in March were primarily against Israeli infrastructure targets and consisted of 16 purported attacks against a chemical plant, a refinery and powerplant in the port of Haifa, the municipal airport in Kiryat Shmona, the town of Rosh Pina, Ben Gurion International Airport, a powerplant in Tel Aviv, the "defense ministry headquarters," and Israel Air Force intelligence bases in the Golan Heights, in Palmachim and in Uvda.[31] Israeli authorities did not report any strikes or interceptions in Israeli territory due to these attacks. In this context, it should be noted that the London-based Al-Arabi Al-Jadid daily reported that Jordanian security forces found debris of a drone in the city of Irbid in northern Jordan and assessed that the drone had originally been launched from Syria and not from Iraq.[32]

The surge in attacks continued in April 2024, during which the militias claimed to have carried out 22 attacks against Israeli targets, including Eilat; Israel Air Force basses in Tel Nof, Ramat David, Hatzerim and Uvda; military bases in the Golan Heights and in southern Israel, and airports and oil facilities in Haifa, Ashdod and Ashkelon.[33] During this month, Israeli authorities confirmed that a suicide drone launched from the east (i.e., from Iraq) flew through Jordanian airspace and dealt damage to a structure in a naval base in Eilat.

According to an April 23, 2024 infographic marking 200 days of war, published by pro-militia Telegram channels, approximately one-quarter of the militias' attacks during that period were towards Israeli territory (65 out of a total of 243 – although the militias in fact only claimed responsibility for 57 attacks).[34]

In May 2024, the militias claimed over 40 attacks, including one against the Leviathan offshore natural gas field. Despite the militias' claims that most of the attacks resulted in direct hits, the Israeli military reported the interception of only one suicide drone from the east that month, on May 6.[35]

June 2024 saw a decrease in the purported strikes against Israel, with the militias claiming only 24 operations.[36] Notably, some of them were carried out "jointly" with the Yemen-based Houthi Ansar Allah movement. According to this movement, one of these attacks targeted three ships in the port of Haifa, two of which were "carrying military equipment" while the third had "violated the decision to ban entry to the ports of occupied Palestine." By contrast, the Iraqi militias did not provide any details about the targets of the attack.[37]

In July there were 14 strikes, some of them carried out in collaboration with the Houthis. As stated, one of them targeted the Hedera powerplant. A video published July 17 by the Islamic Resistance in Iraq shows Al-Nujaba secretary-general Akram Al-Kaabi helping to prepare a drone for an attack on Eilat. This was the first time a senior militia official was documented taking part in a military operation. Probably due to operational security considerations, the claim of responsibility published along with the video did not specify the date of the attack."[38] The London-based Qatari daily Al-Arabi Al-Jadid stated that it had likely been launched from Syria.[39] It should be noted that, on July 14, Israel announced that it had attacked Syrian army facilities "in response to the launch of two drones from Syrian territory to the region north of Eilat, which were intercepted."[40] The resistance did not issue any claim of responsibility for an attack on Eilat on that date, so this may be the attack in which Al-Kaabi participated.

It should be noted that, on May 30, 2024, a group called Saraya Awliya Al-Dam[41] claimed to have launched two suicide drones towards "vital targets" in the port of Haifa. Since then, the group has claimed four additional strikes against Israel: Two against in the port of Haifa, one against the powerplant in Caesaria, and another against a "espionage" base in the Golan Heights.[42]

Weapons Used

According to the militias, the strikes against Israel have been carried out with missiles and drones, and new and more advanced models are gradually being introduced. The longer the conflict lasts, the more the militias can be expected to use new weapons against Israel – as has been openly declared by Abu Alaa Al-Walai, the leader of the Sayyed Al-Shuhada Brigades, an Iran-backed Iraqi militia that has been participating in the attacks as part of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq. In a televised speech in early June 2024, Al-Walai said that the "third phase" of attacks would begin "very soon" and would involve the use of advanced weapons.[43]

Suicide Drones

Based on the militias' statements, most of the attacks have involved suicide drones. Initially they relied primarily on the Murad-5 drone, which is based on the Iranian Shahed-101 drone, and is 1.6 meters long with a wingspan of 2.2 meters. According to an IRGC-affiliated Telegram channel, this drone has significant explosive and strike radius capabilities.[44]

Murad-5 suicide drone

In May, the militias announced that they had started using Al-Arfad-type suicide drones, which, according to a pro-militia Telegram channel, is the Iranian Shahed-136 drone.[45] The Hizbullah-affiliated Al-Maydeen news website reported that the Al-Arfad drone is very similar to the Samad-type drone used by the Houthis.[46]

An Al-Arfad drone (Image: T.me/ElamAlmoqawama, May 14, 2024)/p>

Missiles

In January 2024, the militias claimed to have launched Al-Arqab-type cruise missiles towards Israel. An IRGC-affiliated Telegram channel reported that these are Iranian Paveh-351 cruise missiles, known also by their Houthi designation "Al-Quds."[47] These cruise missiles have a range of approximately 1,000 kilometers, can change trajectory mid-flight, and use a turboshaft engine that enables them to avoid detection by radar systems by flying at low altitudes.[48]

Graphic showing an Al-Arqab cruise missile, which the militias claim to have fired towards Haifa in January 2024 (Image: T.me/elamharbi, January 8, 2024)

The Northern Threat: Iraqi Militia Operations In Southern Syria And Lebanon

Some of the drones and missiles are launched by the Iraqi militias from Syrian territory. This is evident from a March 2024 report in Al-Arabi Al-Jadid stating that Jordanian security forces found debris from a suicide drone in Jordan's northern city of Irbid, assessing that the drone had been fired towards Israel from Syria.[49] Israel too has claimed that missiles and rockets were launched into its territory from Syria and has attacked in Syria in response.[50]

In recent years, Syria has been a key stronghold for Iraqi militias, which established their presence in the country during the Syrian civil war that broke out in 2011, under the pretext of fighting ISIS and defending Shi'ite holy sites in Syria. Over time, the true reason for the militias' presence in Syria became apparent: to attack Israel. The militias have deployed forces and established outposts in southern Syria, along its borders with Jordan and Israel. Some of these operations have been disguised as operations of the Syrian military. In March 2017, the Al-Nujaba militia announced that it was establishing the Golan Liberation Army and that this army had "detailed plans."[52]

The militias have been establishing their presence in these regions with the consent of the Syrian regime, and the process has been ignored by Russian forces deployed in the area, despite the understandings made between Israel, Jordan and Russia in 2018 according to which Russia was to push for the withdrawal of the Iran-backed militias from southern Syria.[53]

Since October 7, there have been growing indications that a widescale operation might be launched against Israel from the Syrian front: the militias there have increased their readiness, additional fighters have been sent to southern Syria, and the militias have openly declared that they intend to open a new front in the Golan Heights.[54] It is not inconceivable that, if the scope of the war expands, for instance against Hizbullah, the militias will launch a ground offensive against Israel.

Another front from which the militias are threatening to attack is Lebanon. On October 15, 2023, a pro-militia Telegram channel shared a video of Ayoub Faleh Hassan Al-Ruba'i, aka Abu Azra'il, a senior official in the Iraqi PMU's Imam Ali Brigades, allegedly speaking from southern Lebanon, and threatening that, if given the order to do so, his group would take action against Israel.[55]

Recently, on the backdrop of the escalation between Israel and Hizbullah and the possibility of the outbreak of a full-blown war between them, militia spokespersons have declared that, if needed, they would not suffice with missile and drone attacks from a distance but would also send forces to southern Lebanon to fight alongside Hizbullah. Such declarations demonstrate the militias' obligation to Hizbullah, and the importance of Hizbullah for Iran, when compared to the Palestinian factions.

As early as January 2024, Jaafar Al-Husseini, the spokesperson for the Iran-backed Iraqi Hizbullah Brigades militia, warned that, if Israel escalates the fighting against Hizbullah, his group will fight "shoulder to shoulder" alongside the Lebanese organization.[56] Similarly, Sayyed Al-Shuhada Brigades militia leader Abu Alaa Al-Walai warned on June 25, 2024 that, if Israel expands its attacks against Hizbullah, the obstacle of distance that prevented the militias from actively fighting alongside the Palestinian factions will be "removed" and the fighting will take place "at zero distance." He added that the entire military arsenal of the resistance will be put to use.[57]

The Hizbullah-affiliated Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar reported that, after their June 13, 2024 meeting in Baghdad with Iranian interim foreign minister Ali Bagheri Kani, the Hizbullah Brigades and Al-Nujaba militias declared their readiness to fight alongside the Lebanese Hizbullah "if it agrees to this." Kazem Al-Fartousi, the spokesperson for the Sayyed Al-Shuhada Brigades militia, explained that Hizbullah has great military capabilities, "high-quality" equipment, and "many fighters," but that "if the situation demands the presence of fighters from Iraq in South Lebanon, we will be on the front of resisting the Zionist aggression, since this is an Islamic and Arab matter that erases all borders and definitions."[58]

In late June 2024, two Arab journalists claimed that "hundreds" of Iraqi militia operatives had entered Lebanon ahead of a possible escalation in Israel's war with Hizbullah.[59]

As of this writing, Hizbullah claims that it has denied the request of non-Lebanese elements to join the fighting from Lebanese soil. In a June 19 speech, Hizbullah leader Hassan Nasrallah said: "The leaders of the resistance movements contacted us and wanted to send fighters, but we told them that we have more than enough fighters."[60]

The Threat From Jordan: Iran Aims To Open A Jordanian Front Against Israel, With Help From The Iraqi Militias

Even before October 7, Israel identified Iranian attempts to smuggle weapons into the West Bank from Jordan. These efforts intensified after October 7, and in November 2023 Israel's security agencies reportedly captured 137 weapons that were being smuggled in from Jordan.[61]

In addition to smuggling weapons into the West Bank, Iran is attempting to exploit the war in Gaza and the solidarity with the Palestinians to establish a presence in Jordan by means of militias and other elements that are loyal to it. The long-term goal of this activity is to undermine and ultimately topple the Jordanian regime, and to deploy forces loyal to Iran along Israel's eastern border, in order to smuggle weapons into the West Bank and eventually carry out attacks against Israel from Jordanian soil.[62]

In early April 2024, the militias openly declared that these were their intentions. Senior Iraqi Hizbullah Brigades official Abu Ali Al-Askari announced that his group is working to arm operatives in Jordan. Iraqi MP Ali Fadhlallah, who belongs to the Hizbullah Brigades' political party, admitted that the group aims to establish a militia in Jordan that will also assist in action against the U.S. Fadhlallah said that "Jordan is very important to the resistance axis" and that the group aims to "activate the dead front in Jordan so that it supports the factions in Palestine." It has been reported that, since October 7, Jordanian authorities have foiled several attempts by Iraqi militants to infiltrate Iraqi territory as part of aid convoys for the Palestinians.[63]