Russia This Week is a weekly review by the MEMRI Russian Media Studies Project, covering the latest Russia-related news and analysis from media in Russia, the Caucasus, Central Asia, and Eastern Europe.
Collage Of The Week
(Source: Trueinform.ru)
In The News:
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Russia-China Relations
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Russia-US Relations
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Russia-Ukraine Relations
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Domestic Policy: Preparing For The Election Of Governors In The Fall; Zhirinovsky Recommends Restoring Exile To Siberia
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Economics: Russian Economy In The First Quarter Of The Fiscal Year; How Russian Families Evaluate Their Financial Situation; Debt Load Increases:
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News In Brief: Russia-Iran Relations; Russia-Venezuela Relations; Arctic
Russia-China Relations
(Source: Kremlin.ru)
In the midst of a major uptick in the US-China trade war, Chinese President Xi Jinping will visit Russia on June 5-7 and will take part in the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum. During the visit, Xi and Russian President Vladimir Putin will sign a number of important agreements. The two countries’ leaders will also take part in a gala event in the Bolshoi Theater dedicated to 70 years of diplomatic relations between Russia and China.
(Tass.com, May 29, 2019)
China Is More Dependent On Cooperation With Russia On International Matters Than The Other Way Around
Russian expert Vasily Kashin wrote an analysis on Russia-China relations, stating that bilateral relations between the two countries are stable and steady:
"With every year, China has accounted for an increasingly significant share of Russia's foreign trade. Each year, the two countries have moved slightly forward in their military and political cooperation. Now China is Russia's second largest trading partner after the European Union. It is also Russia's most trusted partner among major powers in defense and security.
"Starting in the late 1990s, the Western approach to Russian-Chinese relations was to ignore the significance of this partnership in principle. The relationship was described as a naive tactical move by Moscow and Beijing in the hope of strengthening their positions in dialogue with the United States. Their partnership was said to lack any solid basis, especially economically.
"It is now clear that ignoring the nascent Russian-Chinese partnership was not the best strategy for the United States even in the mid-to-late 1990s.
"While Russian-Chinese trade was insignificant, Russia during that period helped China make an unprecedented military industrial breakthrough, leapfrogging one or even two generations in military equipment.
"As a result, the early 2010s saw China's rebirth as a great military power. Recognizing this fact, US military and defense industry planning had to turn predominantly anti-China in orientation. Russian-Chinese defense industry cooperation played an important role in the alignment of forces in Asia and in the world, which was Moscow's greatest contribution to the development of a real multipolar order.
By the 2010s, it was no longer possible to ignore the significance of Russian-Chinese relations. So denial gave way to recognition of the partnership between Moscow and Beijing as a fact of life, but still nothing to worry about as it would not last long. 'I see little in the long term that aligns Russia and China,' US Secretary of Defense James Mattis said.
Sooner or later, such factors as 'Chinese economic and demographic expansion into Siberia and the Russian Far East,' 'rivalry in Central Asia' and, finally, the fact that the two neighboring countries 'would probably see each other as a threat,' especially considering the 'burdensome historical legacy of bilateral relations,' were expected to lead to conflicts and the collapse of relations…
"The last stage of denial about Russian-Chinese relations is the idea of Russia becoming China's 'junior partner,' forced to follow in the wake of Chinese politics and 'play second fiddle.' Such a position would sooner or later become unbearable for Russia, which has been a great power throughout its history, and would lead to the collapse of the partnership. All they have to do to bring this about is remind Russia as often as possible that it is a 'junior partner' now.
"There is one small problem with this approach – it is impossible to justify. All the evidence sounds naïve and childish and largely irrelevant to the essence of the matter: Chinese GDP is seven times larger than Russia's; China accounts for about 15 percent of Russian foreign trade, and Russia, for less than 2 percent of China's, etc.
"But, whenever we talk about alliances, equal or unequal, we are dealing with political, not economic categories. It is more about one side of an unequal alliance having asymmetric leverage over the other's policies.
"That leverage can result from one of the parties' economic, political, military, or sometimes technological dependence on the other.
"A large GDP is not the same thing as political weight or influence. You cannot tell others, 'Look at our huge GDP! Kneel, you scum!' This will not have the desired effect.
"What asymmetric leverage does China have to pressure Russia? From an economic standpoint, this usually means debt. For example, debt leverage turned the United States into an influential player in Europe even after the First World War and ensured its dominance after the Second World War. Relying on this leverage, the United States forced its real, rather than imaginary, junior partners in Europe to abandon the fight for their colonial empires.
"China does not have any effective debt instruments to pressure Russia, and the Russian government is careful that China does not get any. Russia occupies one of the last places among large economies in terms of its public debt to GDP ratio…
"Finally, in the sphere of international politics, Russia generally remains a more active and influential player than China. Despite the declared transition to 'great power diplomacy,' the Chinese foreign policy system remains cumbersome and hardly capable of acting in conditions of risk and rapid change. Russia and China often have coordinated positions on international issues. But in this duo, China plays the leading role only on problems in the immediate vicinity of its own borders, such as the situation around North Korea. Russia's role is usually more important and active in dealing with international issues in other parts of the world.
"The situation around Venezuela is indicative: although Russia's economic interests there are far smaller than China's, it plays a much more important political role in the diplomatic process.
"It looks like China is more dependent on cooperation with Russia on international matters than the other way around.
"It would be wrong to idealize Russian-Chinese relations. Russia and China have their own points of contention, and there may be ups and downs in their cooperation. But it is clear that their relationship does not fit the artificial concepts based on simplistic ideas about Russian politics and economics."
(Valdaiclub.com, May 23, 2019)
(Source: Inosmi.ru)
Russian Expert Maslov: Russia Has Always Been More Open To China Than China Has Been To Russia
Commenting about Xi's visit to Russia, Alexey Maslov, Head of the School of Asian Studies at the Higher School of Economics, stressed that Russia has always been more open to China than China has been to Russia. "That was particularly evident after the 2014 events, after which Russia declared a turn eastward. However, China failed to become an important partner in import substitution, while investment cooperation was not very extensive as well. So, Xi’s planned visit is a positive sign, but don't delude yourself. It is not improbable that only ‘old’ issues like energy resources with a discussion of their volumes and prices will be raised during the visit. One can judge the results by the volume of actual deals," the expert stressed.
(Tass.com, May 30, 2019)
A View From Ukraine on Russia-China Relations
Sergei Korsunsky, a Ukrainian diplomat, belittles the friendship between Russia and China:
"It is hard to find new colorful description other than those employed by official sources in Moscow and Beijing to glorify relations between the Chinese People's Republic and Moscow. This is the single most tightest, reliable and durable partnership, indestructible friendship, and mutual understanding on the level of ideal family spouses. One can point out to the uninitiated observer that we are dealing with a realist strategic alliance of the second economy in the world with a practically underdeveloped and unsettled resource based territory. In reality they do not like the fierce and unyielding 'Chinese Communists' in Moscow, who contrary to tumultuous announcements and promises are in no hurry to invest in joint projects and instead have practically absorbed Siberia and the Far East.
"In normal circumstances the Chinese threat would have pushed Moscow to draw close to the West (for the sake of balance). However, the Kremlin's imperial aspirations, the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbass have made this rapprochement impossible. As a result Putin has no other way out but to make friends with Xi Jinping and sooner or later agree to the role of the 'younger brother'.
"In Beijing they do not fear Russia's military power at all. The aggression against Ukraine has deprived Moscow of freedom of maneuver and this situation is easily read in Beijing. Soon Xi Jinping will journey to the St. Petersburg Economic Forum and will deliver an address there. Afterwards he will visit Bishkek, where an SCO summit will take place. Later he is awaited in Tadzhikistan. Everywhere he will talk about the need for cooperation, inclusivity, and mutual benefit. It cannot be negated that the CPR and Russia have common interests antagonistic to US interests for example in Iran and Venezuela. But one shouldn't be fooled by this. Russia for China is a source of raw materials, an expanse for development and the possibility of political maneuver. China for Russia is an attempt to show the West that it has an alternative and some political support at the UN and other international fora."
(Segodnya.ua, May 30, 2019)
Read More:
- A festive ceremony marked the occasion of the coupling of the Russian and Chinese parts of a bridge across the Amur river. (Gazeta.ru, May 31, 2019; read the full article)
- China and Russia to reinforce ties with cross-border highway bridge. (Scmp.com, June 1, 2019; read the full article)
- China looks to Russia, Central Asia for support amid tensions with US. (Scmp.com, May 28, 2019; read the full article)
- The US sanctions and tariffs spree is drawing Russia and China closer together, providing new opportunities for the development of bilateral trade in the agricultural and energy fields, Chinese scholars say, stressing that the countries' economies complement each other. (Sputniknews.com, June 1, 2019; read the full article)
- See MEMRI Special Dispatch No. 8099, Russian Media Outlet Gazeta.ru: US-China Trade War Will Bring Down Russian Economy, June 2, 2019.
Russia-US Relations
Kremlin Dismisses Pentagon Accusations That Russia Broke Nuke Test Ban
Russian Presidential Spokesman Dmitry Peskov has declined to comment on remarks by Director of the US Defense Intelligence Agency, Robert Ashley Jr., who claimed that Russia was ‘probably’ conducting low-yield nuclear tests.
"No, I could not [comment on that statement] I don’t know what it is based on. Besides, several answers have already been given by our Foreign Ministry," the Kremlin spokesman said. Peskov also called on reporters to refer to the Russian Foreign Ministry’s answers.
(Tass.com, May 30, 2019)
Tit For Tat: Putin Introduces Bill On Suspension of INF Treaty With US to State Duma
Russian President Vladimir Putin introduced a bill on the suspension of the INF Treaty in the State Duma. The first reading is scheduled for June 18. Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergey Ryabkov will present he bill.
Watch the video.
Russia-Ukraine Relations
(Source: Wikipedia)
Writing in Kommersant, the journalist Victor Loshak criticized the Russian government for refusing the decision by the UN Court of Maritime Law in Hamburg ordering the release of the Ukrainian sailors detained after the Sea of Azov incident. Russia's response was to prolong their arrest.
Loshak wrote:
"Let us just say that Ukraine learned to exploit our total intransigence towards peace…
"I am not talking of the absurdity of this policy from a human and practical viewpoint but how by releasing the twenty-year-old lads to mothers and wives (who by the way are actually residents of the Russian speaking part of Ukraine) would we undermine Russian greatness in the least? …
"Fifty-six percent of Ukraine's residents favor peace with Russia. It is hard to understand why we do not embark on some visible dialogue with that part of the Ukrainian population. Moreover, Russia itself is more than tired of the confrontation with Ukraine. On both fronts, Donbass has demonstrated to all, what war and the inability to negotiate brings. The number of war's beneficiaries is minimal by comparison with those for whom what has transpired between our countries it unprofitable economically, and from humanitarian and civic perspectives. People do not expect frowning faces and astonishing decisions but ideas and steps towards peace." (Kommersant.ru, May 30, 2019)
Domestic Policy
Preparing For The Election Of Governors In The Fall
"[On May 29,] the poll data on [voter] preferences for the fall governors' elections were published. All reports provide a highly favorable outlook for incumbent candidates: it looks as though they will be go through [already] in the first round. However, four problematic regions have already been identified, where all available administrative resources will be thrown - St. Petersburg, Sakhalin, Volgagrad and Vologda. Administrative resources implies that the most severe pressure will be applied on any alternative candidates [...] who may be able to attract the protest vote. Polls have shown that the election of governors from the regime is certain only when the field is completely secured. It is unknown what will happen in case there is at least someone who is less disgusting than those who are strongly pushed by the Kremlin. Actually, the main efforts of the technologists will be directed in this direction - to pick up 'competitors' that will look even worse, and knock down all the others while they are still on the approach path.
"The regime's internal policy remains the same - the lid of the boiling pot will be kept even more tightly closed. No [safety] valves, no venting of steam - the authorities quite soberly evaluate their miserable ability to control the release of discontent as non-existent. Therefore only pressure remains. This doesn't resemble a strategy at all, but purely a tactic which adheres to the rule: 'we must get through the night.'
"Such a policy can lead to curious results: in troubled regions, protests will assume new forms, and the authorities, concentrating only on them, may fail to address the situation in other regions that seem to have a relatively high potential for protests. It should not be forgotten that the authorities themselves generate motives for protest, as happened in Ekaterinburg, and besides, there is also the factor of the fierce struggle by criminal clans over shrinking resources of food. Therefore, the possibility of 'mini-Maidans' at the regional level should not be excluded.
"In general, the factor of intra-elite warfare gradually is becoming increasingly significant. This fact can be assessed by an increasingly large-scale anti-corruption struggle, which, in a mafia-state, is just a tool for settling accounts among the various criminal communities in power. Any activity for fostering 'Maidans' and 'color revolutions', in Russia are traditionally associated with the malicious participation of a somewhat abstract West, but the basic contradictions that can cause micro-and macro-Maidans are strongly internal in nature. As a rule, [criminal] clans and groups, who have lost out in the cadre war are behind their organization, [...]. In this regard, surprises from defeated criminal communities can become a very unpleasant discovery for the central government, even when everything seems to be under control and calm."
(El-murid.livejournal.com, May 30, 2019)
Zhirinovsky Recommends Restoring Exile To Siberia
The Russian politician and leader of the LDPR party Vladimir Zhirinovsky recommends restoring exile to Siberia as a form of punishment. "We recommend restoring such a form of punishment as exile – this is not deprivation of freedom in the full sense but at the same time it is a serious limitation because a person is forced to leave the city and tear himself from his customary way of life."
However Zhirinovsky was alarmed by the low rate of acquittals in Russian trials. The acquittal rate was 0.2% compared with 20% globally. "Why are we running half the country through the prisons? Locking up behind bars should only be for the murderers, rapists, drug dealers, big time fraudsters and thieves; on the rest punishment should be imposed without deprivation of freedom.
(Ura.ru, May 29, 2019)
Economics
Russian Economy In The First Quarter Of The Fiscal Year
Gazeta.ru published an article commenting on the provisional report of Rosstat (Russia's State Statistical Service) on the state of the Russian economy in the first quarter of the fiscal year. Gazeta.ru reported that the Russian GDP grew after three months by 0.5% in toto. The experts did not nourish illusions, but reality turned out worse than the official prognoses. The Russian Ministry of Economic Development forecast 0.8% growth, and the Central Bank gave a prognosis of 1-1.5%. Gazeta.ru commented that even without the Rosstat report, it is clear that the Russian economy has hardly progressed recently.
There is another bad thing. Russian experts are now talking of a recession that is a real slowing of economic growth. The generally accepted scheme for recognizing the fact of recession is if economic growth is slowing 2 or even more 3 consecutive quarters. This is now technically officially a recession. Further on the crisis phase of depression arrives.
(Gazeta.ru, May 28, 2019)
How Russian Families Evaluate Their Financial Condition
|
Category |
2017 |
2018 |
|
Do not have enough money even to eat |
0.8% |
0.7% |
|
Enough money to eat, but find it difficult to buy clothing and pay for housing services |
18% |
14.9% |
|
Enough money for food and clothing, but cannot allow themselves to buy durable goods |
49.8% |
48.2% |
|
Enough money for food, clothing and durable goods but cannot allow themselves to buy a car, an apartment or a dacha |
27.4% |
32.3% |
|
Means suffice for purchasing anything they consider necessary |
3% |
3.2% |
(Source: Russian Federal State Statistics Service (Rosstat) cited in Rbc.ru, May 28, 2019)
Debt Load Increases
Russian families increasingly spend their available savings and take credit
The share of spent savings and borrowed funds rose from 7.8% in Q4 2017 to 11% in Q4 2018.
Hence, the share of monetary income in the structure of disposable resources (this includes salary, benefits and compensation payments) declined from 89.3% to 86.5%
BCS Financial Services' top analyst Anton Pokatovich commented: "This model of behavior can be characterized as a model of forced consumption that forces people to lose their savings for the purpose of sustaining a necessary standard of living."
(Rbc.ru, May 28, 2019)
News In Brief:
Russia-Iran Relations
- Bloomberg published a report, citing its sources, which says that Russia has rejected a request from Iran to buy S-400 missile defense systems amid concerns that the move would deteriorate the situation in the Middle East. The next day, Kremlin spokesman Dmitry Peskov said he did not have information that Russia had allegedly refused to supply S-400 air defense systems to Iran. (Sputniknews.com, May 31, 2019; read the full article)
Russia-Venezuela Relations
- Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov on June 3 will hold talks with his Colombian counterpart Carlos Holmes Trujillo, who is paying a working visit to Moscow on June 3-9. (Tass.com, June 2, 2019; read the full article. See also Tass.com, June 3, 2019; read the full article)
Arctic
- Russia launched a nuclear-powered icebreaker on Saturday, part of an ambitious program to renew and expand its fleet of the vessels in order to improve its ability to tap the Arctic's commercial potential. (Themoscowtimes.com, May 25, 2019; read the full article)
